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“In human behavior there was always uncertainty and risk. The goal of the 
Oakland front office was simply to minimize the risk. Their solution wasn’t 
perfect, it was just better than the hoary alternative, rendering decisions by gut 
feeling.” 
Lewis (2011 p.136) 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite football being deeply entrenched in Scottish culture it is under-
researched from a business perspective. This research develops a conceptual 
framework that views professional football clubs from a number of different 
perspectives. It draws on strategic management literature since this views the 
firm as the intersection between internal competence, customer perception and 
competition within an industry. A review of previous sports business research 
highlighted five main themes that were used to create a structure for the 
analysis: on-field performance, attendance, finance, the playing squad and the 
manager. These themes were used as frames to view the firms within the 
industry from a number of different perspectives.  Each frame allows a different 
aspect of the firm to be considered singly in turn and then collectively to develop 
a deeper understanding of the existing frames in use within the industry. 
 
The research is based on a pragmatic philosophy that allows mixed methods to 
be combined to provide both an objective and subjective view of the industry. 
The subjective view was drawn from five interviews with senior figures within 
Scottish professional football. These participants were from a number of 
different roles and organisations within the industry to provide a balance of 
experiences. The views were triangulated with a descriptive analysis of 
secondary data from a number of industry sources to establish patterns within 
and between these frames. A peer group of six clubs was selected as they 
competed in the Scottish Premier League in each of the seasons within an 
eleven-year period (2000-2011). The peer group clubs selected were: 
Aberdeen, Dundee United, Heart of Midlothian (Hearts), Hibernian, Kilmarnock 
and Motherwell. By focussing on a small group of clubs with a similar on-field 
record a broad study across the five frames could be carried out in detail 
without the findings being influenced by the impact of relegation to a lower 
division or sustained participation in European football.  
 
Within each of the original five frames a number of sub-components were 
identified and linked to the framework; this expanded the content to reflect the 
findings of this project. There appeared to be little link between on-field 
performance and attendance although progress to the later stages of cup 
 
 
competitions allowed clubs to connect with fans who do not regularly attend. 
The relationship between a club’s income and wage bill should be expanded to 
include interest repayments since this expenditure can be used to highlight 
future financial problems caused by increased debt levels. Although all of the 
interview participants spoke with pride of the players that had progressed from 
the club’s youth academy to success at the highest level the peer group clubs 
only produced one player each season that played more than ten matches for 
the club. Almost half of the players signed from the youth academy left the club 
without playing for the 1st Team. The importance of the relationship between the 
manager and club chairman was highlighted, although the speed with which 
managers were appointed suggests that little consideration was given to this 
before offering a contract. Once appointed there appeared to be little clarity 
over the job description and areas of responsibility. Several of the interviewees 
brought experience from other businesses to football but admitted that short-
term decision making and entrenched behaviour made change difficult.  
 
The conclusion of the research is that by taking a firm-wide view of the club, 
longer-term decisions can be taken within football. Player development and 
supporter relationships were both identified as long-term processes that are 
impacted by the current short-termism. With greater role clarity for managers 
and a mixture of short and long-term objectives those involved in the industry 
are more likely to have opportunities to learn from experience and performance, 
across the different frames, will improve as a result.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background to the study  
 
“The Scottish psyche is infatuated with football. It is a crucial component 
of our national life, it is part of our very identity, and we simply cannot, 
as a nation, allow football to wither and die.” 
Reid 2005 p.18 
This quote from Harry Reid’s book, which is part reminiscence and part hope for 
the future, highlights the importance of football to Scotland as a nation and as 
such underlines why, as an industry, it is important as an area for academic 
research. Throughout the project the author has met many within the industry in 
search of new thinking and ideas that can help those making the decisions 
within clubs in a rapidly changing environment. This project explores those 
ideas, the impediments to progress and the realities of running a professional 
football business in Scotland at the outset of the 21st Century.  
The genesis of this research project can be traced back to March 15th 2004. It 
was the day after the Scottish League Cup and the author spent time with a 
close personal friend, who happened to be one of the losing team. The 
discussion centred on the problems in the lead up to the match. The loss could 
not be explained away by bad luck or poor refereeing but the conversation 
highlighted a number of decisions in the lead up to the game that impacted on 
preparation, which resonated with the author’s own experience in the IT 
industry. Projects failed not because of a lack of effort or of resources but 
because of poor planning and inadequate use of resources. The conversations 
have continued as the player moved to a life after football and the author 
became more involved in coaching the University 1st Team. The coaching 
experience helped the author clearly distinguish between football as a sport and 
football as a business.   
Porter (1991) suggests that understanding the reasons why firms are successful 
whilst others fail is central to the academic study of strategy. To develop an 
understanding of those reasons demands a holistic view of the firm, the industry 
and wider social environment in which it operates rather than focus on one 
particular aspect, such as operations or business processes. Rather than focus 
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on strategy in a broad manner seeking generalisation that could be applied to 
any business, this thesis focuses on full-time professional football within 
Scotland as an industrial context. The research is not about supporters, 
matches or tactics; it treats players and managers as employees and financial 
assets. Clubs are firms within an industry and fans are paying customers. The 
different components of the firm are drawn together to form a series of 
complementary lenses through which the firm, and by extension the industry in 
which it operates, can be viewed.  The term frame is used throughout the thesis 
to describe the process of individuals selecting an appropriate mental model to 
make sense of the current situation (Bolman & Deal, 2014).To view an industry, 
often built on passion, in this way requires a certain detachment for the 
researcher. Porter (1991) argued that researchers should create frameworks, to 
reflect the complexity of the firm or industry, rather than develop predictive 
models that simplify reality into a few key variables. To understand the 
complexities of an industry the views of participants were sought and balanced 
by a numerical analysis. The thesis draws on research into the business of 
sports to help define a range of specific lenses that can be used as a basis to 
view the industry from different, but complementary, perspectives.  
With Porter’s (1991) suggestion in mind, this thesis will present Scottish football 
as an industry in flux and the output of the thesis is a framework that illustrates 
the internal tensions that exist within the clubs. The use of a framework has the 
potential to facilitate discussion amongst the participants to establish which 
factors are deemed most important at the point in time for the firm. The 
framework created within in this thesis will form the basis of ongoing 
discussions with those in the game in Scotland and further afield. 
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1.2 Research Aim & Objectives 
 
The aim of this research is: 
To develop a conceptual framework that combines a broad range of 
strategic factors to allow new frames to evolve within the business 
management of professional football clubs in Scotland to encourage the 
adoption of a longer-term view of company development within the 
industry.  
To achieve this aim the following objectives will be met: 
Develop a literature review that draws on strategic management and 
how the process of strategy is impacted by the ‘frames’ that act as filters 
as options are developed. A secondary literature review will discuss the 
academic literature focussed on the business of professional sport. This 
literature will be used to develop a conceptual framework that will 
structure the research project.  
Research the current dominant frames within Scottish football through a 
series of interviews with industry figures. The content of these 
unstructured interviews will be used to develop an understanding of the 
industry including the elements previously identified by academic 
literature as well as introducing concepts that have not previously been 
researched.  
These frames will be further explored through an abductive analysis of 
secondary data currently available on Scottish football clubs and their 
players. Working within the frames highlighted in the literature review 
this analysis will develop industry baselines over an eleven-season 
period for a group of clubs that form a subset of the professional football 
industry in Scotland.  
Based on the analysis of the primary and secondary data, develop a 
conceptual framework for the professional football industry in Scotland 
to develop short and long term strategic management decisions.  
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
 
To meet these objectives the thesis is structured as shown in Figure 1. 
Following the introduction a brief industry context is given that demonstrates 
how Scottish professional football links into the worldwide organisation of the 
sport.  
Introduction
Industry Context
Literature Review
Research Methods
Analysis: 
Exploring Existing Frames
Findings: 
Identity the Components
Conclusion: 
Reframing Scottish Football
Key Findings
Contribution to Knowledge
Contribution to Practice 
Building the Framework
Identify the existing frames from 
interviews and descriptive statistics
Philosophical perspective
Interview design
Database design
Business Strategy
Frames
Sports Business 
Defining Scottish Football
Background
Research Justification
Aim & Objectives
Contribution
Key Findings
Contribution to Knowledge
Contribution to Practice 
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of Thesis. Created by the Author 
 
The literature review begins with a discussion of business strategy research 
with a focus on the lack of clear definitions of the terms used and the different 
views of the subject. Business strategy literature is used as it takes a ‘whole 
firm’ view of the club rather than focus on specific areas such as finance, 
operations or HR. The links between the firms’ competencies, customers and 
competitors are explored to give a context of the firm, internally and externally.  
Underpinning this range of views on how strategy is created and implemented is 
a discussion of the mental models that frame an individual’s decisions. These 
frames can limit the data collected to shape the decisions made. To enable new 
thinking in an industry the existing frames need to be identified before changes 
can be made.  
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The literature of sport as a business is also reviewed to identify the main areas 
within previous research to provide a scaffold around which the collection and 
analysis of data can take place within this project.  
The chapter on research methods explores pragmatism as a philosophy that 
supports mixed methods research and encourages the researcher to explore 
the problem in a number of different ways. The research uses qualitative data 
gathered through unstructured interviews with industry participants and 
descriptive statistical analysis of secondary quantitative data to establish 
patterns over the review period.  
The analysis chapter is structured around the themes identified in the sports 
industry literature and combines the primary data collected in a series of 
interviews with an analysis of secondary data from the industry. Each theme is 
used to analyse the comments made by each of the interviewees to identify 
consist themes or areas of disagreement. The secondary data analysis is used 
to explore the industry using more subjective data to determine the extent to 
which the views expressed are consistent with quantifiable data 
The findings chapter uses the detail from the finding, building on the frames 
highlighted in the literature review, to identify the components to be included in 
the conceptual framework. The five main themes are expanded to include 
detailed components that can be quantified from existing data to build a 
conceptual framework that can be used to examine a football club through 
different frames. 
The conclusions chapter combines the components identified in the findings 
and constructs a conceptual framework that allows a professional football club 
to be viewed from a number of different perspectives and to suggest how these 
components may influence each other.  
The final section highlights the key findings and offers contribution in the 
academic study of strategy and the business of sport as well as the contribution 
to practice.  
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Chapter 2: Industry Context 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to define the industry context of the research 
project, which is focussed on a small peer group of similar professional football 
clubs based in Scotland. The selection criteria used to create the peer group 
are discussed in the research methods chapter, however an explanation of the 
context used by the author to frame this project will allow the reader to 
understand the terms used throughout the analysis.  
2.1 The Global Organisation of Football   
 
Football as a sport, and as an industry, is organised hierarchically at a global 
level (see Figure 2a) this project is focused on professional football in Scotland. 
In 2006 there were 6,600 football clubs, at all levels, in Scotland with over 
420,000 registered players (FIFA, 2006). The author’s focus is on those clubs 
competing professionally at the highest level.  
 
Africa North & Central 
America
Asia Oceania Europe South America
      
 
Scotland
Scottish 
Premier League
Scottish 
Football League
 
Governing Body
Continental 
Confederation 
National 
Association
Competition 
Organiser for 
Professional 
Clubs
1 league 
division of 12 
teams
3 league 
divisions of 10 
teams each  
Figure 2a: The Organisation of World Football. Created by the Author 
 
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is the sport’s 
governing body that approve the Laws of the Game applied throughout the 
world. FIFA also organises the various World Cup competitions between 
national representative teams, for men and women at various age levels. There 
are six continental federations which govern the sport under FIFA regulations 
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and organise the World Cup qualification competitions and regional international 
competitions, such as the European Championships. Each country member of 
FIFA, through a national association, has responsibility for the implementation 
of the laws and regulations set down by FIFA at a local level. In Scotland the 
Scottish Football Association (SFA) ensures that all matches comply with the 
laws, oversees discipline for players and officials who break those laws and 
manages the registration of players at member clubs. The SFA also selects the 
Scotland national team and organises the annual Scottish Cup knock-out 
competition.  
2.2 The Organisation of Football in Scotland  
 
Within Scotland there were previously two bodies that organised club 
competitions, the Scottish Premier League (SPL) and the Scottish Football 
League (SFL). These merged in 2013 to form the Scottish Premier Football 
League (SPFL) but the previous competition structures have been retained, with 
the forty-two senior clubs competing in four divisions based on the previous 
season’s performance. The teams in each division play each other three or four 
times each season, based on competition rules. Three points are awarded to 
the winning team and one is awarded to each team if the scores are level at the 
end of the match. A team’s position in the league is based on the number of 
points gained in the season. The team with the lowest number of points drops a 
level, or is relegated in football parlance, at the end of the season and is 
replaced by the team with the highest number of points in the next division 
down, known as promotion. The SFL organised the Scottish League Cup for the 
forty-two senior clubs each season.  
This research project focusses on SPL clubs over the period between August 
2000 and May 2011. During that time eighteen different teams competed within 
the SPL. The breakdown of these clubs is shown in Figure 2b indicating the 
number of seasons that the teams played in the competition. Within this period 
Scottish football was dominated by Celtic and Rangers, known collectively in 
Scottish football as the Old Firm, with one of the two winning the league every 
season. The Old Firm also won nine out of eleven Scottish Cups and nine out of 
eleven League Cups within that period.  
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Figure 2b: Seasons in the SPL. Created by the Author 
 
The Old Firm also dominated Scottish football financially over that period. The 
six clubs which participated in the SPL every season had an average annual 
turnover of £6.3m. In comparison, Rangers’ average turnover for the period was 
£51.6m and Celtic generated £63.1m. This highlights the financial disparity 
within Scottish football and some of the challenges facing the other SPL clubs 
trying to compete as equals on the field.  
2.3 An Overview of the Scottish Football Industry 2000-2011 
 
The 11-season period reviewed was a turbulent period for Scottish football. 
Season 2000-01 was the first year of an expanded SPL with an increase from 
ten to twelve teams with the league being split into two for the final five matches 
(The Herald 1999b). The split was introduced to reduce the number of 
meaningless mid-table matches towards the end of the season by introducing 
the incentive of a top-6 finish (The Herald 2000c). Neither change was without 
controversy. Some argued for a fourteen or sixteen team league (The Herald 
1998b; The Herald 1999a) whilst others thought that the split was unnecessarily 
confusing (The Herald 2000c). 
The league was to be expanded to twelve teams by the top two teams in the 
SFL joining automatically with a play-off match between the bottom SPL team 
and the third ranked side in the SFL(The Herald 2000b). Aberdeen, who 
finished bottom of the SPL, were reprieved when third-placed Falkirk were ruled 
ineligible for SPL membership as their stadium did not meet the required 
standard of 10,000-capacity all-seater stadium (The Herald 2000b). Falkirk 
Club
Total 
Seasons 
in SPL
00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11
Aberdeen 11 SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL
Celtic 11 SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL
Dundee 5 SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL
Dundee United 11 SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL
Dunfermline 7 SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SFL SFL SFL SFL
Falkirk 5 SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SFL
Gretna 1 SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SPL SFL SFL SFL
Hamilton 3 SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SPL SPL SPL
Hearts 11 SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL
Hibernian 11 SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL
Inverness CT 11 SFL SFL SFL SFL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SFL SPL
Kilmarnock 11 SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL
Livingston 5 SFL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL
Motherwell 11 SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL
Partick Th 2 SFL SFL SPL SPL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL
Rangers 11 SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL
St Johnstone 4 SPL SPL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SPL SPL
St Mirren 6 SPL SFL SFL SFL SFL SFL SPL SPL SPL SPL SPL
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explored several ground-share options (The Herald 2000a) but these too were 
rejected after a vote by SPL members, including Aberdeen (The Herald 2000b). 
Falkirk were again excluded from the top flight in 2003, as their stadium still did 
not meet SPL requirements, so Motherwell escaped relegation (The Herald 
2003b). In 2004 Inverness Caledonian Thistle were admitted to the SPL after 
the required stadium capacity was reduced to 6,000 seats (The Herald 2004d) 
and a temporary ground-share with Aberdeen was permitted (The Herald 
2004e). The rule changes were passed after two votes and a ruling from the 
Court of Session to state that the first vote was invalid (The Herald 2004f).  
Clubs needed to achieve on-field success to be promoted but the stadium 
requirements for membership set a financial hurdle as well. Any changes to 
rules required a vote by the SPL members including the club who would benefit 
most from maintaining the status quo. 
 
When the SPL expanded in 2000 any decisions made by the twelve members 
clubs required an 11-1 voting majority (The Herald 2002i). This effectively 
meant that the Old Firm, by working together, could block any change not in 
their combined interest (The Herald 2001a). The problems caused by this came 
to a head in August 2002, during TV contract renegotiations, when the ten non-
Old Firm clubs submitted their intention to resign from the SPL at the end of a 
two-year notice period (The Herald 2002i). This mass resignation would have 
left Celtic and Rangers without fixtures as football’s governing body in England 
(The FA) had previously ruled that the Old Firm could not join either the 
Premiership or Championship (The Herald 2002g).The battle between the Old 
Firm and the other ten SPL clubs continued for six months until a number of 
changes were agreed, including the regulations voting to allow an 8-4 majority 
on future rule changes effectively ending the Old Firm embargo on legislation 
(The Herald 2003a). 
 
Income from TV coverage was a major factor throughout the review period. As 
the league expanded to twelve teams in season 2000-01, the SPL were part-
way through a four-year £45m contract with Sky to broadcast matches on pay-
per-view TV (The Herald 1998a). The SPL rejected an extension of the contact 
with the broadcaster as the member clubs explored the creation of their own TV 
channel (SPL TV) (The Herald 2002a). The disparity between the sums of 
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money invested by Sky in Scottish and English football made it hard for  SPL 
clubs to compete for players with even mid-level teams (The Herald 2001b). 
Although Celtic and Rangers were originally on board with the concept of SPL 
TV within months the Old Firm began to express doubts about the venture (The 
Herald 5/4/2002). With the SPL 11-1 majority regulation, so long as the Old 
Firm stuck together there appeared little the others could do to create the new 
venture (The Herald 2002d). As the Sky contract ran out, the SPL negotiated a 
two-year deal with the BBC for less money (see Table 2) forcing clubs to cut 
back the size of their playing squad (The Herald 2002b).  
Year 
Started  
Contract 
Length 
Broadcaster Contract 
Value 
Matches 
broadcast 
per season 
Value per 
Season 
1998 4 years Sky £45m 30 £11.25m 
2002 2 years BBC £15m 38 £7.5m 
2002 2 years Setanta £1.75m 10 £0.9m 
2004 4 years Setanta £35m 38 £8.75m 
2006 4 years Setanta £50m 60 £12.5m 
2008 4 years Setanta £125m 60 £31.25m 
2009 3 years Sky/ESPN £65m 60 £20m 
 
Table 2: SPL Broadcasting deals. Developed various articles retrieved from The Herald newspaper.  
 
The uncertainty caused by Celtic and Rangers exploration of playing in England 
had left Sky wary of investing heavily in a league that relied heavily on Old Firm 
matches to generate interest outside Scotland (The Herald 2002f). The collapse 
of ITV Digital (The Herald 2002c) meant the SPL had limited broadcast partners 
forcing them to accept the BBC deal despite the financial implications for 
member clubs (The Herald 2002j). 
Running parallel to the BBC contract in 2002 was a much smaller deal with the 
Irish broadcaster Setanta (The Herald 2002j). The relationship between the SPL 
and Setanta would continue to develop over the next seven years with 4-year 
contracts renewed after only two for more money (see Table 2) until the 
broadcaster went into administration in 2009 (The Herald 2009b). The SPL was 
forced to pay the member clubs £3m from its own reserves to meet the shortfall 
(The Herald 2009b). As was the case in 2002, the SPL would be required to 
seek a new broadcaster for less money (The Herald 2009c). The global 
recession had already limited sponsorship opportunities for clubs and the sale 
of season tickets dropped as fans adjusted to lower disposable income (The 
Herald 2009a).  
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Over the 11 season period covered by this project, four SPL entered 
administration: Motherwell (2002), Dundee (2003), Livingston (2004) and 
Gretna (2008).  
Motherwell were placed in administration, and put up for sale, by the chairman 
John Boyle, as the SPL TV project failed and the club lost its main sponsor (The 
Herald 2002e). Boyle was prepared to write off his own £11m investment in the 
club as he sought a buyer. No buyer was found and the club exited 
administration in March 2004 (The Herald 2004c). 
Dundee were placed in administration in November 2003 with debts of £20m 
(The Herald 2003d). Several years of over-spending on players’ wages finally 
took its toll at the club as an auditor’s report warned that a wage bill constituting 
154% of revenue was not sustainable (The Herald 2003c). Costs were cut 
immediately through redundancies, including several of the big name players 
(The Herald 2003d).   
Livingston entered administration in February 2004 under pressure from HBOS 
who held the club’s £10m debt (The Herald 2004a). As with Dundee, player cuts 
were made immediately, with six high earners made redundant and six others 
saw their wages halved (The Herald 2004b). The club was taken over by a 
consortium in May 2005 (The Herald 2005b).  
Gretna were admitted to the SFL in 2002 following the liquidation of 
Airdrieonians (The Herald 2002h). The club was taken over in 2003 by local 
businessman, Brooks Mileson, who invested in the club without expecting to 
see a financial return (The Herald 2005a). The club was promoted through the 
SFL in just three seasons and joined the SPL in season 2007/08 (The Herald 
2007). As the club struggled to adapt to life in the top division, the club was 
placed in administration in March 2008 after an illness hospitalised Mileson, the 
only authorised signatory in the club, so the club was unable to pay staff (The 
Herald 2008a). The SPL made emergency payments to the club to ensure that 
all fixtures could be fulfilled (The Herald 2008b) but the remaining players were 
made redundant the day after the season ended (The Herald 2008c). Gretna 
were originally relegated to the fourth-tier of Scottish football (The Herald 
2008d) but the club was wound up in June 2008 (The Herald 2008e). 
 
12 
 
This brief history of the SPL from 2000 to 2011 demonstrates that Scottish 
football, even at the highest level, is never too far from crisis although not all of 
them are self-inflicted. The global financial crisis had an impact on football clubs 
across the globe and the failure of Setanta and ITV Digital had an impact on the 
game in Scotland. This discussion of an industry in a prolonged state of flux 
underlines the need for a systematic study of clubs in Scotland to develop a 
better understanding of the issues faced and offer practitioners the opportunity 
to develop new mental models to assist in improved strategic decision-making.  
This project does not focus on the SPL as an entity but the focus is on the 
company management of clubs from a business strategy perspective. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this research project is to develop a conceptual framework that 
allows new frames to be identified within the Scottish Professional Football 
industry. The research is set within the academic context of strategic 
management as this wide body of literature considers the interaction of the 
constituent parts of firm, individuals, teams, departments or divisions. The firm 
is also considered as a single entity operating within an industry of competitors 
offering a range of similar products to customers.  
This literature review is split into two main sections; strategic management and 
the business of professional sports. The first section looks at the strategic 
management research as a broad topic with the different schools of thought 
compared and contrasted. Much of this literature looks at the firm as a single 
entity but the importance of the individual’s frame of reference is considered as 
frames establish what data is important and how it can be used to establish a 
strategic advantage within the industry.  
The second part of the literature review looks at the academic research that has 
been carried out in the business of professional sport. There are two main 
strands of work in this area: empirical studies that look at the impact of 
managerial change on on-field performance and conceptual frameworks that 
propose how the professional football industry could, or should, work.  
The conclusion of the literature review pulls together the frames identified in the 
previous sports research to create a structure for the findings and analysis 
sections rather than set specific questions to be answered.  
3.2 Strategic Management 
Porter (1991) suggests that the fundamental question of research into the 
strategic management of companies appears to be this: why do some 
companies do better than others? This gives a starting point for a wide-ranging, 
and at times conflicting, area of academic study.  
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3.2.1 Definitions of Strategic Management 
 
One of the few areas of agreement within the topic is that there is no agreed 
definition of the subject (Capon, 2008; Thompson & Martin, 2010). De Wit & 
Meyer (2004) suggest that to give a subject definition would be misleading as 
this would imply that there is agreement within the discipline.  
Some authors offer a rather vague ‘means to an end’ (Thompson & Martin, 
2010) or ‘unifying idea or goal’ (White, 2004 p.5) but this type of strategy is 
dismissed by Rumelt (2011) as ‘fluff’ (p. 37) and can lead to the creation of ‘bad 
strategy’ as there is no clear definition of the problem faced or link to action. 
Rumelt argues that:  
“The diagnosis for the situation should replace the overwhelming 
complexity of reality with a simpler story, a story that calls attention to its 
crucial aspects. This simplified model of reality allows one to make 
sense of the situation and engage in further problem solving.”  
Rumelt 2011 p.81 
This view suggests that the concept of strategy is to allow the decision-makers 
to focus on the key elements of the situation, which is likely to be highly 
complex (Bowman, 1998; Fitzroy & Hulbert, 2005; Miles & Snow, 2003) and 
begin to identify solutions that are linked to action (De Witt & Meyer, 2004; 
Segal-Horn, 1999). 
To allow the participants to simplify a complex situation, most definitions or 
frameworks make reference to internal capabilities (Barney & Hesterly, 2006; 
Capon, 2008; De Witt & Meyer, 2004; Fitzroy & Hulbert, 2005; Johnson, 
Scholes & Whittington, 2008; Miles & Snow, 2003) and the external 
environment (Capon, 2008; De Witt & Meyer, 2004; Fitzroy & Hulbert, 2005; 
Johnson, Scholes & Whittington, 2008; Miles & Snow, 2003; & Segal-Horn, 
1999).There is however some debate about whether the aim is to match internal 
capabilities with external changes (Haberberg & Rieple, 2008), to develop the 
capabilities requires to meet external demand (Fitzroy & Hulbert, 2005; 
Johnson, Scholes & Whittington, 2008) or to drive changes in consumer 
behaviour (Teece, 2010).  
In defining the external environment, some authors consider the importance of 
industry and competitors (Barney & Hesterly, 2006; Porter, 2004) although 
others do not define this clearly (Ansoff, 1977; Capon, 2008; Coulter, 2002). 
Other authors consider the role of stakeholders in setting expectations 
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(Haberberg & Rieple, 2008; Johnson, Scholes & Whittington, 2008) whilst 
others focus on the role of meeting customer expectations in defining strategy 
(Grant, 2013; Jacobs, Stayaert & Überbacher, 2013; Rumelt, Schendel & 
Teece, 1995).  Ohmae (1982) argues that the success of strategic management 
comes from balancing the needs of customers with the firm’s internal 
competence in relation to competitors which appears to be a specific blend of 
internal (competence), external (customer) and industry (competitor). The 
appeal of Ohmae’s definition is that it introduces the concept of balance but is 
more specific in what needs to be the focus of any firm: internal ability, the 
needs of customers and the challenge of competitors. This goes some way to 
answering Porter’s (1991) question: Why do some firms do better than others? 
They have the capabilities to meet the consumers’ needs better than others 
firms in the industry. This capability is not fixed: the needs of customers can 
shift and the industry does not remain static which leads onto a discussion of 
timescale. 
As well as these differences in viewpoint of the researchers on the interactions 
between internal capabilities and external factors there is the tension between 
the long and short term view of strategy (Dodd & Favarro, 2007). Some authors 
define strategy in terms of a long-term advantage in relation to competitors 
(Ansoff, 1980; Johnson, Scholes & Whittington, 2008; Pralahad & Hamel, 1990) 
although Hurst (2002) argues than whilst firms start off looking to the long-term 
they can lose their sense of purpose over time. Firms should take a long-term 
view of corporate planning but need to remain flexible enough to change their 
plans (Argenti, 1981) as the internal and external environment changes (Boddy, 
2008) and that some sense of direction is better than none (Bowman, 1998). 
Long-term growth remains key for the firm this achieved through a series of 
short-term decisions (Dodd & Favarro, 2007; Weiss, 1995) although decisions-
makers do need to remain cognisant that the short-term options selected can 
have hidden long-term implications (Senge, 2006). It has also been suggested 
that short-term success can postpone the need for long-term action (Joni & 
Beyer, 2010). As with the balance of internal capability with external 
environmental changes there appears to be no consensus on whether the long 
or short-term view takes precedence within the academic subject area and this 
dichotomy can create a tension within the topic.  
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3.2.2 Strategic Management Classifications 
 
Table 3.2a compares four of these studies (Chaffee, 1985; Mintzberg & Waters, 
1985; Mintzberg, 1987; Whittington, 1997) to establish any underlying trends 
within the groupings. Although each of the studies uses between three 
(Chaffee, 1985) and ten (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) categories to group the 
types of strategy development model identified there are two categories that 
appear in each study that can be grouped under the generic terms ‘Planned’ 
and ‘Developing’ created by the author to avoid overlap with the terms used by 
other authors. Planned changes are created as a logical series of steps to be 
followed from the decision point onwards. Developing changes can be seen as 
being more evolutionary and are developed in reaction to circumstance.  
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Author  Planned Developing Study type Other categories used in the study 
Chaffee, 
1985 
Linear Adaptive Distinct types of strategy 
that may be discreet, 
overlap or used 
sequentially.  
Interpretive A series of co-operative agreements between individuals who have 
choice. Leaders can shape the frames of participants rather than 
change the physical product. 
Mintzberg 
& Waters, 
1985 
Deliberate Emergent Spectrum of types from 
completely deliberate to 
entirely emergent.  
Planned  Strategies are created from formal plans with clear goals as set by 
senior management.  
Entrepreneurial  Ted to be driven by the vision of the central leader so can adapt to 
new opportunities. 
Ideological  Strategies are driven by a shared, central understanding of the firm. 
Umbrella Targets are set centrally but groups or individuals have freedom to 
respond to their own situation. 
Process Key decisions are taken by senior managers but others work within 
guidelines or structure.  
Unconnected  Bottom-up strategy with individuals taking action based on their own 
situation and judgement. 
Consensus Strategies emerge through discussion and shared understanding of 
the situation.  
Imposed Strategy is driven by external factors. 
Whittington 
1997 
Rational Processual Two by two matrix using 
outcomes (profit 
maximising to plural) and 
processes (deliberate to 
emergent) 
Evolutionary Markets not managers dictate success or failure. Managers can 
simply adjust to the environment the best they can. 
 
Systemic Strategies are created in a social structure that reflects the views of 
those involved in the process. 
Mintzberg, 
1987 
Plan Pattern Distinct forms that strategy 
may take within a firm 
although there appears to 
be some linked aspects. 
Ploy Actions taken by a firm to deliberate unsettle or mislead a 
competitor. 
Position Firm makes a strategic choice in relation to the marketplace within 
which it operates, e.g. low cost or luxury brand 
Perspective View of the firm taken by internal stakeholders that generates a 
strong culture that drives decisions.  
 
Table 3.2a: Planned and Developing Classifications of Strategy. Created by the Author 
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Of these four studies (Chaffee, 1985; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Mintzberg, 
1987; Whittington, 1997), only that by Whittington (1997) uses a conceptual 
framework (see Figure 3.2a) to illustrate the difference in the strategic 
perspectives.  
Profit-maximising
Plural
Deliberate Emergent
Processes
Outcomes
Evolutionary
(Fatalistic)
Classical
(Rational)
Processual
(Pragmatic)
Systemic
(Relativistic)
 
Figure 3.2a: Generic Perspectives on Strategy. Whittington, 1991 p.3 
 
Whittington (1997) argues that by establishing the organisational outcomes and 
the types of processes used to create the strategy the perspective taken can be 
plotted on the matrix. Outcomes can be rated from ‘profit-maximising’, where 
achieving the highest possible financial reward is the aim of the firm, to ‘plural’ 
where the firm takes a wider view. This type of firm may look to invest heavily in 
Research and Development or for the organisation to be a not-for-profit or 
social enterprise. The vertical axis considers how fixed the organisational 
processes are and uses the same terms as Mintzberg & Waters (1985) 
‘deliberate’ and ‘emergent’ to make this distinction. One other difference 
between Whittington’s and others’ work (1997) is that he advocates a position of 
systemic strategy development where more deliberate mechanisms are used 
but that firms should seek more than high profits. The other studies (Chaffee, 
1985; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Mintzberg, 1987) argue that a combination of 
perspectives can be used where appropriate and that no one approach is better 
than the others although Whittington (1997) does concede that managers 
should choose their own position based on the data and analysis that is 
available to them and the stability of the market within which they operate. 
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Chaffee (1985) argues that leaders tend to shape the frames used by other 
participants whereas Whittington (1997) recognises that ‘processualists’ can, at 
times, be quite cynical and this can be healthy for a firm as they challenge 
assumptions made. This ability to see a situation in a new way can be defined 
as reframing (Bolman & Deal, 2014) and the importance to the process of 
strategy creation is dealt with later in this literature review.  
A third attempt by Mintzberg to classify the different schools of thought in 
strategy development, in conjunction with others (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & 
Lampel, 2009), is used in Table 3.2b to classify a range of strategic 
management literature used to underpin this research. Using the wide range of 
strategic management research available, the authors argue that each school of 
strategic management thought gives part of the wider definition that is missing 
(Capon 2008; De Witt & Meyer, 2004; Thompson & Martin, 2010) but they can 
to be used in conjunction to establish the full picture of what strategy is and how 
it is developed in practice (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 2009). 
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School of 
Strategic 
Thought 
Brief 
Description of 
Strategy 
Development 
Authors Contribution to Theory 
Design Process of 
conception 
Miles & Snow 
(2003) 
Chandler (2003) 
Johnson & 
Scholes (1984) 
Grant (2013) 
 
The most influential view of strategy formation and provides the basis for all other schools of thought.  
Seeks the fit between the firms internal capabilities and the external possibilities available. Introduced the 
concepts of SWOT & PEST 
Views the CEO, or equivalent, as the strategist. 
Tends to focus on the process rather than the product but has very little focus on learning from the 
strategic change.  
Planning Formal Process Ansoff (1977) 
Wheelen & 
Hunger (1984) 
Ansoff (1991) 
Thompson & 
Martin (2010) 
Rooted in the design model but developed by the corporate planners.  
Identifies five distinct phases: 
1. Objective setting 
2. External audit 
3. Internal audit 
4. Strategy evaluation 
5. Operationalise 
 
Planners can add to the data gathering stage for input and by measuring the effectiveness of 
implementation. 
Positioning Analytical 
Process 
Kay (1993) 
Porter (2004a) 
Porter (2004b) 
Barney & Hesterly 
(2006) 
 
Extension of design and planning schools. 
 
Firms should seek a place in the market where they have an advantage over their competitors. Most 
influential writer in Porter who developed the 5 forces, generic strategies and value chain models that are 
all widely used although these tend to focus on large, multi-national manufacturing firms. 
Controlled and conscious process. 
Helpful in decision making by use of data. 
Entrepreneurial Visionary 
Process 
Baden-Fuller & 
Stopford (1994) 
Leavy & Wilson 
(1994) 
Bowman (1998) 
Falls into both the prescriptive and descriptive schools.  
Focuses on vision.  
Firm can create new combinations or new ideas. This may be improved products or improved processes.  
An entrepreneur can be: 
The founder of an organisation 
Manager of a self-owned business 
An innovative leader.  
Can be an important approach either in the period of start-up or turnaround. 
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School of 
Strategic 
Thought 
Brief 
Description of 
Strategy 
Development 
Authors Contribution to Theory 
Cognitive Mental Process Daft & Weick 
(1984) 
Duhaine & 
Shwenk (1985) 
 
Psychological approach based on a loose collection of research based on the notion of understanding 
the decision making process.  
Two main views: 
Objective approach: one view 
Subjective approach: many views 
Assumption: More information makes for better decisions.  
Evidence: More information makes us more confident about the decisions we make. 
Focuses on the individual rather than the collective. 
Learning Emergent 
Process 
Lindblom (1959)  
Mintzberg( 1979) 
Mintzberg( 1991) 
Quinn (1980)  
Hamel & Prahalad 
(1996) 
Weick (2002) 
Based on the premise that strategists learn over time. 
Two main concepts: 
Emergent strategy 
Retrospective sense-making 
Focussed on the idea of action, learning from the experience and keeping what works.  
Moves away from the notion of one strategist. Small ideas can make big changes.  
Learning is good but the day job does need to be done. 
Power Process of 
Negotiation  
Ackermann, Eden 
& Brown (2005) 
Joni & Beyer, 
2010 
Miron-Spektor, 
Gino & Argote( 
2011) 
The learning school introduced the idea of power and politics. This school develops that idea further.  
Suggests that: 
Organisations are coalitions 
Members have different views 
Scare resources must be allocated 
Conflict is caused by the above 
Decisions made by negotiation and bargaining. 
Deliberate strategies introduce power shifts. Stakeholder analysis is key.  
Through negotiation new strategies emerge. 
Cultural Collective 
Process 
Johnson, Scholes 
& Whittington 
(2008) 
Mintzberg ( 1987) 
 
Considers the importance of the collective rather than the individual.  
Asks: what makes organisations different? 
Outsider view tends to be objective 
Insider view tends to be subjective 
Strategy is the result of social interaction.  
Beliefs tend to be acquired tacitly and rooted in the history of the organisation. 
Strategy tends to be a perspective rather than a position. 
Culture can limit growth by discouraging change. 
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School of 
Strategic 
Thought 
Brief 
Description of 
Strategy 
Development 
Authors Contribution to Theory 
Environmental Reactive 
Process 
Coulter (2002) 
Fitzroy & Hulbert 
(2005) 
Haberberg & 
Rieple (2008) 
Based on the perception that the organisation is largely passive and moved by changes in the external 
environment.  
Strategic leaders are required to respond to market changes rather than drive change. 
Configuration Process of 
Transformation 
Miles & Snow 
(2003) 
De Witt & Meyer 
(2004) 
 
Draws on all of the other schools. 
Looks are two areas: 
Configuration – the firm in its context 
Transformation – strategy making process 
Organisations change over time. They tend to see periods of relative stability interrupted by 
transformations.  
Looks to use the correct methods at the appropriate time. Does tend to focus on the central tendency 
rather than view the outliers. 
 
Table 3.2b: Classifications of Strategy by School of Thought. Created by the Author 
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The classification of different author’s work by ‘school’ (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & 
Lampel, 2009), shown in table 3.2b, highlights the differences between the 
strategic perspectives but also serves to demonstrate some of the areas of 
overlap between the concepts. The positioning and environmental schools both 
view the firm’s position in the marketplace as being significant although the 
attitude to the place differs. The positioning school seeks the optimum range of 
products or services to meet demand, focussing on Ohmae’s (1982) 
competence to meet customers’ needs, whereas the environmental school 
suggests that the balance of power lies in ‘the market’, which can be viewed as 
Ohmae’s competitors. In these schools of thought the focus appears to be on 
one part of the environment rather than a combination of factors as Ohmae had. 
The design and entrepreneurial schools both place a lot of emphasis of the role 
of the business leader in the process of strategy development with the 
importance of the selection of the right leader for the situation identified (Leavy 
& Wilson, 1994). The power and cultural schools of thought both highlight the 
impact that a wider range of people have on the strategy process than the 
design and entrepreneurial schools do.  
Mintzberg’s work on how strategy emerges appears central to the entire field of 
study as he has sought to advance the discussion from how strategy is created 
to how it is implemented (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; 
Mintzberg, 1987; Mintzberg, 1991; Mintzberg, 1990; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & 
Lampel, 2009). Figure 3.2b illustrates how, in Mintzberg’s view strategic 
intentions are realised with some of the original plan being dropped, for a 
variety of reasons, with new aspects emerging over time (Mintzberg, 1978).  
Intended 
Strategy
Deliberate 
Strategy
Realised 
Strategy
Emergent 
Strategy
Unrealised 
Strategy
 
Figure 3.2b: Types of Strategy. Mintzberg, 1978 p.945 
 
The realised strategy is different from the intended one but no less deliberate as 
decisions are taken during the implementation in light of changing events 
(Mintzberg, 1978). In this Mintzberg is not arguing against planning but that 
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changing events and new information are incorporated into the strategy as 
trusting an out-of-date plan can lead to poor decisions.  
3.2.3 Sense-Making in Strategic Management 
 
Mintzberg’s later work had questioned the reliance on a single strategist, usually 
the CEO, in the prescriptive schools of thought (Mintzberg, 1990). He 
questioned whether one person could understand the situation fully and be able 
to process all of the required information to make the decisions in advance of 
implementation (Mintzberg, 1990). Mintzberg suggested that conceptual 
frameworks, designed to help explore a situation, had been taken as models to 
explain a situation. This distinction was picked up by Porter (1991) who 
suggests that models are used to simplify a complex situation by reducing the 
number of variable factors to those that could be measured whereas a 
framework retained the complexity of the situation. This can be linked back to 
Rumelt’s suggestion that the ‘overwhelming complexity’ of the environment 
needs to be simplified to allow managers to focus on the critical issues (Rumelt, 
2011). The use of models is common in other academic subjects, such as 
economics and biology, for classification or prediction. In strategy however, 
there is no limit to the number of labels, boxes or classes that can be used; 
companies adapt at a faster rate than in those subjects (Baden-Fuller & 
Morgan, 2010) This “pretence of science” based on partial analysis and 
unbalanced assumptions can be dangerous in practice as it downplays the 
complexity of the business environment (Ghoshal, 2005). The frameworks can 
be used in the process of sense-making (Rumelt, 2011; Weick, Sutcliffe & 
Obstfeld, 2005) and this will be explored in a later section of the literature 
review as the role of frames is discussed.  
Mintzberg’s (1991) challenge to the assumption that it was possible for firms, (or 
individuals), to be in possession of all of the information required for a 
completely planned strategy is supported by Simon (1993) who suggests that 
as the repercussions of any decision lay in the future then, to some extent, 
imagination takes over; this challenges Ansoff’s notion of rationality (1991). 
Hamel & Prahalad (1996) suggest that the role of the manager is not to predict 
what will happen in the future but rather to imagine the possibilities and then 
create a strategy from the imagination. They suggest that firms are actually 
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competing in the industry of tomorrow rather than today (Hamel & Prahalad, 
1996). Makridakis (1990) argues that there are three things we can say about 
the future with any certainty: 
1. The future will be different from today and the further into the future we 
move, the more different it will be.  
2. Of the forecasts made about the future, these will include predictions 
about events that did not happen, and will not include some things that 
did happen. 
3. Any knowledge of the future is of limited use if it applies to events that 
are external to the organisation, and is shared by any of the competitors.  
This should not be taken to mean that firms operate without plans or forecasts 
but the flaws in the information need to be accepted (Makridakis, 1990; 
Mintzberg, 1990). Figure 3.2b illustrates that emergent factors combine with the 
deliberate strategy to create a realised strategy (Mintzberg, 1978). Managers 
can suffer from an “impossible overload of information (much of it soft)” 
(Mintzberg, 1978 p.948). The difference between too much raw data and not 
enough processed  information has been highlighted as a potential problem for 
managers (Fitzroy & Hulbert, 2005) but the focus on the important issues of the 
situation is vital for sense-making and decision-making (Rumelt, 2011). Where 
there is a lack of information managers have to rely heavily on intuition (Simon, 
1993; Fitzroy & Hulbert, 2005). Other authors argue that managers have to 
blend data and creativity to make decisions in any case (Ohmae, 1982; Weick, 
2003; Teece, 2010). Firms can look outside their own organisation for 
information through bench-marking to understand how good company 
performance is in comparison to competitors although this data is historical and 
of limited use for forecasting (Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1994). This links back to 
the third point made by Makridakis (1990) above as the data is both external 
and shared by competitors.  
Argenti (1985) offers some suggestions on the level of information required by a 
firm. He argues that is the data collection system is complex then it needs to be 
simplified to the key variables (Argenti, 1985) but this links back to Porter’s 
(1991) warning on over-simplification. There appears to be a need for the 
identification of the key variables. With too much data there can be paralysis 
(Mintzberg, 1978) but not enough could lead to a misunderstanding of the 
situation (Porter, 1991). Elsewhere he argues that the data used need to be 
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clearly defined, otherwise individual managers are more likely to spend time 
arguing over the format and meaning of the data rather than the content 
(Argenti, 1981). This would seem to link back to the political view of strategy 
development where multiple actors are involved with differing perspectives (Joni 
& Beyer, 2010; Miron-Spektor, Gino & Argote, 2011). Heffernan (2011) 
suggests that individuals are twice as likely to look for information that supports 
their viewpoint than challenges it and our mental models dictate how we 
interpret the data collected (Bolman & Deal, 2014). Figure 3.2c illustrates how 
these mental models can impact on how managers create strategy (Duhaime, 
Stimpert & Chesley, 2012).  
 
Mental Models Decision Making Strategies
Performance 
Outcomes
Feedback
Reinforces or suggests changes in 
managers’ mental models
 
Figure 3.2c: Relationships among Manager's Beliefs, Decision Making, Strategies and 
Performance Outcomes. Duhaime, Stimpert & Chesley, 2012 p.7 
 
In this framework there appears to be some suggestion as to why different 
strategy development tools are favoured by some but not others, as the 
manager’s own mental model distinguishes the important data to include in the 
decision making process (Ferguson & Ferguson, 2000; Duhaime, Stimpert & 
Chesley, 2012) as well as the individual’s definition of what strategy is and how 
it is created. These mental models are developed over time through personal 
experience, culture and education as well as imitating others (Duhaime, 
Stimpert & Chesley, 2012). These heuristics are based on past events so may 
well have limited use in the current situation (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Gary, 
Wood & Pillinger, 2012).  
The formal data collection systems outlined by Argenti (1985) can be classed as 
explicit knowledge as it is formally codified and shared within the organisation 
(Ferguson & Ferguson 2000). As manager’s internalise these explicit models 
the knowledge can become tacit and include elements of the individuals own 
experience and learning (Ferguson & Ferguson, 2000; Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 
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2010). Senge defines a tacit mental model as “ingrained assumptions, 
generalizations or even pictures or images that influence how we understand 
the world and how we take action” (2006 p.8). With “ingrained assumptions” 
there is a danger that the individual may not be aware of the mental model 
being used (Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1994; Simon, 1997; Markides, 2000) and 
that managers can seek to rationalise behaviour after the event (Hurst, 2002). 
Duhaime & Schwenk identify the dangers in “reasoning by analogy” (1985 
p.288) where individuals refer to past events with the assumption that everyone 
else’s tacit mental model matches theirs. Differences in those pictures can lead 
to project failure as there can be a significant gap in the unstated assumptions 
made by the participants (Lindblom, 1959; Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; 
Ferguson & Ferguson, 2000). Another danger can come from using old models 
in new situations without taking time to establish if the previous decision has the 
desired performance outcomes (Gary, Wood & Pillinger, 2012). Early 
commitment to the first available answer, based on the prevalent mental model, 
can lead to project failure (Nutt, 2002). Existing mental models can also lead to 
choices being rejected because they do not meet the expected form (Ferguson 
& Ferguson, 2000). Learning needs to take place in order for new frames to 
form (Blosch, 2001). 
Figure 3.2c includes a feedback loop where managers can match performance 
outcomes with the mental model and decisions taken (Duhaime, Stimpert & 
Chesley, 2012) with reflection taking place after the event (Simon, 1997 & 
Franklin, 2013). This reflection needs to be a conscious act (Gary, Wood & 
Pillinger, 2012) and can be impacted by cynicism and self-interest (Dewett, 
2004; Baumard & Starbuck, 2005). Denial of corporate error can leads to a 
destruction of business value (Grundy, 1995) and limit the learning (Nutt, 2002). 
Argyris (1991) suggests that senior managers may not learn from mistakes as 
they have little experience of failure and can become defensive as they have 
not developed the learning skills required. Failure can be dismissed through 
external factors although success is always down to the skill of the participants 
(Baumard & Starbuck, 2005).  
In summary, there are a number of problems highlighted by this research. 
Mental models may be explicit however experience can lead to tacit knowledge 
being incorporated by individuals involved in the strategy process. This can limit 
the collection or interpretation of data within firms leading to a strategy that does 
28 
 
not address the current situation. The strength of the mental models in use can 
be limited due to incomplete - or entirely missing - learning opportunities from 
past projects. This research would seem to suggest that firms can repeat 
failures by not updating faulty mental models. The next section will look at ways 
in which firms can deliberately change the mental model in use through 
reframing (Bolman & Deal, 2014).  
3.2.4 The Importance of Frames  
 
Bolman & Deal (2014) chose the term ‘frame’ to describe the process of an 
individual selecting the most appropriate mental model to develop a solution to 
the situation faced. They did so because it has many different ways in which it 
can be applied and such diversity helps illustrate the different ways in which the 
term can assist the manager to use an explicit model rather than tacit pattern 
recognition (Dewey, 2010; Bolman & Deal, 2014).  
“In describing frames, we deliberately mix metaphors, referring to them 
as windows, maps, tools, lenses, orientations, filters, prisms, and 
perspectives, because all these images capture part of the idea we want 
to convey.”  
Bolman & Deal, 2014 p.10 
In choosing a term that can be viewed in a number of ways the complexity of 
these mental models is conveyed. Windows let light in but keep draughts out. 
Maps illustrate the surrounding territory to allow the reader to deduce where 
they are and how they should proceed. Filters strip out the unwanted elements 
whilst a prism breaks a beam of light into its constituent parts (Bolman & Deal, 
2014). In this choice of term Bolman & Deal reflect on those used by others who 
have studied the impact of mental models on business decisions. Mental 
models have been described as screens or filters (Ferguson & Ferguson, 2000), 
lenses (Weick, 2003), heuristics (Finkelstein, Whitehead & Campbell, 2009) or 
paradigms (Quinn, 1980).The term ‘framing’, as defined by Bolman & Deal 
(2014) captures a wider range of meaning than the others offered here, so it will 
be used within this study. 
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3.2.5 The Role of Reframing in Strategic Management  
 
For firms to be able to innovate they need to be able to break their existing 
frames (Dewett, 2004; von Oetinger, 2004; Talke, Salomo & Rost, 2010) or 
reframe the current situation to envision a different outcome (Janis, 1982; 
Bolman & Deal, 2014). This requires a creative culture (Dewett, 2004); the 
combination of existing data and imagination can allow people to innovate 
especially where an industry is in flux (Weick, 2003; Dewey 2010; Teece, 2010). 
There is a danger in linking reward to success as it can damage a firm’s ability 
to collect new data which may question the definition of success (Baumard & 
Starbuck, 2005). The reward structures can lead to internal competition so 
complementary solutions may be overlooked (Miron-Spektor, Gino & Argote, 
2011) as politics and self-interest take over (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005). 
Several authors (Quinn, 1980; Simon, 1993; Blosch, 2001; Flanagan & Runde, 
2009; Franklin, 2013; Guiette & Vandenbempt, 2013) highlight the importance 
of different frames within teams to avoid mistaken patterns to be identified in 
new situations (Kay, 2010) or groupthink to develop (Janis, 1982). Opportunities 
to reframe the business can be missed as managers can act on a tacit rather 
than explicit frame (Argenti 1985) or information that contradicts the dominant 
view is overlooked or dismissed (Markides, 2000). The individuals involved in a 
project do not always hold the same views (Blosch, 2001) but these differing 
perspectives are required in order to develop a better understanding of the 
external factors that may be driving change and the internal actions required to 
meet those external stimuli (Guiette & Vandenbempt, 2013; Franklin, 2013). 
These different views may lead to conflict within the firm but proper 
management of this will likely increase the firm’s ability to develop as a whole 
rather than as competing components (Hamel & Prahalad, 1996; Joni & Beyer, 
2010; Miron-Spektor, Gino & Argote, 2011). Joni & Beyer (2010) suggest that 
conflict within management teams needs be about the future rather than the 
past and the overall purpose of the firm. Using the tension created by the 
disagreements to be innovative (Flanagan & Runde, 2009; Joni & Beyer, 2010) 
and can prevent the conditions that lead to groupthink (Janis, 1982) or single-
outcome decisions (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985). Managers can continue with 
projects that appear doomed to failure due to the personal investment already 
made in the project (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Workman, 2012). Managers 
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with limited view of the organisation can blame individuals for organisational 
failings, and this concept of ‘scape-goating’ is discussed more fully in the 
section on sports literature. Hamel & Prahalad (1996) argue that as well as 
learning, firms need to forget those practices that are no longer relevant to the 
current environment even where this appears counter-intuitive or dangerous 
(Weick, 1996).  
3.2.6 The Role of the Leader in Reframing   
 
Although a new leader will likely bring new frames to the firm (Hutzschenreuter, 
Kleindienst & Greger, 2013) they will require time to learn the existing models in 
place and the strength of available resources (Franklin, 2013). Leavy & Wilson 
(1994) describe strategic leaders as “tenants of time and context” (p.113) and 
observed the importance of linking the correct type of strategic leader with the 
situation faced by the organisation. Each frame (see Figure 3.2d) identified is 
suited to different stage of organisational development (Leavy & Wilson, 1994). 
Builder Revitaliser
Turnarounder Inheritor
Formative stage of the organisation
Expansionist and opportunistic
Visionary but with the ability to deliver
Generates momentum through people
Imaginative
Risk-taker
Professional Manager
Sees the ‘big picture’
Introduces their own staff
Breaks with the past where necessary
Short-term specialist
Focussed on the issues
Stabilise cash flow
Cut costs before rebuilding
Restore stakeholder confidence
Tends to be an insider 
Seeks continuity rather change at least in 
the beginning
Team-oriented
 
Figure 3.2d: Tenants of Time and Context. Developed by the Author from Leavy & Wilson, 1994 
 
The builder is likely to be imaginative and prepared to take risks in order to help 
the company grow (Leavy & Wilson, 1994). The revitaliser is classed a 
‘professional manager’ and is likely to be an outsider. They would likely bring in 
their own staff as they are less likely to be tied to historical frames (Leavy & 
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Wilson, 1994).The turnaround manger is likely to be a specialist in company 
rejuvenation (Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1994) and would be a short-term 
appointment (Leavy & Wilson, 1994). In this case cost-cutting and cash-flow 
stabilisation are crucial (Leavy & Wilson, 1994). The inheritor would be a more 
likely appointment when the context is relatively stable and a deep 
understanding of the existing organisational frame is required (Leavy & Wilson, 
1994). Leavy & Wilson make the link between strategy and leadership in terms 
of the external environment and the stage of the company life-cycle. Their 
contention is that the dominant frame of the leader is key to a firm developing 
which links to the notion of a new leader bringing a new frame 
(Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst & Greger, 2013).  
3.2.7 The Role of Reframing in Leveraging Resources 
 
Hamel & Prahalad (1996) suggest that through using existing resources as 
levers much more can be achieved (see figure 3.2e).  
 
Concentrate
Accumulate
Complement
Conserve
Recover
Convergence – target resources on a common goal
Focus – identify the key aims and ensure their deleivery
Extract – Learn from experience and challenge assumptions
Borrow – Learn from partners 
Blend – Combine knowledge and experience partnerships
Balance – Performance should be consistently high
Recycle – Use expertise in different parts of the business
Shield – Protect resources by taking on the right challenges
Co-option – Get help from others to solve problems
Recovery – Recoup the revenues spend on resources
 
Figure 3.2e: Methods of Leveraging Resources.  
Developed by the Author from Hamel & Prahalad, 1996 
 
Each of these levers can be seen as a different frame that can be combined to 
achieve the maximum benefit for the firm. For the firm to concentrate, managers 
would need to agree on what the common goal is and how to achieve that 
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(Miron-Spektor, Gino & Argote, 2011). Accumulation of learning from other parts 
of the business, or from other industries, is likely to require innovation to see 
how to apply a lesson from one area to another by breaking the existing frame 
(Dewett, 2004; Franklin, 2013). The concept of complementing the different 
parts of the business requires learning through combination (Hamel & Prahalad, 
1996; Miron-Spektor, Gino & Argote, 2011) to achieve high performance 
throughout the firm (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Teece, 2010). Within the 
conception of conservation Hamel & Prahalad (1996) include recycling 
expertise throughout the business to combine frames to solve problems as well 
as focussing resources (Flanagan & Runde, 2009; Guiette & Vandenbempt, 
2013).  
Both Hamel & Prahalad (1996) and Leavy & Wilson (1994) consider important 
aspects of strategy development without any discussion of how that strategy 
should be created. Both discuss how the firm interacts with its environment and 
offer a number of frames in leadership style (Leavy & Wilson, 1994) and how 
resources can be maximised (Hamel & Prahalad, 1996) to move the firm into 
the future.  
3.3 Summary of Strategic Management Literature 
 
From the review of the literature there appears to be no agreed definition of 
what strategic management is, how it is created or implemented. Working 
through the disparity of views within the literature a working definition can 
created: business strategies, based on a combination of data and creativity, 
envision a future possible state of the firm, within an industry, to establish a 
series of intended outcomes that will incorporate new factors over time.  
 
This definition draws on Mintzberg’s (1978) concept of the emergent strategy as 
the definition of the future state of the firm evolves over time in the light of 
factors that were not anticipated at the time. The combination of data and 
creativity builds on Rumelt’s (2011) two-state approach of sense-making 
followed by problem-solving. The information used by the decision-makers will 
be dependent on the frame that aids their data collection and analysis 
processes.  The ‘possible future state of the firm’ can be viewed as a long and 
short-term vision and how the timeframes interact is crucial (Dodd & Favarro, 
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2007). Here the tension between ‘overwhelming complexity’ (Rumelt, 2011 
p.81) and over-simplification (Porter, 1991) of the issues needs to be identified 
and managed to encourage decision-makers to make active choices (Fitzroy & 
Hulbert, 2005). Within these elements lies a balance that relies heavily on the 
context.  
The author’s definition also draws on Whittington’s (1997) two-dimensional axis 
of processes and outcomes as this can help navigate the strategist to the most 
appropriate perspective: is the profit-maximisation or are there more goals that 
need to be balanced?  If there are other outcomes for the firm then there is 
likely to be a need for these to be defined and prioritised. These definitions and 
priorities may change over time as the environments, both internal and external, 
changes. The definition created within this thesis is also influenced by Leavy & 
Wilson’s (1994) observation that different types of strategic leaders are required 
given the time and context within the firm and that their skillset needs to match 
the situation. This concept of ‘tenants of time and context’ (Leavy & Wilson, 
1994 P.113) can be linked to the mental models, or frames, that influence the 
strategic decision maker’s choices (Duhaime, Stimpert & Chesley, 2012). The 
strategic leader’s ability to accept feedback from a variety of sources (Duhaime, 
Stimpert & Chesley, 2012) is also incorporated into the author’s definition of 
business strategies. Without that feedback loop the ability of the leader 
incorporate new information is likely to be limited.  
Ohmae (1982) expresses the important factors in just three words: customer, 
competition and competence. This notation helps focus the discussion away 
from an academic discussion on the merits of different perspectives of strategy 
development into a more focussed attempt to answer Porter’s (1991) question 
of why some firms do better than others. By accepting the premise of Ohmae’s 
suggestion the strategist is then forced to consider the following questions: who 
are our customers and what products or services do we sell them? How well are 
our competitors performing? What competences do we have to meet those 
needs? How can we develop these competences to strengthen our position in 
the industry?  
The questions above are deliberately personalised to focus on the strategy 
creators - rather than at the firm level as many authors do - and on the 
importance of the frames used by the individuals within management teams. 
The term ‘frame’, as proposed by Bolman & Deal (2014), has been selected 
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within this research project in that there are multiple ways in which a frame can 
be seen. It sets a boundary to provide some focus for the research but also 
creates a structure upon which learning can be built. These frames are a set of 
assumptions and ideas that help individuals make sense of their surroundings. 
Reframing is the ability to recognise existing patterns of behaviour and create 
new ways of working from those existing patterns. It is the process of reframing 
that allows firms to engage in the stretch and leverage methods (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1996) that require decision makers to be creative in their problem 
solving by seeing existing resources in a new light.  
Underpinning this thesis is Porter’s (1991) argument that research should 
create frameworks rather than models so that the complexity of the situation 
can be retained rather than focus on a set of key variables that are fixed. Whilst 
these variables may have been relevant at the time, changes to the firm, the 
industry and the wider environment may require a different set of approach be 
taken.  
The conceptual framework developed by this process is designed to explore the 
complexity of firms within an industry rather than reduce the richness of the 
environment. The balance and selection of the key variables appears vital in 
this process. Too much data can lead to paralysis but too little data can lead to 
over-simplification. By focussing on Ohmae’s (1982) questions the strategist 
has a higher chance of success in identifying the key variables.  
As this research is concerned with the specific industrial context of professional 
football within Scotland the next section explores the previous research into the 
business of sport. The sports literature is used to identify the key themes that 
will be used to create the basis of the framework in the rest of the thesis. This 
literature helps identify the keys factors for firms within the sports industry that 
can be combined to create a strategic management framework for Scottish 
Professional football. 
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3.4 Using the Sports Industry for Academic Research 
 
This section will focus more directly on academic research that focuses on the 
sport industry from a business perspective. One of the earliest empirical 
research papers on leadership used baseball data to understand the impact of 
managerial change on organisations (Grusky 1963). Baseball was used not 
through any particular interest in the industry but because the industry provided 
company information that: 
 Was readily available 
 Featured organisations of roughly the same size 
 Was an industry where organisational aims were similar 
 Could easily define success and failure  
(Grusky 1963) 
Grusky developed a conceptual framework proposing ten different 
organisational factors that could impact on team performance. This section of 
the literature review will consider both the above outputs and subsequent 
studies that have been generated as academic research into the sports industry 
has grown.  
3.4.1 The Impact of Managerial Change 
 
Grusky (1963) set out to challenge the ‘common sense’ idea that changing the 
team manager had a positive impact on team performance however his findings 
suggested that the upheaval caused by organisational change actually had a 
negative effect on performance (Grusky 1963).  
Similar studies have been carried out since using baseball, ice hockey and 
football to test the assumption that replacing a failing coach has a positive 
impact on on-field performance (see Table 3.5).  
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Author Year Sport Country Time period Findings 
Grusky 1963 Baseball USA 1921-41 & 
1951-1958 
That the rate of managerial change in an organisation has a negative impact on 
effectiveness. A change in the rate of succession has a negative impact on effectiveness 
Gamson  & Scotch 1964 Baseball USA 1921-41 & 
1951-1958 
Introduces the notion of scape-goating in challenge to Grusky 
Allen, Panian & 
Lotz 
1979 Baseball USA 1920- 1973 Current performance is most strongly linked with past performance. Frequency of change 
does have a small but significant impact.  
Fabianic 1984 Baseball USA 1951 - 1980 Supports the 'common sense' view of replacement but when slump and recovery elements 
are removed the scapegoating theme is supported 
Fizel & D'Itri 1997 College 
Basketball 
USA 1984 - 1991 Suggest a clear link between succession and declining performance. When teams replace 
their coach there tends to be a decline in performance. 
Dobson 1998 Football England 1972 - 1993 Teams improve after a poor run of results more effectively if no change is made rather than 
those where a change is made. Comparison of 6, 12 or 18 games either side gives the 
same result.  
Audas, Dobson & 
Goddard 
2002 Football England 1972 - 2000 They find that teams that do change their manager mid-season do slightly worse than those 
that don't but suggest several reasons for this. Compares performance for 16 games before 
and 16 games after the change. 
Hope 2003 Football England 1995 - 2001 There appears to be a short-term boost but there is a cost involved in a period of rebuilding.  
Koning 2003 Football Holland 1993 - 1998 Suggests there is no improvement in performance after managerial replacement and that 
coaches are sacked too often. Board reacts to fan & media pressure for change. 
Rowe, Cannella Jr., 
Rankin & Gorman 
2005 Ice 
Hockey 
USA 1942 - 2002 There is an impact but this is dependent on timing 
Balduck & Buelens 2007 Football Belgium 1998 - 2003 There appears to be a pick-up of performance after sacking the coach but this happens with 
teams that do not. Looks at performance for 4 games before and 4 games after the change.  
de Dios Tena. & 
Forrest 
2007 Football Spain 2002 -2005 Indications are the clubs performing below budget expectation are more likely to replace the 
coach. There appears to be a small improvement in home form after the change although 
away form is unaffected. Suggests that 'scapegoating' may in fact improve the feeling within 
the home fans who give the players a boost.  
Frick, Barros  & 
Prinz 
2009 Football Germany 1981 - 2003 The higher paid managers are more at risk. Managers with more experience and higher win 
percentages are less at risk.  
Hughes, Hughes, 
Mellahi & Guermat 
2010 Football England 1992 - 2004 Suggest that there can be a short lift in performance following change before the underlying 
issues take hold and performance drops. 
Table 3.5: Studies in the Impact of Managerial Change in Sports. Created by the Author 
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It should be noted at this point that the sport, country, time period of study and 
the number of matches before and after replacement vary from study to study 
making comparison limited. Although all of the studies are longitudinal the 
differences between 1920’s American baseball (Allen, Panian & Lotz, 1979) and 
twenty-first Century sport are not explored within the original papers. However, 
there is no conclusive evidence that replacing the team manager has a positive 
impact across the studies. Several studies have supported the theory that 
changing a coach has a positive impact (Allen, Panian & Lotz, 1979; Hope 
2003; Rowe, Cannella Jr., Rankin & Gorman, 2005), others support the notion 
of scape-goating (de Dios Tena & Forrest, 2007 and Fabianic, 1984) whilst 
other suggest that there is a similar improvement in team that do not change 
their manager (Balduck & Buelens, 2007 and Dobson, 1998 & Koning, 2003). 
Audas, Dobson & Goddard (2002) not that teams who change their manager 
mid-season do worse that those who don’t. The distraction caused by the 
change may have a negative impact (Grusky, 1963 & Audas, Dobson & 
Goddard, 2002) although it may be that the replacement manager is no better 
than his predecessor (Audas, Dobson & Goddard, 2002). This may be that the 
managers who are looking for work mid-season are available because they 
have failed elsewhere (Gamson & Scotch, 1964). 
The majority of the studies in Table 3.5 look retrospectively to see if changing 
the coach/manager has the desired effect which would appear to match the 
view that strategy research relies on proving the ‘conventional wisdom’ of the 
industry rather than developing new ideas (Adcroft & Willis, 2008) with the 
exceptions of Grusky (1963), Gamson & Scotch (1964) and Hope (2003).  
The original study (Grusky, 1963) brought an immediate response (Gamson & 
Scotch, 1964) that introduced a new concept of ‘ritual scape-goating’. Unable to 
change the entire team and unwilling to replace themselves, owners took the 
line of least resistance and sacked the coach (Gamson & Scotch, 1964)  
Gamson & Scotch used data from a twenty-seven year period. The conclusion 
drawn was that of ‘virtual scape-goating’ was not fully supported by the 
evidence provided, a point highlighted by Grusky (1964) in response.  
The concept of ‘ritual scape-goating’ has been identified by researchers since 
that its introduction (Fabianic, 1984; Audas, Dobson & Goddard, 2002). The 
factors that may spark a short-term decision by the board include the impact of 
fan and media pressure on directors or the league position at the time (Hope, 
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2003; Koning, 2003; Ascari & Gagnepain, 2006). Managers who are more 
highly paid than their peers may be more at risk of contract termination 
particularly if they have limited experience (Frick, Barros & Prinz, 2009).  
Football managers would appear more at risk as the length of tenure has fallen 
from 3.1 years in season 1992/93 to 1.5 by 2008/09 (Bridgewater, 2010). In 
comparison, a study of CEO replacement in other businesses showed a fall in 
tenure from 9.5 years in 1995 to 7.3 years by 2003 (Greiner, Cummings & 
Bhambri, 2003). The actual of impact of the manager is seen as limited as it is 
the players who compete once the match has started (Adcroft & Teckman, 
2008; Bridgewater, 2010) although the manager is expected to make decisions 
that get the most from the resources available (Bridgewater, 2010). Although 
there is a risk that club owners over-estimate their ability to select coaches if the 
club is threatened with relegation to a lower league a short-term risky decision 
may be taken (Audas, Dobson & Goddard, 2002) especially if attendances are 
falling (Bachan, Reilly & Witt, 2008). Clubs looking to the longer-term are more 
likely to have owners who are less involved in football decisions (Gilmore & 
Gilson, 2007).  
Hope (2003) attempted to create a predictive model to indicate when clubs 
should replace their manager. By his own admission the findings are 
inconclusive although he suggests that more data is required to refine this 
model (Hope, 2003). It has been suggested that predictive business models 
have little practical use because researchers can exclude troublesome factors 
that practitioners cannot (Simon, 1997; Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010). Although 
the findings are limited Hope does introduce three factors that can be used as 
frames to improve the decision-making process. New managers have a 
‘honeymoon period’ where they are unlikely to be sacked. If this period is too 
short then there may be a short-term boost (Allen, Panian & Lotz, 1979; Hope, 
2003; Rowe, Cannella Jr., Rankin & Gorman, 2005) but a high cost of change 
(Hope, 2003; Rowe, Cannella Jr., Rankin & Gorman, 2005). If the period is too 
long then there may be a drop in performance (Hope, 2003) although this is 
challenged by the findings of others who found no advantage to changing the 
manager (Balduck & Buelens, 2007; Dobson, 1998). Hope (2003) also identifies 
a level of performance, usually league position, below which the manager is at 
risk. If the ‘trap-door’ is too high then good managers could be lost after only a 
short period of poor performance (Hope 2003 & Bridgewater, 2010). If this level 
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is too low then poor performance could be rewarded (Hope, 2003; Bridgewater, 
2010). This level is set by the ambition of the club (Ascari & Gagnepain, 2006; 
Bridgewater, 2010) or the wage bill (Frick, Barros & Prinz, 2009). Hope (2003) 
acknowledges that clubs can take a short- or long-term view that will impact the 
rate of turnover. 
3.4.2 Factors Impacting Attendance at Matches   
 
Grusky (1963) drew a direct correlation between on-field performance and 
match-day attendance. The better a team performed the more people came to 
watch (Grusky, 1963) although it could be argued that this is one particular area 
where the comparison between 1950’s baseball and modern sport coverage is 
limited since the means of consumption has changed from purely physical to a 
combination of in-person and virtual attendance. TV revenue has become a 
major source of income although different distribution models are used across 
Europe (Ascari & Gagnepain, 2006; Baroncelli & Lago, 2006; Barros, 2006; 
Buraimo, Simmons & Szymanski, 2006; Andreff, 2007; Noll, 2007; Buraimo, 
Forrest & Simmons, 2009). In England a single TV deal is negotiated for the 
league (Buraimo, Simmons & Szymanski, 2006) whereas in Spain (Ascari & 
Gagnepain, 2006) and Italy (Baroncelli & Lago, 2006) clubs can negotiate their 
own TV deals that can lead to a disparity of income between clubs.  
Several studies have considered the impact of TV coverage and physical 
attendance at matches (Forrest & Simmons, 2006; Noll, 2007; Allan & Roy, 
2008; Buraimo, Forrest & Simmons, 2009). The findings across these studies 
are limited as the time frames are different ranging from one season in Scotland 
(Allan & Roy, 2008) to seven seasons across all four divisions in England 
(Buraimo, Forrest & Simmons, 2009). Noll (2007) uses data from several 
different leagues across Europe and suggests that increased TV coverage has 
increased attendance, whereas Allan & Roy (2008) found a 30% drop in 
attendance, if the game was televised, for those fans who pay on a match by 
match basis rather than purchase a season ticket. They also established that 
fans are less likely to travel for matches where the home team is expected to 
win (Allan & Roy, 2008). There does appear to have been an impact on 
attendance at matches when there is a clash with the Champions League on TV 
(Forrest & Simmons, 2006; Noll, 2007; Buraimo, Forrest & Simmons, 2009). 
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There also appears to be a negative impact on attendance where matches are 
played at ‘non-traditional’ kick-off times (Forrest & Simmons, 2006; Noll, 2007). 
Another factor that can have a negative impact is a number of matches in a 
short period of time (Forrest & Simmons, 2006).  
3.4.3 Supporter Classifications   
 
Several studies into football supporters identified a number of broad categories 
of people who watch football, including the ‘armchair’ supporter who only 
watches matches on TV (Giulianotti, 2005; Adamson, Jones & Tapp, 2006). 
Giulianotti studied supporters from a sociological perspective and made the 
distinction between those fans who are long-term supporters of a team and 
those who are drawn to success (Giulianotti, 2005). Adamson, Jones & Tapp 
(2006), who linked customer relationship management (CRM) to football, also 
identified ‘glory-hunters’ as fans drawn to success but distinguished between 
different types of long-term supporters: casuals, regulars and fanatics. The 
distinctions made were based on the balance between football as a form of 
entertainment against the importance of winning and the level of commitment to 
the club. Their argument is that clubs need to communicate with the different 
types of fans in a variety of ways, including developing new ways to interact 
with arm-chair fans. Andreff & Staudohar (2000) argue football has moved from 
a SSSL model (spectators, sponsors, subsidies, local) to a MCMMG (media, 
corporations, merchandising, markets, global) model although their focus is at a 
pan-European level and compares that market to the US model of sports 
franchises. It does however set a context within which clubs operate with more 
football on TV and the impact on smaller clubs attendance (Forrest & Simmons, 
2006; Noll, 2007; Buraimo, Forrest & Simmons, 2009). 
Despite the moves to CRM and the global model, many fans reject the notion of 
being a customer of the club as they identify with the club rather than purchase 
a product although some fans do understand the need for club merchandise as 
a means of competing with other clubs financially (Giulianotti, 2005). Clubs can 
treat fans purely as a means of income and a short-term view is taken rather 
than a consistent approach across the different parts of the club in order to 
engage fans (Adamson, Jones & Tapp, 2006).   
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Although studies into fans and attendance come from a range of academic 
disciplines and tend to focus on different markets there appears to be a move 
towards a global market for football fans that clubs will need to take account of. 
It has also been argued that moves towards a CRM approach should improve 
the communication between clubs and fans.  
3.4.4 Football and Corporate Social Responsibility  
 
In recent years there has been a greater focus within football on Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) as clubs reach out to wider community in a variety 
of ways (Anagnostopoulos, Byers and Shilbury, 2014) which is not considered 
in the virtuous cycles (see figures 3.6b & 3.6c) or the value system (see figure 
3.6.d). Clubs in Scotland have been slower to engage in these activities, or at 
least report on them, than their English counterparts although the financial 
challenges of the clubs North of the Border would appear to be a significant 
factor  in this (Hamil & Morrow, 2011). Community Trusts, run in conjunction 
with the clubs, in the Premier League in England can apply for central funding to 
fund a range of community based work (Anagnostopoulos and Shilbury, 2013). 
In season 2009/10 all of the SPL clubs were engaged in community- based 
CSR projects (Kolyperas, Morrow & Sparks, 2015) although the motive activities 
are not always seen to be completely altruistic and may be marketing-driven to 
increase engagement with supporters who may not always attend (Hamil & 
Morrow, 2011). Half of the clubs created arms-length organisations to oversee 
this work whilst the rest ran the projects through the community departments 
(Kolyperas, Morrow & Sparks, 2015). One of the most common activities 
identified was youth and community football coaching in the area although other 
education and health-based activities had no clear link with sport (Kolyperas, 
Morrow & Sparks, 2015). There can be a clash between the strategic goals of 
the club and the community trust (Anagnostopoulos and Shilbury, 2013; 
Kolyperas, Morrow & Sparks, 2015) especially where cash-flow or on-field 
performance issues with the club mean that CSR activities can be seen as a 
distraction (Hamil & Morrow, 2011). The external nature of CSR work, 
especially where arms-length organisations are used, means that these 
activities are likely to be seen as secondary to on-field performance and may 
suffer as a secondary activity.  
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3.4.5 Grusky’s Framework  
 
Grusky (1963) argued that the disruption caused to the club by replacing a 
central figure like the ‘bench coach’ had longer term negative effects that 
outweighed any short-term benefit. The more change there was in the club the 
greater the negative impact. The disruption caused tended to have a negative 
effect on results so the owners repeated the action. This process of repeating 
mistakes has been noted in wider industry (Bolman & Deal 1997).   
Although Grusky’s work (1963) on the impact of managerial replacement is 
empirical using secondary data this framework (see Figure 3.6a) would appear 
to entirely conceptual with major assumptions made regarding the industry. 
However, the questions raised by this framework introduce a number of issues 
that can be used to develop new frames to view the sports industry by taking a 
wider view of the club rather than reducing the study to a single factor.  
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Figure 3.6a: Framework of Organisational Factors. Grusky 1963 p.26 
 
This framework can be used to review other sports literature that goes beyond 
the impact of managerial change.  
Table 3.6 gathers different aspects of sports literature using Grusky’s (1963) 
framework (see Figure 3.6a) to create a more holistic view of sports research. 
Most papers would appear to focus on a single aspect of the sports industry 
without taking into account the bigger picture of firms who compete within an 
industry. The framework does look internally rather than considering other 
factors within the industry.  
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Although no single study has sought to address all of the organisational factors 
(Figure 3.6a) it can be seen how the sports industry in general, and the football 
industry in particular, has changed since the original study (Grusky 1963). The 
importance of finance can be seen as clubs move to strike a balance between 
on-field success, differentiating between types of supporters and financial 
stability. This shift may have led to increased pressure on the manager with 
competing priorities as the firm expands.  
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Factor Description Author(s) Findings 
1 Organizational effectiveness Szymanski & Kuypers, 
1999 
Suggest that most clubs are not 'profit maximisers' but seek a balance between 
attendance, sporting success, local commitment and financial measures. 
Buraimo, Simmons  & 
Szymanski, 2006 
Highlights the importance of the wages/turnover ratio. Also notes the falling revenue 
due to smaller crowds. Views it as lost income. 
Bridgewater, 2010 Performance is seen as easily measured, i.e. results. 
2 Manager’s expectation of 
replacement 
Bachan, Reilly & Witt, 2008 Managers most under threat are those in relegation trouble with falling attendances. 
Bridgewater, 2010 Highlights the shortening tenure of football managers. 
3 Managerial role strain Wilders, 1976 Observes the lack of formal & higher business education within football.   
Nevin & Sik 1998 Pressure on the manager is greater than players because there is no physical outlet.  
de Dios Tena & Forrest, 
2007 
Indications are the clubs performing below budget expectation are more likely to 
replace the coach. 
Bridgewater, 2010 Pressurised role - possibly uniquely so. Short-term, minimal control of resources and 
high degree of scrutiny. 
Frick, Barros  & Prinz, 2009 Higher paid managers are more at risk of replacement. Coaches may opt to stay at a 
smaller club but questions if this stretches them professionally. 
4 Rate of Succession Bridgewater, 2010 Highlights the shortening tenure of football managers. 
5 Style of supervision Carter 2006 Once players cross the line there's not much a manager can do so he needs to be able 
to choose his players carefully so that they will act in positive ways. 
Kelly, 2008 Authority in football still tends towards the traditional authoritarian style. External 
business parts of the club have become more professional but the manager’s role has 
remained largely unchanged. 
Bridgewater, 2010 Links to Leavy & Wilson (1994) to give different styles of manager: builder, revitaliser, 
accelerator, turn-arounder & inheritor. 
6 Internal Stability Buraimo, Simmons  & 
Szymanski, 2006 
Financial problems can lead to players being sold quickly and for less than the 
perceived market value.  
Rowe, Cannella Jr., Rankin 
& Gorman, 2005 
Short-term disruption caused by coach replacement.  
Bridgewater, 2010 Short-term view has to be taken by the manager. 
7 Morale Nevin & Sik 1998 Dressing rooms are full of gossip so managers need to explain decisions. 
Club debts can have an impact on player’s morale.  
Kelly & Waddington, 2006 The use of authority can be seen as arbitrary. Players become accustomed to this as 
they progress through the club. 
Bridgewater, 2010 Highlights the problem of players earning more than the manager. 
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Factor Description Author(s) Findings 
8 Clientele Support Szymanski & Kuypers, 
1999 
Wider range of stakeholders involved rather than simply supporters and sponsors. 
Relationship with the media is important.  
Andreff & Staudohar, 2000 Argues football has moved from a SSSL model (spectators, sponsors, subsidies, local) 
to a MCMMG (media, corporations, merchandising, markets, global) model. 
Grundy, 2004 Sees low attendances as lost value. 
Buraimo, Simmons  & 
Szymanski, 2006 
Falling attendances have a financial impact on the club.  
de Dios Tena & Forrest, 
2007 
There appears to be a small improvement in home form after the change although 
away form is unaffected. Suggests that 'scapegoating' may in fact improve the feeling 
within the home fans who give the players a boost. 
Bridgewater, 2010 Managers need to manage upwards as well in their relationship with the board. 
Complexity of stakeholders. 
9 Availability of objective 
assessment of effectiveness 
Szymanski & Kuypers, 
1999 
Highlight the difficulties of studying the football industry as the business objectives are 
not clearly defined. 
Nevin & Sik 1998 Highlights the problem of spending huge sums on assets without really being able to 
find enough about them. 
Gilson et al 2001 Role clarity is defined as a major step forward. Each person knows what they are 
required to do and what others do to contribute to the goal. 
Grundy, 2004 Suggests bench-marking with other similar clubs.  
Szymanski 2009 Highlights the different views between fans (success first) and owners (profit or at least 
prudence) 
Anderson & Sally 2013 Clubs need to have a better idea of what makes a good manager. 
10 Discrepancy between authority 
and responsibility 
Fabianic, 1984 Supports the 'common sense' view of replacement but when slump and recovery 
elements are removed the scapegoating theme is supported 
Gilmore & Gilson, 2007 Case study of successful club. Chairman didn't have any influence on the football side. 
The manager was carefully selected and then given freedom. Both respected the 
history of the club. 
Bridgewater, 2010 Shifting role of the manager - business experts to look after finance, etc. This can lead 
to a clash if the manager expects to run the club from top to bottom.  
Highly visible through media coverage but needs to be careful not to talk about the 
wider club. 
 
Table 3.6: Sports Research Linked to Grusky’s Factors. Created by the Author 
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It has been suggested that as clubs become more successful they see an 
increase in profitability (Grusky, 1963)  from TV revenue and merchandise sales 
(Grundy, 1999; Andreff & Staudohar, 2000) that can be used to create a 
competitive advantage (Grundy, 1999).  The concept of success leading to 
greater profitability has been challenged as success may require a higher cost 
base through increased wages (Szymanski & Kuypers, 1999). The ratio of 
wages to turnover has been highlighted as a suitable measure of financial 
effectiveness (Szymanski & Kuypers, 1999; Morrow 2003; Baroncelli & Lago, 
2006; Buraimo, Simmons & Szymanski, 2006) with most authors arguing that 
the ratio should be around 65% to improve. Against improved governance are 
some fans who view higher spending as a demonstration of ambition within the 
board (Barros, 2006) that matches the supporter’s expectations (Szymanski, 
2009) but the growing cost of player acquisition has been compared with an 
escalating ‘arms race’ as clubs spend more and more money chasing success 
(Andreff, 2007). 
3.4.6 Debt Levels within Football   
 
The problem of debt within football has been highlighted in England (Buraimo, 
Simmons & Szymanski, 2006), Spain (Ascari & Gagnepain, 2006), Portugal 
(Barros, 2006), Italy (Baroncelli & Lago, 2006) and Scotland (Morrow, 2006).  
Whilst these studies look at the risk of high levels of debt the impact of interest 
repayments has not been considered. The danger of debt securitisation is 
discussed (Grundy, 2004; Morrow, 2003) as this may lead to player sales at a 
later stage to service this debt at a point not of the club’s choosing leading to 
lower than expected revenue (Buraimo, Simmons  & Szymanski, 2006).  
Several authors have noted that player development and sale is a method of 
revenue generation (Barros, 2006; Baroncelli & Lago, 2006; Bridgewater, 2010).  
3.4.7 Conceptual Frameworks of Football Clubs 
 
Two conceptual models (see figures 3.6b & 3.6c) have been created based on 
the aspirations of clubs of different size (Lago, Baroncelli & Szymanski, 2004). 
Both models use the basis of finance to create the strategic direction of the 
club.  In both frameworks a ‘virtuous cycle’ is shown where increased revenue 
is ploughed back into the club allowing the club to grow. For the bigger clubs 
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(figure 3.6b) greater financial resources allow competitive teams to be created 
through higher salaries. On-field results increase the revenues of the club and 
the cycle continues (Baroncelli & Lago, 2006). 
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Figure 3.6b: The Virtuous Cycle. Developed 
by the Author from Lago, Baroncelli & 
Szymanski 2004 
Figure 3.6c: The Virtuous Cycle for 
Smaller Clubs. Developed by the Author 
from Lago, Baroncelli & Szymanski 2004 
 
For smaller clubs the possible profitability, or ‘virtuous cycle’,  of the club is 
reliant on the identification and development of players who can generate 
revenue either by selling them on to bigger clubs or relative success on the field 
increasing revenues and giving the club greater financial resources from which 
to build (Baroncelli & Lago, 2006). The ‘virtuous cycle’ is similar to the value 
system (see Figure 3.6d) suggested by Grundy (1998). The value system links 
to other sources of income that reflect the changing model of football from a 
local perspective to global one (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000). 
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Figure 3.6d: Business Value System - Football Clubs. Grundy, 1998 p.129 
 
The success of the academy system has been questioned with Premier League 
clubs in England producing one player every two years who goes on to play 
more than ten matches for the club (Anderson & Miller, 2011) although these 
clubs would likely be viewed as larger clubs rather than smaller ones (Lago, 
Baroncelli & Szymanski, 2004). The football academies have been viewed as 
the research and development function within manufacturing (Anderson & 
Miller, 2011) which seems to suggest that players are viewed as assets to be 
utilised, sold and then replaced. Fans may not accept that the academy’s role is 
to develop and then sell players for others (Barros, 2006) which can be linked to 
different views of fans and club directors (Szymanski, 2009). Anderson & Miller 
(2011) highlight the financial cost of the academy systems to English Premier 
League clubs with coaches, scouts and support-workers recruited to oversee 
the development of players, sometimes as young as 10 or 11 years old 
(McGillivray & McIntosh, 2006), but there is a high personal cost for those who 
seek to become professional footballers (Roderick, 2006). Rather than view 
players as assets others have researched the individual player’s sense of 
identity.  
Roderick (2006) observes that the key attribute sought in young recruits by the 
clubs is “attitude” but what this actually means is very poorly defined (Roderick, 
2006 p.37). Loyalty to the team and hard work on the training field appear linked 
to a player’s attitude (Roderick, 2006) which can result in young players 
switching off from education (McGillivray & McIntosh, 2006) as they create an 
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identity as a footballer (McGillivray, Fearn & McIntosh, 2005). This identity feeds 
the self-worth of the individual but injuries or failure to progress to the next level 
can damage the individual’s self-confidence (Roderick, 2006). The culture of 
football feeds the short-term view of both clubs and players (McGillivray & 
McIntosh, 2006). Although the clubs may offer educational opportunities for 
players these are seen as secondary to football related development 
(McGillivray & McIntosh, 2006) which leaves players unsure of future career 
plans after their playing career is ended (McGillivray, Fearn & McIntosh, 2005). 
Between 2003 and 2005, job security for players dropped especially for players 
in aged between eighteen and twenty-two (McGillivray & McIntosh, 2006) which 
suggests that the transition to a life outside of football happens earlier than 
might be expected. It has been noted that fewer than one in five players plan for 
a career outside the game after football; two in five plan to stay within the game 
with the remainder unsure of what the future holds (McGillivray, Fearn & 
McIntosh, 2005). 
 
3.5 Summary of Sports Industry Research 
 
This section of the literature review has covered both the empirical papers, 
which tend to focus on the impact of manager replacement in professional 
sport, and the conceptual papers that look at the problems faced by football 
clubs or leagues within specific countries.  
There appears to be little consistency in the research considered. There is no 
consensus on whether changing the team manager has a positive or negative 
impact, either in the short- or long-term. The focus of these studies tends to be 
on match results rather than a balanced measure of outcomes that may prove 
more conclusive. Although questions about the long-term implications of 
repeated change are raised the studies have not focused on this cumulative 
effect of constant change.  
The research tends to focus on single clubs or the industry as a whole without 
considering the firms who compete within the industry. Although bench-marking 
is proposed as a means of improving the measures of success there appears to 
be little work on a comparison of similar clubs. There appears to be little to 
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benefit the practitioner in the research as it focusses on single issues rather 
than embrace the complexity of firms within an industry.  
On the whole research tends to be about sport as it offers easy access to 
secondary data that is not available in most industries rather than an attempt to 
understand the viewpoints of participants involved in the industry. The review of 
the sports literature does identify some recurring themes that can be used to 
analyse professional football clubs.  
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In summary, the main themes in the existing literature are: 
 
On-field performance Match results have been widely used as an 
indicator of success particularly to measure the 
impact of managerial change. Studies have 
tended to focus on a relatively small number of 
matches either side of a change to assess the 
impact. The use of win percentage is valid in 
North American sports as this is used within the 
sport but is not widely used within the football 
industry.  
Attendance Match attendance has been studied in a number 
of different ways. Some evidence has been 
presented that as on-field performance improves 
attendances increase. Recent studies have 
focussed on the impact of live matches TV on 
attendance and the identification of different types 
of supporters.  
Finance Studies on finance have tended to focus on the 
balance between player wages and turnover as 
well the type and level of club debt. Other 
conceptual studies have suggested that clubs can 
increase revenue through player development.  
The players  The research into players as employees or assets 
is limited although player development is a 
recurring theme in relation to finance.  
The manager Although the central figure in much of the 
research, particularly in terms of replacement, the 
role of the manager remains under-researched. 
 
This research project seeks to create a conceptual framework to better 
understand the professional football industry in Scotland based on the views of 
industry participants and a wide range of secondary data to allow reframing 
within the industry. These five themes will be used to provide some boundaries 
within the remaining chapters of the thesis will be framed.   
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3.8 Literature Review Conclusion 
 
This two-part literature review draws on strategic management literature, as a 
basis for understanding organisational strategic thinking, as well as academic 
research into the sports industry. Using Ohmae’s (1982) definition that a 
company’s success is based on the balance of customer, competition and 
competence these five frames can be combined as follows: 
 On-field performance  Competition 
 Attendance  Customer 
 Finance  Competence 
 The players   Competence 
 The manager  Competence 
 
This section has met the first objective of the research project. Two areas of 
academic literature have been reviewed to create a starting point for the 
conceptual framework. These five frames will be used in turn to analyse the 
interviews with industry participants and the descriptive analysis of secondary 
data. This will allow the second and third objectives to be addressed by 
expanding on these frames to create a conceptual framework based on 
inductive research.  
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Chapter 4: Research Methods 
4.1 Introduction  
The research objectives for this study state that a mix of interviews and 
secondary data are to be used within this project. This section contains a 
discussion of the philosophical perspective of pragmatism and how the 
combination of mixed-methods and abductive analysis is appropriate for the 
project. This is followed by a discussion of the methods adopted to achieve the 
overall aim of the project. This includes detail of the primary data collection, 
through interviews, and the database used to host the secondary data. 
 
4.2 Philosophical Perspective 
 
The use of a pragmatic philosophy can bridge the gap between the subjective 
and objective worldviews (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2008). Whilst pragmatism has 
been dismissed by some as ‘whatever works’ (Benton & Craib, 2001) the 
approach offers a solution to the choice between objective and subjective (often 
forced by other philosophical positions) by accepting that the complementary 
positions add strength to the findings (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2006). It is 
suggested that rather than force a choice between objective data collected 
through quantitative methods and subjective data gathered by qualitative 
methods the pragmatic researcher can view the methods as a continuum 
offering a combination of approaches that enable triangulation of methods as 
well as data (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2008). The phenomenon can be better 
understood if multiple methods are used, which should limit the impact of 
researcher bias.  
  
Sports literature has tended to produce objective research, based on 
quantitative methods, that strips out the complexity of the situation by focusing 
on the relationship between managerial replacement and match results. The 
conceptual papers are based on the subjective views of the researchers as 
there is no evidence provided to support the frameworks. The sports industry 
has appealed to researchers because of the large amounts of secondary data 
publicly available (Grusky, 1963) and the difficulty of gaining access to the 
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industry to collect primary data has been noted (Kelly, 2008). This research 
seeks to include both objective data, collected from the public domain, but 
balanced with the more subjective views of industry participants.  
A simple example can be used to illustrate the difference between the objective 
and subjective view in football. The final league table gives an objective 
statement of final league positions calculated on the rules employed by the 
organising body. Subjectively, one club may be delighted with a fifth place finish 
based on previous performance whereas the club finishing fourth may be 
disappointed if they had been placed higher in previous seasons. The final 
position in the league table is objective however the subjective frame, used by 
the individuals within clubs, will perceive that result differently. To balance the 
subjective views of the interview participants, more objective data will be used 
from secondary sources. This will focus on match results, attendance figures 
and player usage, which can be argued as objective measures, taken from 
verified sources rather than rely on journalist’s comment or speculation which is 
more subjective.  
As well encouraging the combination of objective and subjective data, 
pragmatism accommodates the combination of inductive and deductive 
reasoning (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2008). Whilst other philosophies focus on one 
or the other, pragmatism allows the researcher to a search the data for 
emergent patterns, themes or categories and deductively analyse the data 
using an existing framework (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2006). This recursive 
process of moving between the collected and data and theoretical 
generalisations has been defined as abduction (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2008). 
Abductive analysis challenges the researcher to move away from pre-existing 
frames to create new ways of making sense of the subject (Tavory & 
Timmermans, 2014). The challenge for pragmatist researcher is to use the 
available tools effectively to achieve the stated aim (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2008). The problem being studied becomes the focus for the researcher with 
the correct blend of tools utilised to create a robust approach that is triangulated 
by method as well as data. Weick (2002) argues that organisational theory 
development should come from a ‘disciplined imagination’ and Mintzberg (1979) 
likened research to the sifting of evidence by detectives seeking patterns. 
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“Our choice, then, is not between true and false theories so much as 
between more and less useful theories. And usefulness, to repeat, 
stems from detective work well done, followed by creative leaps in 
relevant directions.” 
Mintzberg (1979 P.584) 
 
Weick (2002) and Mintzberg (1979) advocate both the collection of data and the 
use of creativity in developing useful theory. Within the context of the DBA, with 
an emphasis on relevance to practice, this focus on the practical application is 
vital. The collection of different types of data from a range of sources provides 
the researcher with the tools with which to make the creative ‘leap’ forward that 
remains valid until it is replaced by another theory. In this approach the concept 
of truth is replaced with usefulness (Mintzberg 1979).  
The argument presented here by the author is that pragmatism opens up the full 
range of data collection methods, for subjective and/or objective data, that can 
then be processed abductively by the researcher to create theory that is based 
on the findings. The limiting factors in this wide range of tools are deciding how 
best to investigate the problem area and determining which tools are 
appropriate in this instance.  
In this project the main aim of ‘reframing’ involves the replacement of one 
subjective mental model with another (Bolman & Deal 2014). To create a new 
frame then the existing views of industry participants needs to be identified. 
These data are subjective data that should be gathered in such a way as to 
retain the voice of the participant rather than the perceptions of the researcher 
(Creswell & Plano Clark 2006). There is an industry ‘reality’ that can be 
measured from secondary data: results, attendance, financial data, players and 
managers are all available as independent facts that can be used to triangulate 
the views of the participants. These facts can be used to determine patterns in 
past events in a more objective manner than the subjective views of the 
participants without investigating causality between factors.   
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4.3 Data Collection Method 
 
A concurrent triangulation strategy of data collection and analysis is used within 
this project (see Figure 4.3a) where both qualitative and quantitative data is 
collected concurrently (Creswell, 2008). The project is based on a number of 
different themes from previous research that can be used as multiple frames to 
develop a better understanding of the professional football industry in Scotland. 
Those frames are the pivot on which the project is balanced with a wide range 
of primary and secondary data to analyse.  
Finance
On-field Performance
Attendance
Players
Manager
The Club Owner
The Manager
The Chief Executive
The Commercial Director
The Adminstrator
The Participant View
Player Movement Detail
Manager Data
Player Appearances
Match Detail
Club Financial Data 
Published Industry Data
Existing Literature 
Primary Data Secondary Data
 
Figure 4.3a: Research Method. Created by the Author 
 
The data was collected through a mixture of five interviews with industry 
participants, to identify the socially constructed view of the industry, and 
analysis of industry secondary data, as a ‘reality’ to balance the perceived views 
expressed in interview. This triangulation of mixed data was chosen to 
strengthen the analysis by limiting the impact of the author’s values in the 
project.  
4.3.1 Primary Data Collection 
The primary data in this research was collected in five interviews with industry 
participants. The first two interviews were carried out before any secondary data 
collection was carried out to use the participant’s bias in the research rather 
than that of the author. The variety of interviews across a range of positions and 
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clubs allows triangulation within the primary data collection with different 
perspectives of the frames examined.  
The interviews formed a volunteer convenience sample of industry participants 
based on availability rather than selection (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2008), with 
one exception (see Table 4.3a).The difficulty in gaining access to industry 
figures has been highlighted in previous research (Kelly & Waddington, 2006) 
so the interviews were arranged in a number of different ways as shown in the 
Comments column in Table 4.3a.  
 
Although snowball sampling is a recognised approach to gain access in closed 
industries, such as football, there is risk of bias due to the similar experiences of 
the participants that leads to skewed findings (Cohen, Manion & Morrison 
2007).  As a result, a convenience approach was chosen over a snowball 
sample (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2008) as this generated a range of roles within 
different clubs. Where access to participants is challenging researchers do need 
to develop techniques to overcome this (Cohen, Manion & Morrison 2007).  The 
use of a range of personal contacts to arrange access did provide a small 
sample of interviewees but with a breadth of experience that facilitated the 
research. The option to shift to a snowball sample was available but the 
richness of the interviews that were undertaken made this unnecessary.    
Details of how the interview contact was made are included in Table 4.3a. The 
interviews offered a range of views from participants at a number of clubs from 
different roles although generalisability of the findings is limited due to the small 
sample (Benton & Craib 2001). All of the interviewees had experience of senior 
roles within a number of SPL clubs so were able to discuss a wide range of 
issues affecting professional football clubs in Scotland. The interviews lasted 
between one and four hours which generated a rich dataset for analysis. 
Unstructured interviews were used to ensure that the limited experience of the 
researcher in professional football did not narrow the issues discussed and to 
reduce the impact of researcher bias. Although the interviews were 
unstructured, to appreciate the role and experience of the interviewees some 
club-specific research was carried out ahead of each interview to ensure that 
the appropriate language was used in the interview as a means of gaining the 
interviewees’ trust (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2011). The interviews 
covered a wide range of topics and were not limited to a single frame. Different 
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questions were asked to each participant and the responses given allowed the 
opportunity for follow-up questions so the interview was more of a recorded 
conversation (Sapsford & Jupp, 2006) than a structured interview. This is 
consistent with an abductive approach to data collection and analysis as the 
interviewee dictates the flow of the conversation rather than the interviewer 
(Tavory & Timmermans, 2014).  
The interviews were audio-recorded, to facilitate the conversational nature by 
removing the need for the interviewer to take extensive notes. The decision was 
taken not to transcribe the whole interview in order to reduce errors in 
transcription, to retain the gaps in conversation and the tone of voice used 
(Sapsford & Jupp, 2006). Several other factors led to the decision not to 
transcribe the interviews: As previously mentioned, the interviews lasted 
between one and four hours and not all of the content was relevant to this 
study. On several occasions, one of the interviewees reminded the researcher 
that “this is between you and me”. One of the other participants asked that an 
unguarded comment be removed from any transcription.  The confidential 
nature of the discussions, in conjunction with the high media profile of some of 
the participants, meant that the transcription would not be out-sourced. The 
interviews were listened to multiple times (Sapsford & Jupp, 2006) to reflect the 
author’s preferred learning style and to identify the themes that recurred across 
the interviews. The order in which the interviews were replayed was changed to 
help the author identify the different frames in relation to the other interviews. 
This iterative process reflects the detective work of data analysis (Mintzberg, 
1979) allowing the abductive analysis to take place over a period of time 
(Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). No physical coding took place during this 
process.  
Once the five main themes had been identified from the literature, manual 
coding notes and timings were made by grouping together comments from the 
participants using a visual process on large paper using coloured pens (see 
Figure 4.3a) as each interview was listened to again. Research has shown that 
visual learners often come to conclusions without the step by step process that 
read/write learners usually follow (Davis & Bruan 2010). Whilst battling with the 
more traditional approach suggested by others, this author was encouraged by 
Mintzberg’s chapter on theory development to follow a more visual approach.  
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“My work is loaded with diagrams, seeking to express every which 
way how the ideas I am trying to make come together”. 
Mintzberg in Smith & Hitt 2005 P.363 
 
 
Figure 4.3a: Excerpt from an interview coding sheet. Created by the Author 
 
This style of visual representation matches the author’s visual thought process 
where the whole ‘picture’ can be seen allowing the sense-making process to 
occur (Weick in Smith & Hitt 2005). The five broad factors from the literature 
review provided an outline to assist in the identification in the sub-factors. 
Mintzberg (in Smith & Hitt 2005) argues that this is an iterative process that 
creates the environment for the creative leap involved in theory creation.    
“Theorizing involves continuously resetting the boundaries of the 
phenomenon and continuously rejustifying what has newly been 
included and excluded.” 
Weick in Smith & Hitt 2005 P.395 
Both Weick and Mintzberg (in Smith & Hitt 2005) discuss an iterative process 
that is not neat and tidy but requires Weick’s(2002) disciplined imagination and  
Mintzberg’s (1979) detective work of looking for patterns in the evidence. 
 
Once the coding of all the interviews was complete, partial interview 
transcriptions were created for inclusion in the final thesis. These selections 
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reflected the broad themes highlighted by the literature that complemented or 
challenged the views of other interviewees. In revisiting the interviews several 
times the sub-categories began to crystallise as the interview detail suggested 
new factors. The links between the interviews are shown in the arrows drawn in 
Figure 4.3a as the visual interpretation aided this abductive process of revisiting 
the data several times (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014).  As the findings section 
was constructed, relevant quotes were included in the thesis. Here the inductive 
nature of the interviews was offset by the deductive approach to the analysis of 
the data. The boundaries set by the findings of the literature review gave a 
structure upon which to build the framework.  
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Interview Tag Interviewee Role within Football Interview 
Date 
Interview 
Location 
Interview Comment 
The Commercial 
Director 
Participant moved into the football 
industry after early retirement from a large 
financial firm. SPL club but not in the peer 
group. 
8/12/08 Club restaurant  Contact offered by a friend who knew people at the club. 
The Commercial Director volunteered to participate.  
The Administrator Full-time member of league organising 
body (SPL) before moving to a similar role 
in Europe. 
17/12/08 SPL offices at 
Hampden Park 
Contact was offered following a request for advice from an 
academic at another University. 
The Owner He had been a shareholder in one before 
taking control of another SPL club. Both 
clubs were outside of the peer group.  
He is the owner of several other 
businesses outside of football. 
5/3/09 Interviewee’s 
office 
Contact offered by a friend who had previously worked for 
the Owner.  
The Chief Executive A player at a number of senior clubs in 
Scotland and England before moving into 
the day-to-day running of a club. 
Experience of several peer group clubs in 
Scotland. 
7/6/09 Author’s home Contact established through a mutual friend as the 
interviewee was able to offer a unique insight based on his 
role.  
The Manager An SPL manager of several clubs within 
the SPL and in England. He has playing 
experience in both Scotland and England. 
Experience as player and manager within 
the peer group. 
25/5/11 Author’s office 
on campus 
The author met the interviewee at an event and set up the 
interview to get the manager’s view.  
 
Table 4.3a: Interview Details. Created by the Author. 
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There were ethical considerations for the interview content. The level of trust 
developed between the interviewees and the author was such that, on 
occasion, something was said that was not for public consumption and the 
participant asked if it could be removed from any transcript. Some of the 
discussions were commercially sensitive and others included personal views 
that were clearly not to be shared. The data included in the final thesis has been 
carefully selected to protect the participants’ anonymity. A broad job description 
is used to indicate which interview the detail came from to make the findings 
chapter easier to read. Any references to players, clubs or locations that may 
allow the identification of the participants have been removed to protect their 
anonymity.  
The primary data was manually coded using the broad themes identified in the 
literature review but long quotes are included to allow the participants’ voices to 
be heard in the final analysis.  
4.3.2 Secondary Data Collection  
 
The process of secondary data identification and collection was exploratory. 
The object was to obtain industry data that was high-quality and would allow a 
sub-set longitudinal analysis (Bryman & Bell, 2003). Some summary data, e.g. 
final league tables and some attendance data, was available from the SPL and 
SFL web-sites but the data was not consistent across the organising bodies and 
contained errors in the attendance detail. The annual PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC) report into the financial state of Scottish football gave some detail but 
the data was limited to what they thought was important and format changes 
over the years meant that consistent data was difficult to acquire. The official 
submissions to Companies House were in a variety of formats with inconsistent 
naming across the clubs and years so those were rejected as well.  
The data used was collected from three main sources: 
 Fame - provides detailed financial data on UK & Irish companies 
available through the University Library. Data over a ten year period can 
be downloaded in a standard format spreadsheet (fame.bvdinfo.com). 
 Soccerbase – a web-site maintained by the Racing Post which is the 
horse-racing industry newspaper. Detailed information is held about 
football by club and season. The site holds details on every signed player 
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with appearance detailed by competition. The data was transferred to the 
database one season per club through ‘copy and paste’ to reduce the 
introduction of manual entry errors (www.soccerbase.com).  
 Football-Data.co.uk – a web-site that hosts data from the betting 
industry. Match details by season can be downloaded in a spreadsheet 
that allows error-free data transfer. Match detail includes the official 
attendance as well as the result (www.football-data.co.uk).  
The data available for these sites set the timeline for the project. The aim was to 
provide consistent data over a long time rather than attach significance to a 
particular short period.  
As the literature review focusses on the question of a firm’s performance the 
secondary data is grouped by club, rather than adopt an industry-wide view, to 
allow a comparative approach to be taken. The data are grouped by football 
season rather than calendar year to be consistent with the industry.  
The context chapter illustrates the clubs who have participated in the SPL over 
the review period (see Figure 2b). Figure 4.3b sorts those clubs into two distinct 
categories based on the number of seasons that the clubs participated in the 
SPL. Only those clubs which spent all eleven seasons in the SPL have been 
included in the study to provide consistency. The financial might of the Old Firm, 
as discussed in the context chapter, meant that the comparison with the other 
clubs would also be of limited value. By focussing on a small number of clubs 
that have been relatively consistent on the field and have comparable budgets, 
a detailed analysis is likely to be more valuable as the extraneous factors have 
been removed.      
Aberdeen
Dundee United
Hearts
Hibernian
Kilmarnock
Motherwell
Celtic
Rangers
Dunfermline (7)
Inverness CT (6)
St Mirren (6)
Dundee (5)
Falkirk (5)
Livingston (5)
St Johnstone (4)
Hamilton (3)
Partick Thistle (2)
Gretna (1)
11 Seasons
Seasons in Scottish Premier League Membership
 
Figure 4.3b: Seasons in the SPL. Created by the Author 
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The club analysis will only be used in the analysis of secondary data as not all 
of the clubs in the peer group are represented in the convenience sample of 
interviews. The aim of the research is to reframe the Scottish professional 
football industry but this is achieved in part by analysing the secondary data at a 
club level to understand more about the whole industry by looking at the firms 
that compete in that market.  
To support the inductive approach to the research project a range of secondary 
data was collected and stored in a Microsoft Access database designed for this 
project (Figure 4.3c). This approach was based on the author’s previous career 
in the IT industry. The choice of relational database was based on skillset and 
the flexibility of data manipulation. Although the statistical functions within 
Access are limited, given the use of descriptive statistics in the thesis the author 
opted to make use of an existing high level of expertise in database design and 
coding.  
 
Club Data
By Season
Individual
Match Detail
Individual Manager 
Detail by 
Appointment
Individual Player 
Movement Detail
Individual Player 
Appearance Detail 
by Season
Linked by Team Name
Manager in Charge
Signed/Released By
Unique Player Id
Linked by Team Name
See Appendix 1 
Table A1a
See Appendix 1 
Table A1e
See Appendix 1 
Table A1b
See Appendix 1 
Table A1c
And Appendix 1 
Table A1f
See Appendix 1 
Table A1d
 
Figure 4.3c: Database Design. Created by the Author 
 
The details of the data stored in each category are shown in Appendix 1. 
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The system used to translate cup competition progress into a numeric value is 
shown in Table 4.3b. This allows league position and cup progress to be 
compared on a season by season for the peer group clubs.  
Scottish Cup Pre Season 
2007-08 
Scottish Cup Season 2007-08 
& following 
League Cup 
Achievement 
Points 
Awarded 
Achievement 
Points 
Awarded 
Achievement 
Points 
Awarded 
3rd Round 2 4th Round 2 2nd Round 2 
4th Round 4 5th Round 4 3rd Round 4 
Quarter-Final 6 Quarter-Final 6 Quarter-Final 6 
Semi-Final 8 Semi-Final 8 Semi-Final 8 
Final 10 Final 10 Final 10 
Winner 12 Winner 12 Winner 12 
 
Table 4.3b: Coding System Employed for Cup Competitions 
 
4.4 Method Limitations 
 
There are limitations in any research method (Creswell, 2008) although care 
has been taken to design a robust system for the collection and analysis of 
appropriate data. One limitation is that, in inductive research, the method 
cannot be value free as the researcher’s views and experience will influence the 
type of data collected and the analysis carried out (Bryman & Bell, 2003). The 
impact of this is minimised through the existing literature and triangulated data 
but the existence of the researcher’s values does need to be recognised.  
A second limitation is the use of a convenience sample for the interviews. The 
difficulties of access to industry participants has been highlighted in previous 
research (Kelly & Waddington, 2006) so a convenience sample was used to 
overcome this difficulty but the wide range of contacts established through the 
process ensures that the views of different roles and clubs are represented in 
the research.  
4.5 Section Summary 
 
The primary and secondary data collected allow the – largely - subjective view 
of the interviewees to be balanced with a more objective view based on 
published data. The interviews are analysed by frame to allow a comparison of 
the different views of the participants. The analysis of the secondary data 
through descriptive statistics allows a triangulation with the primary data to 
establish if there are patterns in the data that can be identified but no causality 
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is sought. The aim of the project is to develop a conceptual framework that 
allows a better understanding of professional football in Scotland.  
The structure of the research is framed by the existing academic literature but 
seeks the view of those within the industry rather than focus on the researcher’s 
opinion of what is important. Five different frames, sporting performance, 
attendance, finance, players & manager, have been identified by the author 
through the literature review of academic research in the sports industry as 
distinct frames that allow the same phenomenon to be viewed from a specific 
perspective. These five frames will be looked at in isolation to identify the 
significant factors that will be used to create the conceptual framework in the 
next chapter. This approach follows Mintzberg’s (1979) notion of ‘detective 
work’ that should be carried out in research.  
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Chapter 5: Analysis – Exploring Existing Frames 
5.1 – Introduction to Findings  
 
The research project is designed to analyse perceptions held by industry 
participants within the frames identified in the sports literature and then to 
explore the views in more detail using secondary data provided from within the 
industry. These interviews were carried out at the beginning of the research 
project specifically to challenge the pre-existing frames and assumptions of the 
researcher and the reader. As was shown in the literature review much of the 
existing academic research into the sports industry relies on the assumptions of 
researchers who operate outside of the industry partly due to the difficulties of 
gaining access to participants (Kelly & Waddington, 2006).   
This chapter adresses the second and third project objectives: 
 Research the current dominant frames within Scottish football through a 
series of interviews with industry figures.  
 The conceptual framework will be further developed through an inductive 
study of secondary data currently available on Scottish football clubs and 
their players.  
These are broad objectives and deliberately so. One of the failings identified 
with academic research in both strategic management and professional sport is 
that it codifies an entire industry into a few key variables. By doing so it loses 
the relevance for practitioners as they live and work in complexity and in 
seeking to add to practice this researcher must seek to retain a much of that 
complexity as is possible.  
 
5.2 – The Structure of the Findings 
 
The detailed discussion of the different frames will begin with Sporting 
Performance as it has been suggested that this is easily measured 
(Bridgewater, 2010) and that firm standing in league tables is a widely accepted 
measure of sporting success (Grusky, 1963) that has become a comparison 
tool in other industries as well, such as all levels of education (Bridgewater, 
2010). Following on from a discussion on Sporting Performance in this chapter 
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Supporter Attendance will be explored. Whilst Grusky (1963) argued that there 
was a correlation between successful Sporting Performance and Attendance 
this has been challenged since (Szymanski, 2009) and the ways in which 
supporters engage with clubs has changed over time (Giulianotti 2005; 
Adamson, Jones & Tapp, 2006). The relationship between club and supporter is 
considered only from the firm’s perspective rather than a sociological study of 
how fans perceive the relationship. Both Sporting Performance and Attendance 
appear to impact on Finance so this frame is considered third in this findings 
chapter. It has been suggested that there has been an ‘arms race’ of spending 
to achieve greater Sporting Performance (Baroncelli & Lago, 2006; Andreff, 
2007) although a range of factors is explored by the different interviewees that 
show how Scottish professional football has adjusted to lower revenue streams 
due to a number of factors during the eleven season period used to gather 
secondary data.  
Players are viewed as the major expenditure in the club but also as assets who 
can be sold as part of a deliberate revenue stream. Although two of the 
interviewees are former professional footballers, the player’s view of the club 
has not been sought. The decision was taken to look at Scottish Professional 
Football from a firm perspective and players are viewed as assets rather than 
employees. This decision was taken to keep the research project focussed on a 
firm view of business competitive advantage.  
The Manager, as a key decision maker, is included as the final frame in this 
chapter. Much of the academic research in the sports industry has focussed on 
manager replacement so this is reflected in the project. The recruitment, 
performance, impact and replacement of managers is discussed at length by 
the interviewees which included an experienced club manager to balance up 
the business executive view. 
Each theme from the sports literature will be used as a frame to analyse the 
data collected and develop a deeper understanding of the perceptions of the 
industry participants.  
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5.3 – Sporting Performance 
5.3.1 – Analysis of Primary Data: The Participants’ Views 
 
Within this section consideration is given to understanding of how success in 
Sporting Performance is defined within the Scottish professional football 
industry. Grusky (1963) proposed that team standing, based on the number of 
matches won or lost over the course of a season, was the established criterion 
for team effectiveness within professional baseball. Bridgwater (2010) updates 
this suggestion with the qualification that not all clubs define success in the 
same terms. This subjective view of success was expressed by several of the 
interviewees who assisted in this research project. The Owner identified that in 
Scottish professional football at that time there were effectively three different 
levels of team within the same league. 
“Rangers and Celtic are a completely anomaly. You have two top 20 
clubs in the world in a country the size of Scotland. You can’t change 
history so don’t even bother butting your head against it. The two of 
them are colossal. The issue we have in the SPL is we have three 
leagues in one league. You’ve got Celtic and Rangers. You’ve got Hibs, 
Hearts and Aberdeen. Dundee United, maybe. And the rest. Celtic and 
Rangers are division 1, the other guys division 2 and the rest of the guys 
are division 3. And what you’ve got, in my opinion, is you got three 
leagues playing each other. And that’s the difficulty that you have in the 
SPL.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The financial resources of Celtic and Rangers made it almost impossible for any 
other club in Scotland to finish in either first or second. In the eleven seasons 
analysed as part of this research project only Hearts in Season 2005/06 broke 
this domination when they finished second in the league. The Owner identified 
three, possibly four, other clubs who operated at secondary level and the other 
five or six clubs in the league were a third tier. This assessment can be seen in 
terms of turnover and attendances and this will be discussed in the relevant 
sections below.  
The Administrator also suggested that there were different levels of 
achievement within the SPL. Those who invested their own money into the 
sport did it because they wanted to; the drive for success, or ‘arms race’, led to 
inflation in spending as a result of the completive nature of sport but that not 
everyone could be successful.  
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“The input of investors or other benefactors at a club level are very 
important but the competitive nature of football means that there is this 
arms race that is ongoing to try and get to that, chase that top six spot, 
or that 3rd place spot or avoid relegation but obviously if you’ve got 12 
teams and they all invest exactly the same amount of money then 
there’s somebody that is going to fail there.” 
“The Administrator” Interview with the author 17
th
 December 2008 
The Administrator highlighted two areas of significance in this statement. He 
discussed the importance of club benefactors, who were willing to invest 
discretionarily in football to achieve a certain level of success. This investment 
will be discussed in the section on club Finance below. The other point made in 
this quote adds to the suggestion that different clubs perceive success in 
different ways based on their budget and playing squad. The Administrator 
suggests that clubs could chase third place in the league, which underlines the 
acceptance at the time that Celtic and Rangers would finish first and second; 
therefore other clubs would be happy to finish in the top half of the table, which 
would increase gate receipts and the distribution of sponsor’s revenue, and 
some clubs would be perceive success as retaining their top flight status for 
another season.  
The definition of what success means for different clubs can be illustrated by 
comparing two statements made by different interviewees. The Chief Executive 
explained how he created the plan to achieve club’s target of third place within 
three or four years.  
“It took six weeks, the manager walked [resigned] in that time and I 
came back to him [the chairman] and said  
‘Look, that’s what I think I can do it for to get you 3rd place. As far I can 
see it was going to be a £1.5m loss every year for you. Can you handle 
that?’ 
‘Absolutely’  
‘Good, let’s go for it then.’ 
It was no more difficult than that.” 
The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
In this process the Chief Executive had created a budgeted plan to achieve a 
clearly defined level of success: finishing third or the best of the rest behind the 
Old Firm. The Commercial Director’s club had more modest ambitions by 
comparison although for a small club finishing in the top half of the table was 
seen as ambitious.   
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“Success for [this club] is to be, our ambitious target is to get into the top 
six in the SPL. Last year we were 7th so the target is top six and any cup 
runs are seen as a bonus. That‘s realistic I think as an expectation.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
If the comments by the Commercial Director about a top six finish are linked to 
the Owner’s views on three leagues operating within one then the ambition for a 
small club can be understood more easily. The Commercial Director also 
introduced the importance of cup competitions for clubs outside The Old Firm.  
“We’re realistic to think we’ll never be a Rangers or a Celtic because we 
just don’t have the fan-base or the income to compete. If Celtic’s getting 
60,000 at a home game and we’re getting 6,000 it puts in in perspective. 
We realise we can compete with them in the likes of cup competitions, 
and we’re in the CIS cup semi-final, but we will never win the league. 
We have to be realistic.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The Commercial Director suggested that smaller clubs could match those with a 
larger fan-base, and the related income streams, in one-off cup matches. The 
Owner who bought into a club which had previously finished third in the league 
and won one of the cup competitions did point out how difficult winning a cup 
competition was.   
“[They] had a few things going for it, now when you look back at it you 
can say [they] had gone over the peak. They had finished 3rd in the SPL, 
won a trophy, first team outside the Old Firm for ages to win a trophy, 
but they were like way beyond their means.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The Owner’s comments reflect the importance of the Cup competitions in the 
club’s assessment of success although this level of perceived success was too 
hard to sustain. From the interviews, there does appear to be a consistent view 
amongst the participants that success is relative to the expectations of the club. 
The Administrator and the Owner suggested that, at that point in time, there 
were different levels of expectations: top three, top six and survival. The Chief 
Executive had created the budget to achieve the top three finish where the 
Commercial Director saw that a top six finish for his club would be very 
successful. However, the Administrator highlighted in his assessment of the 
league that there were different levels of expectations and that with similar 
financial investment someone had to fail.  
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Through the interviews the perceptions of success from each of the participants 
is highlighted. For them, success was relative rather than absolute within 
perceived hierarchies. The top three finish was based on the assumption that, 
at the time, Celtic and Rangers would take two of those places and most likely 
the top two places. Smaller clubs looked to progress from SPL survival to a 
finish in the top six. Whilst the final position in the league table was important to 
each of the participants, several of the interviewees noted that cup competitions 
offered alternative routes to perceived success where the smaller clubs could 
compete with the Old Firm. 
5.3.2 –Analysis of Secondary Data 
Within the research project the subjective view of the industry participants is 
triangulated with secondary data from an eleven-season period focussed on a 
small peer group.  
In this section the final league position is examined over the period to establish 
if there is a hierarchy where some clubs, in a second tier to the Old Firm’, 
achieve regular success throughout the period.   
The same process is applied to the Scottish and League Cups to determine if 
these tournaments do offer an alternative route to success for the peer group 
clubs.  
5.3.2.1 –Final League Position 
 
The final league position of each of the peer group clubs is shown in Figure 
5.3a, with gridlines marking top three, top six and relegation finishes. The graph 
appears confusing with no easily discerned pattern. A review of the data (see 
Table 5.3.2.1) underlines the observation that pattern is that there is no pattern. 
The lines connecting the blocks help the reader trace the final standings of each 
of the clubs.  
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Figure 5.3a: Final SPL League Positions within the Peer Group.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
To assist in the identification of a pattern within league standing the results for 
each club have been categorised and a median position calculated. The 
categories use the definitions used by the interviewees to define success. 
  
 Median 
Position 
Top 3 Top 6 Bottom 6 Bottom 2 
Aberdeen 6 1 6 5 1 
Dundee Utd 8 1 5 6 2 
Hearts 4 5 10 1 0 
Hibernian 6 2 7 4 0 
Kilmarnock 7 0 5 6 2 
Motherwell 7 1 5 6 1 
 
 Table 5.3a: Analysis of Final SPL League Positions within the Peer Group. Created by the 
Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
The absence of a clear hierarchy within the peer group clubs can be seen in 
Table 5.3a. From this Hearts are the most consistent club over the period with 
the highest median finish, only one season where they failed to finish in the top 
six and the only club to break the Old Firm dominance of the top two places in 
Season 2005/06 (See Figure 5.3a). Although more successful than the others 
Hearts performance does fluctuate albeit less than the others. Five of the six 
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clubs finished in the top three but four also finished in the bottom two. 
Motherwell finished in twelfth place and escaped relegation as Falkirk were not 
able to meet the SPL stadium requirements.  
Although there appear to be no dominant teams within the peers it was harder 
for clubs outwith the group to be successful in the league. In the first four years 
of the review, (seasons 2000-2001 to season 2003/2004) three or four of the 
peer group teams finished outside the top six. From Season 2004-2005 
onwards no team outside the peer group or the Old Firm finished in a top six 
league position at the end of the season.  
From the analysis of secondary data there appears to be no fixed hierarchy of 
league success within the peer group. The next sections apply a similar 
analysis to the cup competitions to establish whether or not the perceptions 
expressed in the interviews are backed up by the data.  
5.3.2.2 –Cup Performance 
 
This section considers the performance of the peer group in the cup 
competitions as the Owner explained that the club he took over had “won a 
trophy, first team outside the Old Firm for ages to win a trophy” which suggests 
that the teams that were expected to finish in the top two league positions every 
year also tended to dominate the cup competitions (see tables 5.3b and 5.3c). 
This view is slightly at odds with that of the Commercial Director who suggested 
that in a knock-out competition his team could compete due to fewer matches 
played and the element of luck in the draw.  
The Old Firm clubs do dominate the cup competitions, as suggested by the 
Owner, although not to the same extent (see Tables 5.3b and 5.3c). The 
analysis includes semi-final participation as a perceived measure of success. 
The financial implications of these matches is discussed in a later section but 
the achievement of reaching these showcase matches, held on a neutral venue 
and usually televised, is recognised in this analysis.  
Scottish Cup Winner Finalist Semi-finals 
Old Firm  9 1 1 
Peer Group  2 2 8 
Other SPL 0 5 4 
Other League 0 3 9 
 
Table 5.3b: Analysis of Scottish Cup Performance. Created by the Author from Soccerbase 
Data 
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Rangers and Celtic won nine of the eleven Scottish Cup Finals in the review 
period (see table 5.3b) with the other two won by teams within the peer group. A 
similar picture emerges from a review of the Scottish League Cup Finals over 
the same period with the Old Firm clubs winning nine of the eleven finals. One 
peer group team was successful as was one other SPL club outside the peer 
group.  
League Cup Winner Finalist Semi-finals 
Old Firm  9 3 3 
Peer Group  1 5 12 
Other SPL 1 2 6 
Other League 0 1 1 
 
Table 5.3c: Analysis of Scottish League Performance. Created by the Author from Soccerbase 
Data  
 
The above figures (see tables 5.3b and 5.3c) demonstrate that it is possible for 
clubs outside the Old Firm to win the knockout cup competitions although this 
does not happen often. These figures set a context for the perception of 
success within the peer group and this is looked at in the next section. 
  
5.3.2.3 –Peer Group Cup Performance  
 
From an analysis of the peer group cup performance (see Tables 5.3d and 
5.3.e) it appears that it is difficult for teams to sustain success in the knock-out 
competitions over time. It appears that there is little pattern of sustained 
competitive advantage in the cup competitions. The data has been analysed to 
show how often each of the peer group clubs were knocked out of the cup in the 
first match as well as wins, final and semi-final appearances. Over the period, 
Aberdeen have been knocked out in the first match less than others but have 
not reached the final of either competition. Kilmarnock have been the least 
successful club in the Scottish Cup, exiting in the first match on four occasions, 
but have reached the League Cup final twice. Hearts have won the Scottish 
Cup once but did not get beyond the semi-final of the League Cup. Hibernian 
and Dundee United have been the most successful teams in terms of reaching 
the later stages of the cup competitions with both teams winning once and 
making two other appearances in the final.  
  
76 
 
 
 
1
st
 Round Wins Finals Semi 
Aberdeen 1 0 0 2 
Dundee United 3 1 1 1 
Hearts 4 1 0 1 
Hibernian 3 0 1 3 
Kilmarnock 4 0 0 0 
Motherwell 4 0 1 1 
 
Table 5.3d: Scottish Cup Performance for the Peer Group Season 2000/01 to 2010/11. 
 Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
 
 
1
st
 Round Wins Finals Semi 
Aberdeen 1 0 0 2 
Dundee United 1 0 1 3 
Hearts 2 0 0 4 
Hibernian 1 1 1 1 
Kilmarnock 2 0 2 0 
Motherwell 2 0 1 2 
 
Table 5.3e: Scottish League Cup Performance for the Peer Group Season 2000/01 to 2010/11. 
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
Dundee United’s performance in the league was the lowest of the peer group 
but in terms of competitions they have been the most successful. To create an 
overall assessment of performance the cup data was coded and added to the 
league positions to create a combined total for each season (see Figure 5.3b).   
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Figure 5.3b: Combined On-Field Success within the Peer Group.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
By combining the data in this way a different picture emerges from the league 
only data although the pattern is even less clear (see Figure 5.3a). With the 
combined data Hearts dominance is less pronounced than it is when only the 
league position is considered, particularly from season 2006/07 onwards, as 
their performance in the cup competitions was not as strong as some of others. 
In places there is some overlap of performance so it appears that some clubs 
disappear from the figure. This combined data gives a more nuanced definition 
of ‘team standing’ as it takes account of both league and cup performance.  
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5.3.3 –Section Summary 
 
This section has considered success in match performance terms through a 
combination of final league position and progress in the two knock-out cup 
competitions. Several of the interviewees suggested that the perception of 
success in Scottish professional football can be measured by three bands: top 
three, top six and SPL survival. The perception of performance appears to be 
based on the expectation of the club owners and different levels of risk and 
investment were taken based on that expectation. The Commercial Director and 
the Owner made reference to success in the cup competitions as other 
indicators of a successful club although, again, different clubs had varying 
levels of expectations. The data used has suggested that sporting success in 
cup competitions can also be banded where reaching the final or semi-final can 
be seen as a success for some clubs. The definition of sporting success, in 
Scottish professional football, should take account of the final league position 
and both competitions. 
The next section explores the link between team standing and attendance as 
well as a consideration of the different types of supporters who attend matches.  
5.4 – Attendance 
 
The previous section looked at a way in which sporting performance could be 
defined, taking into account the nature of the different competitions that the 
professional football clubs in Scotland compete. It took a season-long view 
rather than a win-percentage over a number of games within a season as had 
previously been used within academic research (see Table 3.5).  
5.4.1 – Analysis of Primary Data: The Participants’ Views 
5.4.1.1 – Understanding Supporters 
The participants’ views of match attendance was more nuanced than previously 
suggested by the literature as the importance of fans from other clubs was 
highlighted as was the deliberate long-term development of a supporter base 
that several of the participants explained. The Manager was fairly straight-
forward in his view of the importance of supporter’s for the club and the danger 
of isolating them. 
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“You have to give the supporters what they want. In any business you 
have to make sure that your customer is looked after……once you lose 
them [fans], you lose them for good” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Owner explained what his view of what supporters wanted: entertainment.  
“The other thing that people need to recognise is that we’re in the 
entertainment business. One of the managers I interviewed, an ex-Hibs 
manager is famous for saying if you want to be entertained, you should 
go to the cinema. There is nothing better than watching a game when 
your team is 2-down and come back to win 3-2. There is not a better 
experience. It is fantastic.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The Owner explained that he had decided not to appoint the manager in 
question because of the difference in view. The Owner believed that football 
was entertainment whereas the manager who had been interviewed 
(unsuccessfully) did not. The Owner highlighted that excitement is not always 
linked to winning trophies but the maintenance of SPL status proved to be the 
biggest thrill he experienced whilst owning the club.  
“I got to manage the football club and the biggest thrill I’ve had in 
football, even watching people winning cups and winning leagues and 
all sorts of things, was avoiding relegation with [the Owner’s club] in one 
of the seasons I had them in the SPL, was avoiding relegation the last 
day of the season.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
However, the excitement of escaping relegation on the final day of the season 
did not translate into stable attendance numbers. The Owner realised, on 
reflection, that the club had previously over-achieved and as a result attendance 
did suffer.  
“I wanted the club, I believed it had good infrastructure, in a good town 
and at one time had over 4500 season ticket holders. Two things 
happened since then. They were on the downslope and [other clubs 
nearby] started to boom. The overspill of [nearby city] in [the town] 
meant they had an SPL team on their doorstep lets down and watch 
them play Celtic, Rangers, Aberdeen, whatever, they are actually doing 
quite well. Suddenly that gloss went off them and they suddenly started 
becoming very average to below average and I thought I could arrest 
that and I thought I could do something with it.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The Owner identified that some of those attending had chosen to watch the 
opposition as well as support their local team whilst they were successful. The 
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other nearby clubs, also in the SPL, started to improve and there appears to 
have been an impact on the attendance at the Owner’s club.  
“If you take a club like Queen of the South in Dumfries or St Johnstone, 
the butcher, the baker, the candlestick-maker they all put money, the 
love the football club. [We didn’t] have that history to draw on but what it 
had going for it was a huge business community in [the town] and my 
view was that we’ve been in the SPL if we can get back to the kind of 
numbers and the run properly we can make it work.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
This reflection by the Owner suggested that the club did not have the supporter 
loyalty of some other clubs in similarly-sized towns. He identified that 
attendance was dependant on success and that had he been able to return the 
club to the top six in the SPL the attendance would have increased. The Chief 
Executive expressed his view that clubs needed to be successful over an 
extended period of time to have a significant long-term increase in attendance.  
“I think it takes a generation, that’s an easy figure, but it take 20 years, 
15-20 years of success, probably 15 is alright because you need to get 
the kids young, in the schools and develop them as fans, not as players 
as fans.” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
Two concepts can be seen in the views of the Owner and the Chief Executive: 
that the development of a supporter base can be seen as a long-term 
development process and that some of those attending football matches have 
come to see the away team. Both of these ideas were discussed by the 
Commercial Director who explained how his club develop the links between 
these potential attendees and the club.  
5.4.1.2 – Supporter Development 
 
The Commercial Director explained that developing a larger supporter base was 
a long-term project.  
“We need to keep an eye on the short-term from a financial perspective 
but from a marketing perspective we need to have a longer-term 
marketing plan which is all about growing a fan-base in the local 
community. It’s almost like getting this conveyor belt.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
He explained that social football had been identified as a means of developing 
relationships with families in the area.  
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“We have a very thriving community department here. We run teams 
from under-5 all the up to under-19 and many teams in each age group. 
We actually charge a monthly subscription for that so that’s paid by 
direct debit by the parents so their kids can train two nights a week and 
get a game on a Saturday morning. They all get kitted out with the best 
of tracksuits, strips, everything. It really is very professionally run.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
This supporter development through football was kept separate from the elite 
player development which will be discussed in a later section. The community 
department was set up to develop a relationship with families in the local area 
so that became a part of the club in the long-term. This development was to be 
matched with the creation of a family area within the stadium with reduced 
prices to encourage attendance.  
“We’re going to create a family stand where we’re going to really cut 
prices quite dramatically and probably charge something like £10 for 
adults and £5 for kids. To come and watch SPL football, that’s pretty 
good.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The Chief Executive referred to the concept of developing fans in the context of 
growing attendances but the Commercial Director discussed the stages that 
could be followed from the initial engagement through the opportunity for 
children to play football followed up with appropriate ticket pricing and specific 
areas within the stadium. Where previous academic studies (Grusky, 1963 & 
Grundy, 1998) had suggested that improved performances would lead to 
increased attendance two of the interviewees expressed the views that 
supporter development was a long-term process; although linked it was linked 
to improved on-field performance there were other infrastructure projects, such 
as family areas in the ground, that needed to be in place as well. 
5.4.1.3 –Reconnecting with Lost Supporters 
 
As well as building relationships with a new generation of supporters, the 
Chairman and the Commercial Director both spoke of reconnecting with those 
who had attended in the past but had stopped attending. This challenges the 
view of the Manager that once a club lost fans they were lost permanently. As 
expressed in the previous section, the Chairman suggested that by improving 
the on-field results the club may attract the lost supporters back however how 
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this would be achieved was not discussed in the interview. The Commercial 
Director, not surprisingly given his job title, discussed this at some length in his 
interview. 
The community department was engaged in building involvement with the 
football club on a regular basis. These were already viewed as customers.  
“The sales promotion is really aimed at external customers. The 
academy and the community, they are already [our] customers. Sales 
promotions are things we do in the press to try and bring people from 
the wider community who either don’t go to football matches or who 
haven’t been for a long time.”   
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The Commercial Director went to explain how the potential interest in the club in 
the surrounding area could be defined by comparing an up-coming cup semi-
final with the club’s support at a cup final ten years earlier.  
“In the final itself there were 24,000 [club] supporters at that match. I use 
the word supporters loosely but it shows you the catchment area and 
the [town] environment. Although you’ve maybe only got a hard-core 
support of 4,000 or 5,000 who turn up every week, the catchment area 
can support 24-25,000 people on a successful cup run. The semi-final, 
it’ll probably be a cold January night so we’ll probably take about 
10,000. But if we do get a final, which will be played on a Saturday or a 
Sunday then we’ll take about 25,000 to that.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The Commercial Director was able to differentiate between supporter groups by 
comparing the regular league match attendance of 4-5,000 with the potential of 
24,000 who may attend a major cup final. The Commercial Director did not 
expect that all of the additional 20,000 fans who may attend a cup final could be 
attracted to attend of a regular basis, but that 10% could.  
“We have to be realistic. Everything we do it predicated by the fact that 
we’re a 6,000 attendance club.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
By establishing contact with these potential supporters in the local community 
through a range of sales promotions, the Commercial Director believed that 
regular crowds could be improved. He went on to explain the value of the sales 
promotions was not simply increased attendance but the data that could be 
collected to be used in future marketing campaigns. 
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“We’re capturing information. All these things we have coupons that they 
have to fill in: name, address, email address, date of birth. We capture 
that information and add it to the database going forward.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The Commercial Director explained the project that he was working on to collect 
supporter data from a number of sources into a single database that could be 
used in the future.  
“At the moment, we have fragmented databases throughout the football 
club. What we’re trying to as a project just now is pull them all together 
so we have a [club] database. That doesn’t exist at the moment. We 
have all the various categories of databases. The main one is the 
season ticket database of 3,000. But in total these categories probably 
add up to around 10,000 so if we pull all that together and start using 
email marketing.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The increased level of data available on those attending matches allowed the 
club to target their marketing although this is not restricted to ‘home’ supporters. 
The Owner, in his interview, had noted that football supporters in the catchment 
area for his club came to watch the opposition teams as well as their local club. 
The Commercial Director discussed a benefit to his club of a dispute with Celtic 
and Rangers over tickets.  
5.4.1.4 – Developing Relationships with Away Fans 
 
The Commercial Director explained that a dispute over a ticket levy charged by 
Celtic and Rangers had proven to be benefit for his club.  
“Because of the ticket policy that was introduced this year by Rangers 
and Celtic, they were wanting a 5% levy for the privilege of selling our 
tickets we decided that we would just do it ourselves and sell to the local 
Rangers and Celtic football supporters in this area, of whom there are 
many, and we’ve collected all that data from the local Rangers 
supporters and the local Celtic supporters so we have that database 
now, which is a secondary database but it’s potentially people who 
might come back and watch [us] at some point in the future. By the way, 
we’ve sold out all the Rangers ad Celtic tickets without paying the 5% 
levy so we kind of called their bluff and very successful in terms of not 
having to pay the extra income, giving ourselves access to new 
database of customers that we didn’t have previously so it’s been 
successful.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
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The dispute began with the Old Firm attempting to attach a handling fee for 
tickets to away matches. Rather than pay the levy the Commercial Director’s 
club decided to market directly to the Celtic and Rangers fans in their local area. 
Not only did this protect their own revenue stream, but the club were able to 
gather data on these locally based Old Firm fans that would permit future direct 
marketing to away supporters thus creating a different relationship with another 
fan group.  
As well as linking directly to fans of other teams the opportunities for clubs to 
create links with those fans out-with the immediate catchment area was 
discussed by the Commercial Director and the Administrator. This concept will 
be considered in the next section.  
5.4.1.5 – Developing Relationships with Remote Fans 
 
The previous sections have considered the importance of developing 
relationships with different types of people who attend football matches: young 
fans, ‘lost’ supporters and those who follow other clubs but attend matches as 
an away fan. Two other types of fan were identified in the author’s interviews: 
ex-pat fans who retain an emotional interest in their old club despite a physical 
separation and football fans in overseas markets who can be reached by 
importing players. The relationships with those can be developed either directly, 
through web-TV streaming directly by the club, or indirectly through centrally 
negotiated TV deals.  
The Commercial Director explained how the broadcast of matches through the 
club web-site allowed increased revenue by maintaining links with overseas 
fans through a monthly subscription but that fans of other clubs were also 
targeted to watch their team’s matches as well.  
“Modern areas we’re moving into are new media. So its things like [club 
TV channel], which isn’t actually on your TV, it’s on your laptop or your 
PC, where we’ll film all of our home matches and we’ll sell monthly 
subscriptions, it’s usually about £5 a month, so that our supporters 
overseas can watch [us] playing on a Saturday. More importantly, an 
area that we’re just really just being able to capitalise on is opposition 
supporters who are overseas. So, for example, last Saturday when we 
played Hibs, we’re currently just targeting [our] supporters overseas but 
we could actually be targeting Hibs supporters. There are probably more 
of them overseas than there are [our] supporters.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
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The Commercial Director identified here that the direct link to away supporters 
for physical attendance could also be used via the web-site. This allows the club 
to tap into a wider fan-base than just their own. As with the direct marketing of 
physical attendance the collection of data was important to the club.  
“So those kind of areas, the web-site, we’ve had fantastic analytics on 
the website. Last year we had just under a million visits to our [club] 
website. Which is great for a small football club and I think of those 
40,000 of those were unique visitors. These are fantastic analytics and 
we need to capitalise on that, selling advertising space on the back of 
that. We’re just scratching the surface of that at the moment.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The importance of advertising revenue will be discussed in a later section on 
finance but the key point here is that some clubs are developing their definition 
of what a supporter is, how they interact with the club and that the link with 
football fans of other teams is important.  
The Administrator’s role within the SPL gave him an insight into how the whole 
league could be marketed in different countries as the relatively small Scottish 
domestic market became saturated.  
“I think what the clubs are looking at, if they’ve squeezed the domestic 
market as far as possible and they it is saturated then they need to 
explore other markets. If they can marry a football decision with a 
commercial decision, which Celtic have done very successfully with 
Nakamura who has been a wonderful talent on the part but it’s also 
worked for them commercially and the SPL, you know every club in 
Scottish football has benefitted from Nakamura playing here. I think the 
pressure is that the clubs are asking themselves is “have we explored 
every avenue to get revenue from the world. I think the overseas market 
is really difficult to make work, you need a lot of things to fall into place. 
You need someone like Nakamura who’s playing every week. There’s 
no point in signing him if he sits on the bench. He’s playing every week, 
he’s adding and he’s a hero back home. Then they back it up with the 
correct commercial, retail and marketing programme that they can then 
go and tap into the market and then they also need to back that up with 
community initiatives, getting people on the ground in those areas. It 
takes a lot and you need to be really committed if you are going to go 
after one specific market. I think it’s more about the clubs ambitions and 
where they see opportunities.” 
“The Administrator” Interview with the author 17
th
 December 2008 
The views expressed by the Administrator pull together three of the five themes 
identified in the literature review: attendance, finance and players. The example 
he gave was of Celtic signing Japanese international player Shunsuke 
Nakamura in 2005.  This signing allowed Celtic to generate interest in the club 
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in the Japanese market therefore creating a relationship with a new type of 
supporter. Although few clubs in Scotland have the commercial, retail and 
marketing programmes mentioned in the interview, the creation of a new TV 
market for Scottish football did have a benefit for all SPL clubs through the 
centrally negotiated TV deal. Although this relates to the discussion on finance 
the relationship with ‘TV supporters’ takes on a different meaning as these fans 
may be in a number of different countries.  
The introduction of different types of media, for example club web-sites and 
satellite TV as well as Facebook and Twitter, have allowed clubs to interact with 
fans in different ways. Several of the interviewees identified the benefits of this 
interaction however the experience was not always positive. The challenges of 
this relationship will be discussed in the next section. 
5.4.1.6 – Developing Relationships through Social Media 
 
The Commercial Director explained how the club webs-site could be used to 
increase engagement with fans and this could be used to generate income. The 
Administrator expressed the view that the range of social media channels 
available for fans to debate football was a good thing.  
“Debate is healthy. No-one told me when I came into the job that you’d 
have four million advisors out there and they’re all quite happy and 
they’ve got a two-hour phone in every night and 25 email and web-site 
forums and hundreds of newspapers to fill but debate is a good thing.” 
“The Administrator” Interview with the author 17
th
 December 2008 
The introduction of radio ‘phone in’ programmes has given a voice to supporters 
on a national scale as well as the growth of internet message boards that allow 
supporters a voice that previous generations did not have. The Administrator 
suggested that the debate was healthy for the game and that the increased 
scrutiny provided greater accountability. This level of interaction proved a 
valuable learning exercise for the Club Owner.  
“I totally underestimated how even a Mickey Mouse club like [ours] gets 
PR away and above its station. Just unbelievable. Learning exercise 
number one.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
Although he owned a relatively small club the level of public interaction and 
scrutiny was higher than expected. The Manager had previously expressed the 
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view that it was important for companies to meet customer expectation however 
he was concerned about recognising the power that fans could have on the club 
board.  
“If they [the board] are listening to message boards, to what supporters 
are saying or what the press are saying then they’re not running the 
club. They’re just running it to pacify people.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
Social Media may provide a direct line for fans to the club board however than 
can create a situation that the Manager likened to reality TV shows.  
“These fans cannot work it out. Do you know why? Because it’s the X 
Factor scenario – “You’re a great singer and they go up there and can’t 
sing. And I sit and watch the X Factor and go ‘who told them that they 
can sing?’ But they’ve all got their opinion. They can stamp their feet, 
they can boo, the can go on message boards, they can go on radios and 
that’s what’s the matter.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager went on to suggest that although fans are given every opportunity 
to speak up and, at times, directly to the board they may not have all of the 
relevant information.  
 
The Chief Executive’s view saw that the danger of listening to the fans was 
confined to putting pressure on the manager but also could impact the 
Chairman’s decision making. 
“I thought at that point you’re getting carried away with the fan base, 
you’re getting carried away with the celebrity, don’t fall for it. Long, long 
discussions with him and anyone come into the game about the danger 
of fame. The danger of fame and getting your picture in the paper and 
all that stuff. Personally I think its bullshit and don’t get carried away with 
it because it will cost you.” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
Here the direct voice of fans through the media can alter the behaviour of some 
in the game leading to poor decisions. One danger of listening to the fans is that 
they may not be best placed to ask questions on players or managers. 
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5.4.1.7– Interview Summary 
 
Previous research suggested that there was a strong link between on-field 
performance and attendance levels (Grusky, 1963; Grundy, 1998). The Owner 
highlighted that attendance had fallen as the team’s on-field performance had 
dropped. The Manager also expressed the view that once these fans were lost 
it would be hard to win them back. The Chief Executive and the Commercial 
Director expressed the view that developing fans was a long-term project. The 
Commercial Director, perhaps not surprisingly given his professional 
background, had identified a number of different types of supporter that the club 
needed to connect with: young fans and their families; supporters who were 
interested in attending high-profile matches such as cup finals and semi-finals; 
‘away’ fans from others clubs; remote supporters with a historical tie to the club 
who interacted through the web-site. The discussion of ‘community’ projects 
focused on the development of long-term relationships with the local community 
with a view to fan development rather than projects with more altruistic aims to 
put back into the community. The Administrator discussed the importance of 
overseas TV markets and the potential fans that could be encouraged to 
support the club based on player signings.  
Although the importance of social media and the increase in interaction 
between the clubs and their supporters was identified there are dangers for 
managers and chairmen in terms of the increased attention and pressure 
caused by these interactions. The Chief Executive stressed that the impact of 
this needed to be carefully managed to avoid poor decision making by Board 
Members.  
5.4.2 – Analysis of Secondary Data 
 
Any analysis of attendance data is limited to the secondary data published by 
clubs on a weekly basis where a statement is made on match attendance. 
Whilst several of the interviewees discussed the different types of supporter at 
matches, season ticket holders, regular attenders and away fans, the plain 
statement of attendance does not distinguish between these groups.  
The data collected for the Peer Group clubs within the eleven season review 
period has been broken down into three areas for analysis. Firstly, the average 
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attendance by season for each of the peer group clubs is considered to 
establish if there is a clear link between on-field success and match attendance. 
Secondly, based on the comments by the Commercial Director on the 
importance of away fans at matches the attendance at matches will be broken 
down into three areas: matches involving either of the Old Firm clubs, matches 
involving other Peer Group clubs and others. The final analysis in this section 
will look at the additional tickets sold as a result of cup runs as this will help 
explore the comments made by the Commercial Director about supporters who 
will attend Cup Finals and Semi-Finals but do not regularly attend.  
As the focus of the research is the club, no attempt has been made to gather 
the views of supporters on what matches they attend or why. These questions 
are outwith the broad scope of this project although would be worth 
consideration for further research in the future.  
5.4.2.1– Average Attendance by Season with the Peer Group  
 
The Owner expressed the view (see section 5.3.1) that Hibernian, Hearts, 
Aberdeen and possibly Dundee United operated as a second tier, behind Celtic 
and Rangers, within the SPL although an analysis of the final league placing of 
these clubs (see Figure 5.3a) suggested that this was not always the case. If 
the measurement is purely based on average match attendance by season a 
clear split can be seen but Dundee United appear not to be a part of that 
second tier, certainly based on attendance.  
 
Figure 5.4a: Average Home League Attendance Game within the Peer Group. Created by the 
Author from Soccerbase Data 
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Figure 5.4a highlights that the average home league match attendance for 
Aberdeen, Hearts and Hibernian is always higher than that of Dundee United, 
Kilmarnock and Motherwell. This difference in attendance seems to exist 
regardless of on-field success. Figure 5.4b shows the average attendance (line 
graph) and the on-field success (bar chart) for each club within the peer group 
for each season of the review period. The single chart per club is designed to 
reduce the detail presented to establish patterns in the data.  
  
  
  
Figure 5.4b: Average Home League Attendance and On-Field Performance within the Peer 
Group. Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
The charts appear to challenge the assertion of Grusky (1963) that higher 
performance leads to higher match-day attendance. The average attendance at 
Dundee United, Kilmarnock and Motherwell appear to be relatively static, 
regardless of on-field performance. Although there is some variation for these 
clubs season on season, the fluctuation is less pronounced than the changes in 
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on-field success. Aberdeen does have a pattern of attendance that largely 
mirrors success however in season 2010/11 average attendance fell from the 
previous season despite improved results. For Hearts season 2005/06, which 
was the year they finished in second place in the league, proved to be the high 
point in terms of attendance. Although average crowd numbers dropped in 
subsequent seasons this was at a lower rate than on-field performance. Of the 
three ‘big clubs’ Hibernian’s average attendance does seem to vary most 
although this does not always mirror success. The season with the lowest 
figure, 2003/04, was also the season where the manager quipped that football 
was not about entertainment. It may be that the fans disagreed with him. The 
link between on-field success and average attendance does not seem to be 
established by these figures.  
The importance of away supporters will be considered in the next section with 
particular attention paid to Old Firm fans.  
5.4.2.2– The Impact on Attendance of Old Firm Supporters  
 
The previous section considered the impact of on-field success on match-day 
attendance without any strong link being established between the two. The 
Owner and The Commercial Director highlighted the difficulties that a small 
local population base caused their clubs but noted that by attracting away 
supporters those clubs could attract higher crowds. The reported attendance 
data does not differentiate between the team’s supporters however a simple 
measure has been adopted in this project to establish if there is difference in 
match attendance based on the away team. Average attendance figures were 
created for matches where Celtic or Rangers were the away team and for all 
other league matches. These clubs were specifically mentioned by the 
Commercial Director which is why they have been used in this project for the 
measure.   
Figure 5.4c plots the average attendance for each of the peer group clubs over 
the review period for matches against Celtic and Rangers and the average for 
other marches against other clubs. This demonstrates the importance for some 
clubs of matches against the Old Firm although that gap is more pronounced for 
some than others. All of the clubs in the peer group experience a bump in 
attendance for Celtic and Rangers matches with the exception of Hearts in 
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Season 2005/06, when they finished second, and in the subsequent two 
seasons. As performance dropped the increased attendance re-appeared. Of 
the other five clubs in the peer group Hibernian saw the smallest gap between 
the two figures through-out the review period. 
  
  
  
Figure 5.4c: Average Home League Attendance Excluding and Versus Celtic and Rangers. 
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
This ‘Old Firm bump’ underlines the importance of finishing in the top six of the 
league table as the teams in the top half of the table play each other four times 
where the teams in the bottom only play the Old Firm three times. This 
underlines the view of the Commercial Director as his club sought to establish 
who these away fans are, where they are based and if they can be tempted to 
come to other home games when Celtic and Rangers are not playing.  
By working with the secondary data in this way some estimation can be made of 
the importance of the matches against the Old Firm. Reported attendance 
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figures do not reveal who bought the ticket and where they are based. By 
selling directly to these fans and collecting that data directly the clubs can use 
this information for marketing purposes.  
The Commercial Director also highlighted the importance of progress in the cup 
competitions to establish links with fans who do not normally attend league 
matches but are attracted to cup finals and semi-finals. Secondary attendance 
data for cup competitions has been used to establish how many additional fans 
can be attracted to watch cup matches.  
 
5.4.2.3– Cup Ticket Sales  
 
The third type of fan that the Commercial Director sought to develop a better 
understanding of was the supporter who did not regularly attend league 
matches but who would buy a ticket for cup finals and semi-finals.  
Figure 5.3.2.3 illustrates the level of cup tickets sold by each club season by 
season. The single figure published for match attendance does not differentiate 
between types of supporter however the levels allow some analysis of the 
changes season by season of the volume of cup tickets sold based on the 
number of matches played. The big blocks display cup final and semi-final 
appearance. For example, Aberdeen reaching the Scottish Cup semi-final in 
2007/08 and both cup semi-finals in 2010/eleven show a bump in attendance. 
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Figure 5.4d: Total Cup Match Ticket Sales by Club and Season. Created by the Author from 
Soccerbase Data 
 
The data in Figure 5.4d relate to this contained in Table 5.3.2.10 where cup 
success is discussed as a measure of success. Hibernian’s success in reaching 
three Cup Finals and four other semi-finals in the review period is underlined by 
the volume of additional tickets sold. In Season 2006/07 Hibernian won the 
League Cup and also reached the Scottish Cup semi-final, hence the highest 
level of additional tickets sold by any of the peer group clubs in the review 
period. Using the observations of the Commercial Director, this would suggest 
that they have a latent support interested in attending ‘big’ matches but this is 
not reflected in weekly attendance (see Figure 5.4b).  
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The knock-out nature of cup competitions does link ticket sales to on-field 
success: the team needs to win to stay in the competition. More wins leads to 
more matches and the real impact is seen in Table 5.4 which shows the 
average attendance at cup matches for the peer group by round. The average 
attendance by round highlights the importance of getting to the later stages of 
the cup competitions due to the much higher crowds.  
Competition Stage Average Attendance 
League Cup 
Second 3,450 
Third 4,885 
Quarter 7,472 
Semi-final 20,554 
Final 49,940 
Scottish Cup 
Third 7,135 
Fourth 9,118 
Fifth 8,012 
Sixth 11,288 
Semi-final 27,218 
Final 49,651 
 
Table 5.4: Average Peer Group Cup Match Attendance by Stage. Created by the Author from 
Soccerbase Data 
 
The earlier rounds of both competitions attract crowds that are lower than the 
average for league matches. The benefit, as highlighted by the Commercial 
Director, comes in the later rounds. Whilst much of the benefit of these matches 
with large attendances is financial, which will be discussed in the next section, 
the Commercial Director explained that these matches allow clubs to connect 
with fans who do not usually attend.  
The impact of this can be seen by considering the League Cup Final in 2006/07 
between Kilmarnock and Hibernian. This match has been selected as it was the 
only Cup Final played between peer group clubs in the review period. The 
average attendance for matches played in Kilmarnock was 5,631 and 12,092 
when played in Edinburgh. The average for the four matches was 8,862 per 
game. The Cup Final attendance was 52,000, almost six times higher than the 
league match average. This underlines the Commercial Director’s view that 
there are those who have an affinity with the club but do not attend regularly. It 
was not his expectation that all of these people would become season ticket 
holders but that some of these fans could be encouraged to reconnect more 
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regularly than the show-piece finals. The personal information that can be 
collected through competition final ticket sales can be used by the clubs to 
develop their knowledge and increase the regular attendance levels. This use of 
marketing practice from outside of football shows the development of new 
frames within the game that changes the definition of supporters and how that 
relationship can be managed.  
5.4.3 –Section Summary 
 
This section of the analysis has considered match-day attendance from the 
perspective of the interviewees and tried to link those viewpoints to the 
published attendance detail. The depth and variation in the interviews made this 
data more useful as the nuances could be explored. The role of the interviewee 
seemed to have some impact on their views with the Commercial Director 
sharing the greatest detail in how the relationship between clubs and supporters 
(including those of other teams and those in-frequent attendees) is changing as 
different media streams can be explored, with new routes for football fans to 
watch matches through TV deals and live web-streaming.  
5.5 – Club Finance 
 
The previous sections consider on-field success and attendance levels. This 
section will discuss the impact that these have on the financial success of the 
firms under consideration. The financial aspects of the football industry were the 
most commonly discussed factor by all of the interviewees. There were a 
number of different financial models that were employed at the different clubs 
represented and part of this seemed to reflect the perceptions of success as 
discussed in the previous section on performance. 
5.5.1 – Analysis of Primary Data: The Participants’ Views 
 
The focus on finance during the interviews with the industry participants has 
been broken down into three sub-sections for the purposes of analysis. The first 
section considers the sources of revenue for the clubs and links clearly to the 
previous two sections on on-field performance and attendance as both of these 
have a direct impact on revenue. The second area that was discussed by the 
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participants was how the budgets were set at the clubs and how these could be 
affected by external factors, including the relationship with supporters discussed 
in the section on attendance. The third viewpoint given is that of the governing 
body (SPL) towards financial stability of clubs at that point in time.  
5.5.1.1 – Sources of Revenue  
 
The Commercial Director explained the sources of revenue for his club which 
gives some indication of how clubs in Scotland are financed and particularly the 
importance of the centrally negotiated league sponsorship deals.   
“As business, where do we get our income? Basically, you won’t be 
surprised to learn, comes the SPL through the TV income and the 
sponsorship income. So between Setanta Sports and the Clydesdale 
Bank, these are the two major sponsors of the SPL, we get a share of 
that money. We get a guaranteed amount and we get a performance 
related amount at the end of the season. So for this season it will be 
about £1¼m, give or take, it depends on where we end up in the league. 
So that’s what we’ve budgeted for. If we end up higher in the league 
we’ll obviously get more money than that”.   
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
Figure 5.5a illustrates the breakdown of the revenue sources for club that the 
Commercial Director worked for. Almost one third of the income (31%) came 
from the sponsorship deals negotiated by the three organising bodies 
responsible for the national competitions that this club competed in: the Scottish 
Premier League, the Scottish Cup and the League Cup.  
 
Figure 5.5a: Sources of Revenue for an SPL Club. Created by the Author from data provided by 
Commercial Director 
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The sponsorship revenues are distributed to clubs based on performance in the 
relevant competition. The sliding scale used by the SPL in 2007-08 is shown in 
Figure 5.5b. Each SPL club was paid 4% of the sponsorship revenue with a 
sliding of scale of payments based on the final league position from 0.5% for the 
twelfth placed club up to 13% paid to the championship winning club. The jump 
from 4.5% for fourth place to 5.5% for third place is worth noting at this stage as 
this is discussed by a number of interview participants later in the analysis.  
 
Figure 5.5b: SPL Distribution of Sponsorship Income. Created by the Author from the Scottish 
Premier League Handbook Season 2008/2009 
 
The Commercial Director explained that whilst sponsorship revenue was 
important (31%) ticket sales generated more income for the club. 
“Season tickets sales £¾m that comes in more or less in one lump sum 
round about May/June each year. We sell about 3,000 season tickets. 
On top of that you’ve got weekly or fortnightly gate receipts when people 
come and these are mainly away supporters although we have our own 
4 or 500 walk-up supporters for every home game. But the bulk of those, 
for example on Saturday when [peer group club] came we had 1800 
[away] supporters which is fantastic.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
Governing Body sponsorship deals contributed 31% of the overall revenue (see 
Figure 1) but ticket sales contributed a total of 38% of revenue. Within his 
comments the Commercial Director highlights the importance of ‘away’ 
supporters as a revenue stream. Using the rough numbers given by the 
Commercial Director, 3000 season ticket holders, 500 home walk-up fans plus 
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1800 away fans, would suggest that 1/3 of the revenue for this match came 
from supporters of another club. In terms of the match-day revenues shown in 
Figure 1 (19% of total income) the financial impact of other team’s supporters 
would appear significant with 80% of this revenue source coming from the 
‘away’ team. The ways in which clubs can market directly to supporters of other 
clubs was discussed in the section on Attendance.  
“We’re realistic to think we’ll never be a Rangers or a Celtic because we 
just don’t have the fan-base or the income to compete. If Celtic’s getting 
60,000 at a home game and we’re getting 6,000 it puts in in perspective. 
We realise we can compete with them in the likes of cup competitions, 
and we’re in the [cup semi-final], but we will never win the league. We 
have to be realistic. Everything we do it predicated by the fact that we’re 
a 6,000 attendance club. The budgets are set on that basis and any cup 
run we get is a bonus, if we sell players on that’s a bonus. There’s 
nothing in the budget for players being sold on.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The Commercial Director highlights here the disparity between clubs, which was 
discussed in the section on on-field performance, and how his club needed to 
budget according to their level. The final statement regarding player’s 
registration being sold to another club. The process of developing young 
players or those under-valued by other clubs can generate substantial income 
however that income is viewed as additional income. The success of player 
development is considered in the next section; however, as a source of 
potential revenue it does need to be highlighted here.  
5.5.1.2 – Expenditure  
 
The Commercial Director clearly broke down the sources on revenue for his 
club however the explanation of how the money was spent was much simpler.  
“The costs are obviously the football staff is the bulk of the cost which is 
your player’s wages, supporting staff, coaches, physiotherapists. They 
take up most of the wages. We also have an overhead for admin staff, 
the people who run football club from here” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
His club had moved away from signing players for a transfer fee but focussed 
on players who were out of contract to remove this as a cost.  
“One thing we’ve never done recently is actually buy players. We bring 
in players in the transfer windows, we maybe have to pay signing on 
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fees to the actual players, we might have to pay agent fees but we don’t 
any longer pay.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
Likewise the Manager was proud of his track record for finding players who 
could be brought into the club without a transfer fee.  
“I made mistakes, everybody makes mistakes but I never spent any 
money until we got [a striker]. But you made money back on him when 
he gets 22 goals. You say to yourself ‘well that was a success’ but I 
never spent any money. [International midfielder] was a free transfer, all 
that stuff. I worked within the constraints of the budget.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
Those interviewees who talked about the costs associated with their clubs 
focussed on player’s wages and the importance of signing players without 
incurring a transfer fee. These are the main costs to be constrained within the 
club’s annual budget.  
5.5.1.3 – Setting Budgets  
 
The club’s finances, and the impact of the supporter base, appear to be 
important factor in setting targets for this club. Realising that with only 10% of 
the average home attendance the Commercial Director suggested that the club 
set their targets accordingly.  
 “The way the business is run is to break even each year. If we make a 
profit, that’s great, but all the budgets are set on the basis that we don’t 
build anything in for cup runs. So for example we’re in the [cup semi-
final] - that’s a bonus. So that’s extra income which will come into the 
club over and above what was budgeted for at the start of the season.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The budget at his club was set on a break-even based on the minimum 
expected incomes rather than rely on progressing to the later stages of the cup 
competitions that can boost club’s finances. The financial benefit of success in 
cup competitions was highlighted by the Commercial Director.  
“Everything we do here is dependent on what happens on that field out 
there and if your team aren’t playing well, not only do your gate receipts 
go down your sponsorship, your advertising and your other hospitality 
sales will go down as well. The converse to that is if the team is doing 
well all that commercial income goes in the other direction. So it is very 
strange, you know, most businesses are not dependent to the same 
extent on one-offs like that. The CIS cup is a good example, you haven’t 
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budgeted for that but because we’re in the semi-final we will, as a club, 
earn somewhere between £200,000 and £250,000 of income from the 
fact that the gates are shared, the TV revenue’s shared and the 
sponsorship money is shared. The good for us was that Rangers drew 
[the club in question] and Celtic drew [another SPL club]. So you’ve got 
massive crowds at both semi-finals, both of which will probably be 
televised plus the CIS sponsorship money. That’s the icing on the cake.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The importance of this one off match, financially, is significant. Taking the most 
conservative estimate given by the Commercial Director (£200,000), this is 
equivalent to a 5% increase income for one match alone. Using his 30-year 
experience in the banking industry, the Commercial Director highlighted the 
unique nature of the football industry in that all revenue streams are linked to 
on-field success. The financial impact of the two biggest clubs in Scotland, 
Celtic and Rangers, in terms of match attendance and sponsorship revenues 
appear to be of benefit to the smaller clubs. How smaller clubs can interact with 
the supporters of the Old Firm was discussed in the section on attendance.  
Whilst the club sought to break even financially each year, they did rely on a 
benefactor to help fund much needed ground improvements.  
“We’ve been very fortunate to get a benefactor, called [benefactor], who 
has actually put his hand in his pocket paying for that South Stand. 
£2.5m of his own money.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The Commercial Director presented a picture of a club that lived within its 
means, budgeted carefully and had plans in place to grow the club financially by 
increasing the fan-base. However, this approach was still reliant on the 
generosity of a local businessman to fund the ground expansion. During the 
interview, the financial impact of relegation was discussed.  
(What would happen here if you didn’t survive in the SPL?) 
“We would have to downscale quite dramatically. You have to cut your 
cloth. Out income would drop off dramatically so we would have to drop 
off our costs to meet that which would mean a different structure to our 
playing personnel. The one thing we haven’t fallen into the trap with 
here is, all the players are on mostly one-year contracts, maximum two 
years. So that we don’t fall into trap of, for example Dunfermline who 
found themselves being relegated but were still paying SPL wages for a 
full season.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
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Using the experience of another club faced with a similar position, the 
Commercial Director suggested that this scenario had been discussed and 
plans were in place for this outcome. Financially, the club sought to keep 
players on short-term contracts to limit the damage caused by relegation. The 
impact of falling income on the team’s performance was highlighted by the 
Manager: 
“We were fighting relegation and they were just cutting it, cutting it, 
cutting it. All the stuff you’ve worked towards to build up. So we tried to 
create a siege mentality. It was the Board of Directors against us.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
In this situation, the Manager sought to use the financial crisis within his club to 
his benefit. This statement can be used to link together the financial situation 
within a club, the impact on players and the role of the first-team manager in 
using this as a positive. In this case, the Manager and his team avoided 
relegation.  
The approach taken by the Commercial Director’s club can be contrasted with 
the Chief Executive’s experience within another SPL club. He was brought in by 
a new club owner and a clear remit was set. As discussed in the section on on-
field performance, the Chief Executive’s initial role in the club was the creation 
of the budget. This took six weeks, which suggests that it was not rushed, but 
the process was made more complicated when the team manager resigned 
whilst this work was ongoing. The definition of success, achieving third place in 
the league, is different from the Commercial Director’s club. The different 
definitions of on-field success are discussed in the section on Performance 
however it is identified here since the expected performance seems to have an 
impact on the financial situation at the two clubs. From the outset his Chairman 
accepted that there would be a financial loss each year partly explained by a 
low crowd base.  
“I also explained to him at the time that this is going to cost you. You’re 
going to lose each year. You cannot make this do what you want to do 
with the crowd-base you’ve got. Maybe the crowd base will grow if we’re 
successful. It will, I suspect. He says “it definitely will.” I said “well you 
know more about that than me because you’ve built companies before 
but if we can get the crowd base up then it helps bring some extra 
money in. All that’s fine but you’re still going to lose money because you 
can’t, as far as I’m concerned with that base you’ve got just 
now…….The plan was put out there as we were very open about it, very 
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clear about it, very happy about it. All the sums, we could see, added up 
okay.” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
This comment shows a difference in opinion between the two in terms of how 
quickly attendances would grow if the club was successful. The Chief 
Executive’s view was based on his football career and he was willing to learn 
from his Chairman’s experience of building a company. The impact of success 
on attendance is discussed at a later stage however this quote is include here 
because of the impact on the club finances. Although the Chairman accepted 
the losses he may have assumed that these would be short-term. The Chief 
Executive appears to be clear that this is a long-term acceptance of a loss-
making operation. After only a few months of working within a budget the 
Chairman started to make decisions emotionally, rather than in business terms, 
in reaction to the fan’s response to a player signed on a temporary loan deal. 
“……..But after six months or so I think he caught the bug that a lot of 
Chairman do. We got a player on loan, [a former internationalist], and 
his wages were out the ballpark but we got him really cheap on loan. 
The fans went mad and I said we’d love to get, buy this guy to which 
[the Chairman] said “well go and buy him.” I said “no we will not buy him. 
Yes, he fits, he’s quite good, he’s okay but I am not a) trashing my 
whole wage structure and b) trashing every single bit of my budgetary 
plan for this one player. Because the effect it has on the others because 
I know what happens when you give in, so we know that simple. To 
which he then said “I’ll buy him, give you him. It’s nothing to do with your 
budget or the club.”” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
The Chief Executive wanted to stick within his budget as paying one player 
more than the others would likely cause problems within the dressing room. Not 
only would there be an increase in the losses made by the club each season, 
but there was an expected impact on the player’s morale. This will be 
considered in more depth in the section on players.  
The Chief Executive, who had been involved in football for over twenty years at 
this point, warned his Chairman over the dangers of this type of decision that 
appears to be driven through positive fan pressure.  
“That fame that looks like it’s not costing you much. He explained to me 
“but everyone in Scotland knows my name now. Nobody knows the 
Chairman of Marks & Spencer’s. They’re hundred of millions of pounds 
of turnover.” So for that fame it is cheap fame but on the other hand, the 
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monetary cost of it might be cheap fame but the personal cost is 
expensive.” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
The Chief Executive’s concern was that the decision-making process was 
getting away from where they started: from spending six weeks to create a 
budget that projected a £1.5m per annum loss that was accepted to signing 
players out-with the agreed budget based on fan reaction. The attraction of 
owning a football club was also discussed with the Owner of another SPL club.  
“I got to go and experience football in a totally different way. I invested 
£1m into [name withheld] and that was purely the heart nothing to do 
with your head. I actually managed to sell that at a slight profit which is 
interesting but then I wanted to say I could go into football doing this 
better than other people. It’s run by a bunch of idiots and I still think in 
some ways it is. I can do it better and I can apply some of the 
management principles into [the club].” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The Owner had invested in another large club and made money on the 
investment despite it being based on emotion rather than business logic. The 
insights gained in that club encouraged him to take on ownership of another. He 
was dismissive of those involved in Scottish football and assumed that if he 
applied his business experience he could be more successful. His thoughts 
behind the choice of club were discussed in the section in on-field attendance: 
good infrastructure and location, recent success and a sustainable fan-base 
although attendance had started to fall. The initial experience of taking the club 
on appears to be similar to that of the Chief Executive in that he too created 
budgets and ran the club along commercial lines. Again, the impact of 
attendance appears to have an impact on how well a club can perform on the 
field due to the finances. Some of the fans who had been attracted to the club 
whilst successful in the short term had drifted back to their historic supporter 
allegiance. 
 “From my point of view we ran the club, commercially, very well. We ran 
it as a business. We ran proper numbers, we didn’t go nuts, we did 
budgets and we ran it properly but we thought that was the baseline. By 
the time we got in there the baseline was actually way lower than what 
we had said so we were playing catch-up.”  
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The major difference between this club and that run by the Chief Executive 
appears to be that club was financially worse off than expected. Based on the 
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original levels, the club was sustainable however as the club was on the slide, 
in terms of performance and attendances, the actual position meant it was 
much harder to be sustainable.  
“But what I had underestimated was how difficult it was to turn a football 
club around, how difficult it was, the politics in football, the way that 
football clubs are run is unbelievable. The best that I got out of football 
was a thick skin.”  
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The Owner’s understanding of football, as an industry, was limited and the 
politics in clubs and in the wider industry made it difficult to achieve the desired 
outcome. One major difference between the two owners is that one seemed to 
be drawn in by the trappings of fame that can be found in football as can be 
seen in his response to his Chief Executive “but everyone in Scotland knows my 
name now. Nobody knows the Chairman of Marks & Spencer’s”. The Owner 
interviewed admitted that “by the time we got in there the baseline was actually 
way lower than what we had said so we were playing catch-up” and that he had 
“underestimated was how difficult it was to turn a football club around”. This 
would suggest that the problems in one club were self-inflicted by losing sight of 
the budgets set whilst the other encountered unseen problems caused by the 
previous owners. Both men spent considerable amounts of money on the 
football clubs they bought. Despite this the Owner, who had sold the club by the 
time of interview stated:  
“Why did I buy it? Because I thought I could make a change. Would I do 
it again? Absolutely and probably will. But I’ll pick a different club.”   
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
5.5.1.4 – Governing Body Guidelines  
 
The financial situation at Scottish professional football clubs was discussed with 
the member of the SPL team. Despite Gretna going into liquidation a few 
months before the interview there seemed to be little desire to introduce more 
stringent financial controls within the professional game from the league 
organising body.  
“Yes there were lessons that we as an organisational have learned like 
looking to tighten the financial criteria that we apply to potential 
members or current members but there are elements you can’t control 
and you need to recognise that. In terms of our membership criteria that 
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looks at the stadium, the infrastructure, their youth set-up and their pitch 
we’re now adding another branch to that, and the clubs are going to be 
voting on that, in terms of layer of financial criteria that is broadly in line 
with UEFA’s club licensing system and what they use which is 
essentially presenting accounts, presenting interim reports and financial 
statements, etc. but no system is fool-proof. You could present that 
model and you can say on of my main income streams is going to be 
this benefactor who is going to weigh in with the difference between our 
costs and our revenues. And that could be a legitimate business model 
but it doesn’t account for someone who decides to pull the plug on that 
or walk away. We looked at even more stringent systems in the likes of 
Germany and they have teams that have faced major financial 
problems. No system is fool-proof but there are no guarantees. 
Hopefully we can tighten it up.” 
“The Administrator” Interview with the author 17
th
 December 2008 
The SPL had taken the view that the size of the stadium, the youth development 
system in place and the standard of the playing surface were more important 
than financial stability. The Administrator discussed the importance of 
benefactors to a club, like the one who financed stadium renovation referred to 
by the Commercial Director. The risk was admitted by the Administrator by 
recognising that a benefactor could choose to walk away from the club leaving it 
in financial difficulties. The Administrator went on to discuss the reasons who 
someone might choose to spend £2.5m on stadium renovations. 
“You’re talking really about a social donation for personal benefit. I feel 
good about doing this so I’m going to do it. That consumption decision 
isn’t necessarily a bad thing I did my research when I was at University 
on symbolic consumption and while it might not seem like a rational 
decision. Why is it not a rational decision if it makes this person feel 
good? If I want to spend £200 on a pair of shoes as opposed to a £20 
pair of shoes, if I get the benefit out of it, just because it may not be a 
tangible benefit it doesn’t mean to say it is not a legitimate one. And 
obviously you’re talking about people making an investment for an 
intangible return I don’t think there’s a problem with that. If you look at 
the money coming into our game, in terms of the revenues into Scottish 
football I don’t know the exact figures, but in terms of that sort of 
personal investment I don’t think it makes it a big percentage of the total 
turnover of all our clubs. You’re probably looking at a total turnover, 
ballpark of about £200million, but ticketing, broadcasting income, 
sponsorship income, commercial sponsorship for commercial return, 
retail, hospitality and events and then the new media publishing side of 
things that’s your six key revenue streams I don’t think it is a massive 
slice if you look at the grand scheme of things in Scottish football.” 
“The Administrator” Interview with the author 17
th
 December 2008 
Taking the overall industry view the Administrator suggested that the impact on 
the overall game was minimal. However, even within the few clubs included in 
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this study, one club relied on a gift of £2.5m, which equates to 62.5% of annual 
turnover (see Figure 5.5a) to build a new stand or the £1.5m per year subsidy 
as discussed by the Chief Executive. For smaller clubs the need for, and impact 
of, benefactors to provide some financial stability seems to be understated.  
 “We represent our member clubs and we’ve got a sharp focus here in 
terms of investment in the game and bringing the biggest £125m over 5 
years TV deal in the summer. That’s helping the whole of Scottish 
football (interviewer - especially at the moment?) yeah of course and it 
gives them a comfort when they are being squeezed elsewhere 
(interviewer -how bad is that squeeze at the moment?) “We’ve surveyed 
the clubs recently and the vibe is starting to squeeze in a few areas with 
a view that other areas might be squeezed in the next 12 to 24 months 
but at the moment it is okay is the vibe. But they know that it’s coming.” 
“The Administrator” Interview with the author 17
th
 December 2008 
The role of the Administrator was to take a higher level view of the game in 
Scotland and to provide the revenue streams that would support the clubs at a 
point where other sources of income were being squeezed. The supportive 
nature of his role was identified by the Administrator as he discussed his role 
within the sport.  
“The difficulty for us isn’t so much removing yourself, you know, from the 
passion of the game or how you would think as a fan we all have the 
game’s interest at heart in here as much as people think otherwise. 
We’re all fans. Most of the guys are season ticket holders at a club and 
have supported teams as a boy or when they were younger. Some of 
the guys have worked for clubs in here, you know, they all have the 
games interest at heart and everything we focus on we’ve got a 
business plan with a mission which is essentially to ensure that the 
product is healthy, the interest is healthy and the long-term prosperity of 
the game is in good shape. And all our objectives flow from that, all our 
personal objectives flow from that in terms of my remit and my job. 
Everything you do is geared towards that so I don’t find it a massive 
challenge. It’s not as if our priorities are completely different. It’s just that 
you have to keep an eye on the bigger picture whereas as a fan you’re 
maybe, and probably rightly so, you’re blinkered. You care about your 
club, probably care passionately about your club and that’s all you’re 
interested in so you have a very one sided view on whatever issue it 
may be. We can’t afford to take that one sided issue we have to have a 
multi-dimensional view on things. Balances and compromises. You do 
have to focus on some longer term benefits for the game.” 
“The Administrator” Interview with the author 17
th
 December 2008 
The Administrator identified the need to see the bigger picture within the SPL 
rather than the more blinkered fan view of football as a club based sport.  
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“There’s no glory here. If you want glory then go and work for a club. If 
we do something well the focus will be on what’s happening at the clubs 
and with the players because that’s what fans are interested in. No-one 
is really interested in what happens around a board-room table. They 
want to know about their club, they want to hear about the stories on the 
pitch, the players, the managers, that’s where people’s passion lie. And 
rightly so. If things go wrong then people will look to us and ask “what 
are they doing about it?” but that’s just human nature. That’s not to say 
we can do more to try and get our story across of what we’re trying to 
do. No-one here is expecting any glory or rewards. Our personal 
rewards are because we all care passionately about the game and it is a 
joy to come and work here every day. There’s challenges out there but 
there’s challenges in every job it just so happens that a lot is public in 
this job.” 
“The Administrator” Interview with the author 17
th
 December 2008 
The Chief Executive highlighted the dangers of working in the public eye but the 
Administrator noted that the role of the SPL is only really questioned by football 
fans when something in the game goes wrong.  
5.5.1.5 – Interview Summary 
 
Several major themes arise from these interviews.   
Each of the clubs represented in these interviews attempted to set budgets 
although they did not always stick to them. In one case the problem seems to 
be a reaction to the public nature of football. In another case the perceived 
situation at the club was an over-statement of where the club was financially.  
Each of the three clubs required some form of assistance from a benefactor 
either for day to day running of the club or to provide financial backing for 
stadium expansion.  
The SPL took a high-level view of the financial health of the game and accepted 
that the monetary support provided by wealthy individuals was part of the game 
and that each club was responsible for their own financial security. 
 
5.5.2 – Analysis of Secondary Data 
 
To better understand the financial position of the peer group clubs the Bureau 
Van Dijk FAME database (fame.bvdinfo.com) was used to collate standardised 
data to allows a comparison between the clubs. The indicators included were 
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selected from previous academic studies that looked at financial aspects of 
football as an industry.  
The interviewees discussed the targets and budgets set at their clubs and how 
different types of pressure could impact those: fan pressure to sign players, 
poor on-field performances leading to budget cuts and the difficulties of turning 
a failing club around. The Commercial Director was able to break down the 
sources of income during his interview however this was an internal club 
document that was generous enough to share as part of the research. Gaining 
access to club financial data proved difficult as Companies House do not 
require detailed football related data to be submitted.  
The slightly different dates skew the financial data slightly. The 31st May end 
date follows the end of the football season most closely. Some clubs reported 
up to 31st July which will include figures from two distinct football seasons, 
although the financial period is consistent.  
5.5.2.1 – Peer Group Turnover  
 
Assessing the revenue levels for the clubs within the peer group is complex as 
the Commercial Director pointed out (see Figure 5.5a) with six different sources 
of revenue plus any revenue that is generated from selling a player registration 
to another club. Figure 5.5c illustrates the turnover for the peer group clubs 
through the eleven-season review period. Although there is a degree of 
fluctuation for all clubs some trends can be identified. Dundee United and 
Motherwell, two of the three clubs with the lowest attendance, generate lower 
revenues than the other four clubs. This data challenges the suggestion of the 
Club Owner that Aberdeen, Hibernian and Hearts operate at higher level than 
the other SPL clubs, although in the first two seasons of the review period this 
appears to be the case.  
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Figure 5.5c: Peer Group Turnover. Created by the Author from FAME Data  
 
Over the review period the turnover for the six clubs in the peer group become 
closer largely as the clubs with the lowest turnover at the start of the period 
have increased. In season 2000/01 Hearts have a turnover at £7.9m and 
Motherwell £3.2m. By season 2010/11 Aberdeen have the highest turnover of 
£7.5m and Dundee United’s has grown to £5.2m. Through the review period 
income disparity increased, peaking in seasons 2005/06 and 2006/07, where 
Hearts income was over £10m per season, and in season 2007/08 where 
Aberdeen generated £12.8m of revenue. In both of these cases income was 
boosted by player sales and participation in European cup competitions (see 
Appendix 2 for details of player sales). 
Over the period 2003/04 to 2006/07 Hibernian successfully grew their income 
from £5.5m to £9.8m partly though on-field success but also through a number 
of players sold to other clubs (see Figure 5.5d and Appendix 2).  
Figure 5.5d plots the club turnover against the on-field success for each club. 
Although there does appear to be some link between on-field success and the 
revenue generated it does not appear to be the case that if a club is successful 
on the pitch then the income generated increases by the same amount. Without 
a clear breakdown of income from the clubs between gate receipts, sponsorship 
revenue and income from player sales a detailed analysis of these figures 
remains elusive.   
The ‘squeeze’ that was coming, referred to by the Administrator, may have 
been a contributory factor to falling revenues across the clubs although that 
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would not explain the increases in revenue at Kilmarnock and Motherwell in the 
last season of the review period (see Figure 5.5d). The economic impact on 
football clubs and supporters of the 2008 recession is not within the remit of this 
study.   
  
  
  
Figure 5.5d: Peer Group Turnover by Club. Created by the Author from FAME Data 
 
Appendix 2 contains the details of player transfers for the peer group club 
where the fee was in excess of £200,000 although details of transfer fees are 
often not published. This data suggests that transfer fees as a source of income 
are difficult to sustain over a period of time although some clubs have been 
more successful than others. Further consideration of this is included in the 
section on players however this detail is included here to allow the link to be 
made to the financial aspects of this practice 
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5.5.2.2 – Peer Group Wages 
 
The previous section considered the importance of income generation for the 
peer group clubs over the review period. The Commercial Director pointed out 
in his interview that the most significant cost for clubs was player wages. The 
FAME data does not differentiate between the salaries paid to playing and non-
playing staff so the data used in Figure 5.5e contains both.  
The wages paid at the start of the review period suggest a split along the lines 
suggested by the Owner that Aberdeen, Hearts and Hibernian operate at a 
slightly higher level than the other SPL clubs, excluding Celtic and Rangers if 
the annual wage bill is used as the measure. With a wage bill of £7.2m for the 
season, Hearts pay twice as much in salaries as the lowest club Motherwell 
(£3.5m). Figure 5.5e demonstrates that Hearts reduced their wage bill from £7.2 
(season 2000/01) to £4.5m (season 2004/05) although the other peer group 
clubs had also reduced their wage bill. Although there is an increase of 33% in 
wage costs by all of the clubs in the remainder of the review period, the wage 
bill at Hearts jumps by 175% in just two years. The wage bill at Hearts does 
decrease over the rest of the review period but the wage bill is still 77% higher 
than the 2004/05 level, compared to 33% for the other five clubs in the peer 
group.  
 
Figure 5.5e: Peer Group Wages. Created by the Author from FAME Data 
 
It would appear that five of the peer group clubs were trying to reduce their 
costs Hearts under the ownership of Vladimir Romanov were prepared to 
increase the salary bill as they tried to catch Celtic and Rangers. Figure 5.5c 
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illustrates that in seasons 2005/06 and 2006/07 Hearts did increase their 
income to £10.3m that is less than the wage costs of £12.4m.  
A commonly used ratio to assess the health of football clubs is the comparison 
wages to turnover with a recommended level around 65% (Buraimo, Simmons 
& Szymanski, 2006). At the start of the review period (see Figure 5.5f) none of 
the peer group clubs were at the recommend level. The average for the six 
clubs was 89%, with Hibernian and Kilmarnock lowest at 76%. Motherwell, in 
seasons 2000/02 and 2001/02 paid out more in wages than they brought in. 
Most clubs sought to reduce the wage bill in the first few years of the review 
period. As income levels dropped, the falling ratio can be explained by drastic 
cuts to the total wage bill. By Season 2004/05 the six-club average was 57% 
with all clubs meeting the 65% target. Hibernian had reduced their wages to 
turnover ratio to 46% at that point. They would reduce this further in the next 
two seasons through contract reductions and increased revenue.  
 
Figure 5.5f: Peer Group Wages to Turnover Ratio. Created by the Author from FAME Data 
  
The increasing wages bill at Hearts on Season 2005/06 and 2006/07 are shown 
in Figure 5.5f with a jump from 54% in 2004/05 to 97% the following season 
before three seasons where the ratio was over 120%. For every £1 of income 
that Hearts generated, they spent over £1.20 in wages. By the end of the review 
period the five-club average, excluding Hearts is 64%. Despite reductions 
Hearts wages to turnover ratio remained an unsustainable 115%.  
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5.5.2.3 – Peer Group Debt Levels 
 
With the ongoing ‘arms race’, referred to by both the Commercial Director and 
the Administrator, clubs have had to manage their debt levels. As well as 
controlling wages costs clubs need to be able to service their long-term debt 
and the interest repayments on that debt can also be a significant drain on club 
finances. Figure 5.5g illustrates the amount of interest paid by the peer group 
clubs over the review period. Motherwell have the lowest interest repayments 
although this may be a result of the club owner taking them into administration 
in 2002. Hibernian and Kilmarnock both reduced their interest repayments 
throughout the period, Dundee United have increased their slightly whilst 
Aberdeen’s interest repayments have increased over the review period from 
£197,000 to £728,000. By the end of the review period Hearts were paying 
£1.4m per year in interest although this was a considerable reduction on the 
£2.2m in interest repayments in Season 2007/08.  
 
 
Figure 5.5g: Peer Group Interest Repayments. Created by the Author from FAME Data 
  
Previous studies have considered the level of debt that clubs incur but by 
focussing on the interest repayments in the same way as wages, a like-for-like 
comparison can be made. Figure 5.5h plots the interest repayment to turnover 
ratio for the peer group clubs.  
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Figure 5.5h: Peer Group Interest to Turnover Ratio.  Created by the author using FAME data 
 
At the start of the review period all of the clubs were paying very little interest 
with the six club average 4.5% of turnover going towards servicing debts. By 
Season 2003/04 the average had doubled with Hearts (13%) and Hibernian 
(14%) spending significant portions of their revenue on debt servicing. By the 
end of the review period most clubs had reduced their interest 
repayment/turnover ratio although Aberdeen (10%) and Hearts (21%) continue 
to pay well over the average. Where and how the debt was held is not clear 
from the annual reports, either the banks or the club owners, but the focus here 
is on regular payments that needed to be made by the clubs to remain solvent. 
The focus on wages to turnover ratio is a worthwhile measure; however by 
combining wages and interest repayments as a proportion of club turnover, a 
different picture emerges.  
This research project seeks to go beyond the position of previous football 
research by introducing the wages + interest repayments to turnover ratio as a 
means of establishing the financial health of clubs.  
5.5.2.4 – Peer Group Wages plus Interest to Turnover Ratio 
 
Researchers into professional football (Szymanski & Kuypers, 1999; Morrow, 
2003; Baroncelli & Lago, 2006; Buraimo, Simmons & Szymanski, 2006) have 
used the wages to turnover ratio as a measure of club financial health for some 
time. Whilst this calculation is a useful measure it is limited since it focuses on 
only one regular expense. By focussing on the combined outlay of wages and 
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interest repayments in relation to the revenue generated by the club, a different 
picture emerges (see Figure 5.5i).  
 
Figure 5.5i: Peer Group Wages plus Interest to Turnover Ratio. Created by the Author from 
FAME data 
 
At the beginning of the review period for this research project 93% of revenue 
generated by football clubs was spent on wages and interest repayments. At 
that point, season 2000/01 Motherwell had a combined outlay ratio of 110% 
than increased to 115% the following season. After being placed in 
administration, which effectively wiped out the outstanding debt, Motherwell 
have operated in the 61-78% range. By the end of the review period (season 
2010/11) the average wages plus interest to turnover ratio for the five clubs, 
excluding Hearts, was 68%. As Figure 5.5i shows, Hearts were the outlier in the 
second half of the review period. From a healthy 68% in Season 2004/05 the 
ratio increased to 148% in Seasons 2007/08 and 2008/09 before dropping 
slightly to 137% by the end of the review period. Put simply, for every £1 of 
revenue the club could generate they spent £1.37 on wages and interest 
repayments. Within two years they too had entered administration. The figures 
contained in Figure 5.5i would have suggested that this was not a sustainable 
position. This would also suggest that the layer of financial reporting suggested 
by the Administrator was insufficient to avoid clubs failing.  
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5.5.3 –Section Summary 
 
Several of the interviewees discussed the budget setting process at their clubs 
but even with this there were issues: in one club the financial situation was 
worse than expected, in another sound business decisions were replaced by 
populist decisions by the Owner and where on-field performance did not match 
expectations drastic cuts were made as revenues did not meet expectations. As 
was discussed in the section on attendance the clubs can try to market to new, 
lapsed and opposition fans but the financial detail would suggest that this is 
unpredictable in the short term.  
The development of players as sellable assets is also unpredictable with few 
clubs being able to generate revenue in this way over an extended period.  
As most clubs have sought to increase revenues they have also sought to 
reduce costs by managing the wage bill effectively with the exception of Hearts. 
Added to the control of the wage to turnover ratio this project has suggested 
that an extend ration be adopted by clubs that looks at wages plus interest 
repayments in relation to turnover to asses financial health.  
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5.6 – Players 
5.6.1 – Analysis of Primary Data: The Participants’ Views 
 
Throughout the interviews the players were viewed in several ways. As 
employees of an organisation there are traditional measures of team culture 
that can be used to view the performance and behaviour of employees. One 
area where the football industry differs from others is that player’s contracts can 
be bought and sold as financial assets. The different approaches to this process 
were discussed by several of the participants. Finally, the identification of young 
players, who can be developed and then sold as assets, was discussed.  
5.6.1.1 - The Impact of Team Culture on Performance 
The Manager recalled his first day training with a new club. After the first 
training session he asked his assistant for his view on the quality of the players 
they had inherited when they moved to the club.  
“I walked off the training pitch at the end of the first day and said to [his 
assistant] “What do you think?” He said “we’ll get relegated.” “What?” 
“We’ll get relegated”. We gave them the balls and he said we’d get 
relegated. That’s what we saw at the end of the first day of pre-season” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager went on to explain how he thought he could change the culture 
within the club by bringing in players he knew would work hard but this proved 
not to be the root of the problem.  
“Then really trying to hammer the culture, really change it. My problem, I 
thought I had enough lieutenants in the dressing room, my guys, the 
fittest at the club [names specific players who did well in the regular 
fitness tests] all my guys. See the old hat, that had been there for years 
[names], way down there. Trying to change it all and I thought I had 
enough lieutenants in my dressing room for it to go my way. Do you 
know what the problem was? It wasn’t changing the culture of the 
players. It was the staff and the workings in the club.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager realised that the wider culture of the club had a detrimental effect 
on the on-field performance. He identified that the club physiotherapist was a 
bottle-neck in getting players on to the training pitch in the morning. Poor 
organisation and prioritisation seemed to be hampering the manager’s desire to 
improve technique and fitness during the training sessions.  
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“What I was trying to do is, this is the workings of the club. This is how I 
had to do it. You drive in in the morning, you park the car. Half of them 
are parking around the back – safety issues and all of that, fire issues. 
First thing – you have to park in the front car park. That’s how I had to 
do it. You walk in the door, what’s first? You go to that dressing room. 
Kit. They’re all sitting eating breakfast and they aren’t meant to get 
breakfast. All the kids are in the physio’s room. The physio is strapping 
all the kids up so all the 1st Team guys are standing waiting. So we take 
a physio to them and they’ll get strapped up. All you’re trying to do is 
map out your day.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager identified another problem later in the day as the physio did not 
stop for lunch but worked through to get finished earlier. This had a knock-on 
effect on the players that seemed to affect their desire to train.  
“Then you’re saying to the physio ‘that’s what I want’. Physio –go and 
get lunch. ‘I want you to shut down for lunch, I’m giving you a lunch-
break.’ ‘I never get lunch.’ ‘I know, because I know what you do. You 
work through your lunch and the injured guys are out the door before 
you know it. I want you to get a lunch. I want the injured guys to say I 
don’t want to be injured. I don’t want them coming in, sitting there 
reading newspapers or on their phone, playing Party Poker.’ That’s what 
was happening. All I said was ‘I’m taking everything off you. Pass it on 
to me then I’ll go and deal with the confrontation.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager compared the culture to that of a holiday camp. At a previous 
club, injured players were at the training ground longer. At the club discussed in 
the interview, this was not the case.  
“It was like Butlins. In my regime at [the manager’s previous club], when 
you were injured you were in at half-past eight in the morning and you 
were still there at half-past four at night. At [another club], we’re still on 
the training pitch and the injured players are going home.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The dressing room culture seemed to affect the team’s desire to work hard and 
improve their technical skills. When asked about the impact of difficult players in 
the dressing room, the Manager was quite direct. The team could cope with one 
but not two.  
“If the team accept him you get away with it. But that’s one bad one. See 
if you’ve two or three? You have to move one on.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager suggested that players could use club unrest to remove the 
manager rather than change. The impact of managerial change is considered 
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elsewhere in this section but the impact on club culture should be noted here. 
The Manager had plans in place to overhaul the playing squad but he was 
removed from post before this could happen.  
“Because they [the players] are clever enough, they’re clever enough. If 
he goes then, evens the players. If he’s here, I’m out. If he goes then 
there’s a chance of me staying here. And that’s why I let them all run out 
of contract. I was gutting it. Absolutely going to clear the whole lot …… 
that was my chance of changing the whole club.”  
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The uncertainty of the manager’s position, based on their relationship with the 
club owner or results, can impact team culture where the players can look after 
their own interest.  
“If the players read it, it’s in their interest if he goes and there’s a new 
manager then I might get another reprieve.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
Looking back on his time with the club, the Manager saw the link between the 
standard of players that the club brought in and the performances on the pitch.  
“I made mistakes, everybody makes mistakes but I never spent any 
money until we got [a striker]. But you made money back on him when 
he gets [20 plus] goals. You say to yourself ‘well that was a success’ but 
I never spent any money. [International player] was a free transfer, all 
that stuff. I worked within the constraints of the budget. I think there’s 
this belief out there amongst all the [club’s] fans “he’s picking up 
…bollocks. Absolute bollocks. So, as a manager, and it’s happening to 
[the Manager’s replacement] right now, you’re going to get the players 
that fits the wage bill. That’s it. As simple as that.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager referred to a pattern of behaviour at the club through the previous 
two managers at the club. These comments link back to the budget set aside for 
the club for player acquisitions and wages and to the perceptions of fans both of 
which have been discussed previously.  
“Not for one moment did I think that all the players that [a previous 
manager] had brought in were his number one choice. Or his number 
two. All the players that [another previous manager] brought were his 
number one or number two. All the players I brought to [the club] were 
my number one or two targets. Because there won’t be the money. I 
don’t think the fans understand that. “ 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
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In these comments the Manager draws together the impact of the budget and 
culture on the playing squad which in turn feeds the fans’ perception. Although 
this research tries to view the football industry using different frames this quote 
seems to bring all of the problems that this manager faced together in one 
statement: he wanted to change the culture but finances would not allow.  
5.6.1.2 - Player Trades 
The Manager had discussed the problems of the club not spending money on 
new players and not bringing in the players he had requested. He also 
discussed the issues that he had faced with players being sold to other clubs 
without prior discussion.  
“Well they’ve never had the success in terms of selling. The last one 
they sold was [a named player]. He was the last one that was sold on 
my watch.” 
(I’m guessing you didn’t have much say in that) 
“I knew it was happening. Do you know who told me two days before the 
Chairman? I was in America. [The manager of the club signing the 
player]. He phoned me up ‘I’m just giving you the nod, the deals just 
about done for [the player]. He said, they deal will be done tomorrow. I 
found out two days after it. When did they sell [another high profile 
player]?” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager left that as a question knowing that the researcher knew the 
answer. The player in question was sold on the final day of the transfer window 
leaving the manager helpless to replace the player who had made a sizeable 
contribution the previous season. The Commercial Director was clear in the 
recruitment process of his club: they did not buy players but sought those who 
were out of contract so the financial impact of signing the player was less.  
“One thing we’ve never done recently is actually buy players. We bring 
in players in the transfer windows, we maybe have to pay signing on 
fees to the actual players, we might have to pay agent fees but we don’t 
any longer pay.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The Chief Executive’s comments about signing a player who was outside of his 
budget were discussed in the section on finance however the impact was not 
merely financial. 
“That’s a hard thing to turn down. So I said “Look that’s difficult. For me 
then it doesn’t affect my budget and I won’t go over the budget and I’m, 
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happy with that. On the other hand I’ve now got price pressure. I’ve got 
wages pressure which I didn’t have before.” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
The Chief Executive explained that signing a player who earned more than 
others at the club would cause cultural issues within the club as players 
discussed wages. By signing one player the culture and harmony in the 
dressing would be under pressure because that player earned more than the 
others. This suggests that it is not as simple as spending money on players. 
There are cultural and financial implications of this decision.   
The Club Owner explained that the level of investigation carried out in football 
before major purchases are made is lower than the level he would carry out in 
his other businesses. 
“If I was making a £7 million investment this [his non-football] business 
I’d do my homework. But I buy a £7 million player and he doesn’t fit in, 
you find out he’s a psycho, you find out he’s a gambler, you need to do 
a huge amount of homework in that investment and I think some of the 
clubs are starting to do that now. If you take Artur Boruc, just as an 
example. He was arguably worth, after the European Championships, 
£7 million. I’d say he’s lucky if he’s worth £2m now. Because if you did 
your homework on him now you’d go ‘I’ve heard this thing about him in 
the papers’. He’s driving his own asset value down. “ 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The Club Owner discussed the asset value of a player and how his off-field 
behaviour could do damage to his reputation, and therefore, worth to the club. 
The Commercial Director explained that his club viewed themselves as a selling 
club. They sought experienced professionals, out of contract at another club, 
who could help the young players coming through the development system 
mature as players. Without spending money on a transfer fee the risk to the 
club of the player driving down their value was removed.  
 “We are a selling club now. It’s all about bringing up our own young 
players through the academy, mixing in with that a few experienced 
professional that we can buy who are out of contract [players named], 
senior professionals but we’re not buying them as such, we’re just 
bringing them in. The combination of youth and experience hopefully is 
enough, to not just to survive in the SPL but to get that top six finish.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The players sought by this club may not have added financial value directly but 
their experience would hopefully add value to the younger players to achieve 
on-field success and, in some cases, financial value through transfer fees.  
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5.6.1.3 - Youth Development  
The Commercial Director explained that the target was to sell players to English 
clubs are they were more likely to pay transfer fees. As with the Club Owner 
discussing a player’s ‘asset value’, the Commercial Director saw the players 
and the potential transfer fees as a return on investment in the youth academy.  
“For us in the longer term we will hopefully sell these players on to 
bigger clubs, probably in England because that’s where we’ll get return 
on the investment we’ve made in the academy. So instead of a young 
lad going to Rangers or Celtic and being one of 100 or so at each age 
level and one of a thousand who make it in the 1st Team they can come 
here and be one of 15 and out of that 15 maybe 2 or 3 will make it to the 
first team. Do the percentages.  We don’t want to stand in their way, if 
they are good players we’ll sell them on.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The Commercial Director explained that the recruitment approach towards 
young players was to highlight their track record in developing first team 
players, something that was less likely at the bigger clubs where money was 
spent on high-profile acquisitions.  
 “We’ve extended the [club] Academy as a centre of excellence. We’ve 
got it running new. We’ve got teams plating every week. We’ve got the 
[community football], that I spoke about earlier that’s the social side, the 
[club] Academy is the Centre of Excellence for the elite teams. We have 
teams competing every week from under-10 right up to under-19. We 
have a network of scouts who basically operate every weekend from 
Glasgow in the west all the way through to Edinburgh in the east, all 
across central Scotland. We’ve even got people now in Lanarkshire and 
people in Fife, so we’re covering the whole of the central belt. We 
believe it’s more efficient and perhaps a bit more professional than 
some of our competitors. That’s the way we can compete with the 
Rangers and the Celtics of this world. The big selling point for our scouts 
is, if you as a parent, are given the choice of your son going to Rangers, 
Celtic or [our club], your natural reaction might be to put them towards 
one of the Old Firm. But actually you’ve got much more of a chance 
here at [this club]. We can demonstrate that because if you look at the 
[club] 1st Team at the moment there are about three if not four of the 
players who have come directly through the Academy. And I think that’s 
more than any other club in the SPL. So we’ve got players like [named 
player], who’s gone on to play for Scotland, [several named players who 
had played for Scotland] under-21’s. These are all players that are 
actually in our 1st Team at the moment. That’s more than one third of the 
team that’s come through the [club] Academy. And that to us is a 
tremendous endorsement of the investment we’re making in the [club] 
Academy.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
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The Commercial Director demonstrates the success of the club academy in 
developing players who went on to play international football. This information 
was used by the club scouts, who identify and recruit players, to encourage 
parents to send their son to this club as a route to professional football rather 
than go to Celtic or Rangers where more players were taken in but fewer made 
it to the first team. Although the Commercial Director discussed return on 
investment it is worth bearing in mind the comments used in the section on 
finance:  
“….if we sell players on that’s a bonus. There’s nothing in the budget for 
players being sold on.” 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
Although a financial return was sought on the academy investment The 
Commercial Director suggested that there was no figure included in the budget 
for player sales to help the club break even. The Club Owner expressed similar 
views on the success of player development at his club. 
“The biggest thrill in my time [the club] was watching [three international 
footballers]. It’s fantastic to watch them grow with [our club]? Would they 
have got the chance if they’d gone to Celtic? No way. Would [named 
player] be playing [in the Premiership] if he’d gone to Celtic? No chance. 
He’d be so far in their 2nd or 3rd team or wherever the hell they were. If 
think you were a kid, if you were a Dad you’d always put your people in 
the likes of Hibs or [our club] because you can get into the first team.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
There are similarities in the language used by both the Commercial Director and 
Club Owner in referencing the impact on parents deciding which clubs to 
engage with. Both men referred to several players by name. The Chief 
Executive took similar pride in the number of his former players taking part in a 
famous Scotland victory.  
“We’d spent a huge amount, I’d spent more time in Youth Development 
than I had on the First Team. So the whole youth development structure 
had to be right. Now the lovely upside of that is five years down the line, 
after I’d left Scotland beat [a named country], [two academy graduates] 
in midfield, [another young player brought in from a rival] in midfield who 
we’d brought through. The time we’d spent had worked.”  
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
The Chief Executive highlighted that the club viewed the First Team and Youth 
Development system as needing to be separate, and that he had chosen to 
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spend more time in development. The Club Owner agreed that the two needed 
to be split but that the needs of the first team were paramount.  
“Split them separately. The first team dictates the whole club.”  
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The manager explained that clubs preferred to keep the two as distinct entities 
rather than have the 1st Team manager be responsible for both.  
“But [the club] will argue that you move on to bigger and better things 
you take the whole lot and we have to start again. 100% agree with 
that.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
These comments would suggest that the view of the interviewees was that 
academy development was seen as a longer term role than that of the 1st Team 
manager. The Chief Executive explained that he had expected the sale of 
former academy players would help the club through a difficult time financially.  
“So when the crash came, which I’d thought was going to come, I 
expected them to come in and save us. So we could actually deal with 
the costs. I explained to him at the time that all the costs that were done 
through the previous time, right that’s out the window now. The new 
costs regime that we are, which is much, much lower I can get to that. 
And I can get to that and stay successful but it’s going to take a year 
because these kids aren’t cooked yet but they’re close.” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
The Chief Executive did recognise that, when the trouble hit, those players were 
not ready to be sold but that the project remained on track. He argued with his 
Owner that if he stayed the course then the project would be successful.  
“You’ve got to the level you asked me to get to, at the cost. You’ve now 
got a great manager, a fantastic management team in place, you’ve now 
got a youth development organisation that’s the best in the business, 
arguably. Hearts were good at the time, Hibs were good at the time but 
we were producing something special as well. It was all sitting there 
waiting. I explained to him that this is the way that the model works, 
going forward and it might cost you an extra £1m but I think these kids 
are going to be sellable anyway, you’ll get it back.” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
From these comments it is clear that the Chief Executive viewed player 
development as a long term project. Unfortunately for the Chief Executive the 
owner did not agree.  
126 
 
“And over that period he went for it for a wee while and then decided not 
to and decided to put it into administration.” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
Although the Manager agreed that the 1st Team and youth development 
systems should be kept separate he was frustrated by others making decisions 
about which players to transition from the youth teams to the senior squad.  
“I let three guys go, kids they came out of the YTS, we were trying to 
keep them but I mentioned the budget and we’ll have to let them go. I 
came in the next year and they’d still not let them go. I’m the manager of 
the club, why are they still here? ‘We thought we could put them out on 
loan.’ I said ‘They’re not good enough. You need to let them go, you 
can’t do that to the kids.’ And because they couldn’t get them anything 
out on loan eventually they let them go. But they gave another kid a two-
year deal. I had it out with the [Chief Executive]. ‘We have this great 
academy and this is the new kid on the block. We’ll give him a two-year 
deal.’ ‘You can’t do that because he then comes into my first team 
dressing room.’ ‘He won’t be. He’ll be out on loan.’ ‘You can’t put the kid 
on loan. The guy doesn’t want to go on loan.’ ‘Hold on just now. That’s 
my decision not yours. So whose expertise have you used?’ ‘The 
academy expertise.’ ‘Up to what age? Once he goes from under-19 to 
me it’s my expertise you use.’” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
There appears to have been pressure on the Manager to assimilate players into 
his squad that he did not think were good enough. An additional stress seems 
to have been that his expertise was not valued by this club. His frustration 
seems to be that players were given hope that was unlikely to materialise into a 
career. He was also concerned about the impact that this had on his budget. 
Money was spent without any return which links back to the Commercial 
Director’s comments about return on investment.  
“See for the two years they were YTS and two years professionals. 
Who’s responsible for all of that? For making the mistake of giving them 
contracts and counting all that money back. Somebody has to be 
responsible or do you just say ‘well that’s the change we’re talking 
about, becoming boys and men and you have to take it. Some of them 
will make it and some of them won’t. (But do you just take it so that 
some of them of the will make it?) I can tell you at 19 who’ll make it and 
who won’t. (Do you employ someone to help them make it?) I can tell 
you at 19 who’ll make it and who won’t. I can tell you at 18. So when I 
go to the League Manager’s [meetings]. I stand up, that’s my argument. 
They’re trying to scrap the reserves. We need to keep the reserves, they 
need that pathway to go to success. They need to play reserve football. 
There will be one or two exceptions, like me I went [part-time] and came 
full-time again. One of two exceptions but they want to cut it to the bone. 
But when you sit back, they are probably right. Because you can tell 
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their character, their work-ethic, you can tell who’s got that focus to go 
and succeed.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager argued that, using his knowledge of the game, he could tell at 18 
and 19 which of the young players would be successful. The Manager also 
argued within the league organisation that the reserve league, a development 
league, was the way forward rather than age-specific football. The Administrator 
took a different view on player development. Part of the original remit of the SPL 
was to develop Scottish players within the game. One way to achieve this was a 
requirement to have a number of young players in a match-day squad that had 
been developed by the clubs.  
“What the SPL were attempting to do when we were set up, we 
identified a gap in terms of home-grown talent and we introduced the 
Under-21 rule that has evolved over the years and is under review at the 
moment because there’s a feeling that we’re doing well in this territory in 
terms of the average 18 –man squad in the SPL, you’re only really 
looking at between 10 and 12 who are home-grown. Only about 20% of 
our starting 11 on any given weekend is from overseas. The number of 
Scots playing our league is pretty healthy. The number of young players 
in our league is pretty healthy. We can always do more, and our clubs 
can, and that’s what we’re looking to refine with our managers so, 
personally, I don’t think FIFA’s is the right way to do it. In Scotland we 
aren’t flooded with foreigners the way we were seven or eight years ago. 
There’s been a massive decrease in that” 
“The Administrator” Interview with the author 17
th
 December 2008 
The Administrator was asked if the decrease in imported players was based in 
simple economics as the revenue coming into Scottish football decreased.  
“No. That I think speeded up the process but these players, Alan Hutton 
and Craig Gordon, don’t come from nowhere. Scott Brown came 
through a youth initiative we set up with leagues, professional leagues 
and competitive leagues right throughout. Guys like Scott Brown came 
through that system with good investment in talent so to say that Scott 
Brown was just knocking around the streets and because there was no 
money he was just thrown into the Hibs team is just nonsense. I think it 
accelerated the process but without us setting the up the environment, 
which is what the clubs recognise and then the clubs invest in, probably 
the best part of £70 million over the last ten years in terms of youth 
development. To suggest that that investment is pointless is just 
nonsense. The economics played a part as an accelerant rather than 
these kids wouldn’t have got a chance without it.” 
“The Administrator” Interview with the author 17
th
 December 2008 
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As with other interviewees, The Administrator referred to specific big-name 
players who had been developed by SPL clubs. His view was that the number 
of players coming into the professional game was the result of deliberate policy 
and investment. This links back to the Commercial Director and the Chief 
Executive who spoke of return on a long-term investment. However, although 
each interview spoke of the players who had been developed at the clubs 
where they worked, each only referred to a handful of players who had gone on 
to the very top level with no discussion of the number of players coming through 
the youth system or the percentage of those who progressed to the professional 
game.  
5.6.1.4 – Interview Summary 
The interviewees expressed different views of players from the importance of 
the club culture to the Manager, and how difficult that was to change, to the 
need for Scottish Football to develop young players as sellable assets. The 
Commercial Director explained that costs could be minimised by signing players 
who were out of contract at other clubs but who could support the club’s 
younger players in their development. The Chief Executive discussed the 
problems caused within the dressing room by his Owner signing a player who 
altered the wage structure. The Manager had discussed the slow pace of 
changing club culture in a positive way whilst this example appears to suggest 
that negative impacts can happen very quickly. The Manager highlighted that he 
did not always have the final say on who was signed or sold on, which 
increased friction between him and the fans. The Owner admitted that the level 
of due diligence carried out in football investments was way below the approach 
taken in his other businesses.  
The importance of youth development was discussed by all of the interviewees 
with many individual examples given of players who had progressed through 
the clubs to play at international level. The Owner, the Chief Executive and the 
Commercial Director all explained that the number who had progressed through 
their clubs made it easier to recruit younger players ahead of the bigger clubs in 
Glasgow as they had a proven track record of player development. The 
Administrator explained that player development was a deliberate policy, 
supported by the SPL, as the transition from promising youth to international 
star was still the exception rather than the rule. The Manager suggested that too 
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many young players were given contracts and that his expertise was not always 
used. Players were offered contracts by the club when the Manager did not 
believe that they had the necessary character required to make it to the top 
level. The transition of players from the Academy to the First Team is central to 
the statistical analysis carried out in relation to players.  
5.6.2 – Analysis of Secondary Data 
The data collected from the Soccerbase system has been analysed in a number 
of ways to reflect the views of the interviewees, in order to establish any 
patterns emerging from the data. Firstly, some basic analysis is carried out to 
understand the relative size of playing squads of the clubs within the peer group 
to identify how many players are recruited with some consideration given to 
average payments. The squad figures are analysed in a little more detail to 
understand the usage of the players at each club, and to identify the levels of 
unused players. These figures are explored to understand the usage of players 
leaving the club by season to identify how many players leave a club without 
ever making it onto the pitch. Finally, the players signed from the club’s youth 
academy are categorised so as to understand the level of success in 
developing players based on the number of matches played. The interviewees 
tended to focus on the few successes whereas the Manager discussed the 
number of young players who did not make the grade. The final analysis seeks 
to explore the number of young players brought through by the clubs to full 
professional footballers making a contribution on the field of play.  
5.6.2.1 – Size of Playing Squad 
 
Over the course of the review period the total size of the playing squads at the 
peer group clubs has fluctuated (see Figure 5.6a) from 30 (Kilmarnock in 
season 2009/10) to 52 (Hearts in season 2007/08).  
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Figure 5.6a:  Size of Playing Squad by Club and Season.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
The size of the squads underlines the challenges that the football club manager 
faces in trying to maintain squad harmony. With only eleven starting positions 
available, plus another seven players on the substitutes’ bench, the data in 
Figure 5.6a highlights the potential conflict within the playing squad as all of 
those players will want to take part in every game.  
Although there is a degree of fluctuation in each of the clubs Hearts have the 
largest average squad (44) across the review period with the others slightly 
smaller: 35 (Aberdeen & Motherwell), 36 (Kilmarnock) and 37 (Dundee United 
and Hibernian). Figure 5.6b illustrates a rough calculation of the average 
payment made to players at each of the clubs. Using the data shown in Figure 
5.5d, the total wages bill for the club has been divided to calculate an average 
payment per player although this data includes bonus payments as well as the 
basic wages. Not only do Hearts have the highest wage bill (See Figure 5.5e) 
and the biggest squad (see Figure 5.6a) they also pay wages that are 
substantially higher than the other clubs in the peer group.  
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Figure 5.6b:  Average Annual Payment per Player by Club and Season.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase and FAME Data 
 
The average annual salary (see Figure 5.6b) falls for all clubs in the first five 
years of the review period. In season 2004/05 Hearts wages show a significant 
increase in their average payment and the wages paid by them to their players 
stays higher than the other peer group clubs. At the start of the review period, 
Aberdeen Hearts and Hibernian paid higher salaries than the other three 
echoing the view of the Owner who felt that those three clubs operated at a 
higher level than the others. By the end of the review period, the wages for five 
of the six peer group clubs are much closer. Figure 5.6a shows the average 
salary for each club plotted against the on-field success to establish if there is 
any link between the most successful club and the one paying the highest 
wages. The data in Figure 5.6c appears to show no link between wages and 
success although the data used in this analysis is limited. The available data 
does not make a clear distinction between base salary and bonuses nor the 
timing of these payments. Even accepting this caveat for there to be a clear link 
between on-field success and wages there would need to be a closer similarity 
between the shapes of the graphs.  
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Figure 5.6c:  Average Annual Payment per Player and On-field Success by Season.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase and FAME Data 
 
It can be inferred from this data however that club culture (as outlined by the 
Manager) may have a major impact on performance, and that the lack of due 
diligence carried out by clubs before signing players may lead to over-paying 
some players who make little on-field contribution. The Chief Executive 
highlighted the dangers of breaking an existing wage structure to sign an 
individual player, as this could have a negative impact on dressing-room 
culture. 
This question of contribution is explored further in the next section as the 
number of games played by each player over the course of a season is 
compared within the peer group to assess how well the players are used.  
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5.6.2.2 – Playing Squad Usage 
 
The previous section considered this total number of players in each squad as 
well as the average annual salary paid to each player within that squad. Given 
that the average squad ranges from thirty-five to forty-four players (see Figure 
5.6.2.1.1) and each match-day squad includes eleven starting players with 
seven substitutes, only three of which can be used, some players will be used 
more than others over the course of a season.  
Figure 5.6d breaks down the playing squads for each peer group club over the 
review period into three categories: a regular starter who began more than 10 
games over the course of the season, squad players who made fewer than ten 
starts but did play and unused players who may have been named in match-day 
squads but had no playing time for the season.  
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Figure 5.6d:  Playing Squad Usage by club and Season.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
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The graphs in Figure 5.6d show that all clubs have a number of unused players 
each season. Kilmarnock in 2009/10 only had one player who did not feature at 
all and Dundee United has only two in the same season. These graphs can 
offer some insight into the efficiency of the squads. If players are seen as 
assets then each club in each season retained some unused capacity; however 
there appears to be no clear pattern to the usage of the squads across the 
clubs. The Manager highlighted in his interview several reasons why players 
may not be used. Injuries can reduce the number of games players take part in 
over the course of the season but he also felt that some of the players signed 
were not good enough to meet the club target. The Manager questioned the 
decisions made at his club regarding trainee players so the next two sections 
will focus specifically on the players signed by the peer group clubs from their 
own Academy system to establish if there is any basis for his comments across 
the peer group. 
5.6.2.3 – Players Signed from Club Academy 
 
Each of the interviewees spoke with pride of the young players that had moved 
from their Youth Academy to play international football but as the previous 
section has shown there are still numbers of players who do not make the grade 
even at club level. Table 5.6.2a shows the number of players signed by each 
club within the peer group by season throughout the review period. Most clubs 
signed players from their Youth Academy for the First Team squad each 
season, with only four exceptions: Dundee United in 2008/09, Hearts in 
2005/06, Hibernian in 2004/05 and Kilmarnock in 2002/03.  
 00/ 
01 
01/ 
02 
02/ 
03 
03/ 
04 
04/ 
05 
05/ 
06 
06/ 
07 
07/ 
08 
08/ 
09 
09/ 
10 
10/ 
11 
Aberdeen 1 2 7 6 3 3 3 6 4 9 4 
Dundee Utd 2 1 2 4 5 5 4 5 0 2 3 
Hearts 8 3 1 9 7 0 4 4 1 4 4 
Hibernian 1 5 2 9 0 5 5 3 1 6 3 
Kilmarnock 3 5 0 5 4 2 3 1 1 1 8 
Motherwell 1 2 6 1 5 4 2 6 6 5 3 
 
Table 5.6a:  Players signed from Club Academy by Club and Season.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
135 
 
The variation in the number of trainees signed by each of the clubs would 
suggest that despite the efforts of all of the clubs discussed in the interviews, 
the transition from youth football to the professional game is uncertain and there 
are no guarantees of success in the development of future potential assets.  
5.6.2.4 – Usage of Players Signed from Club Academy 
 
The player data were analysed to identify the former Academy players who left 
the peer group clubs each season, in order to calculate the number of games 
each had played (see Table 5.6b). Four main categories were established: 
Unused is the number of players leaving each club without taking part in a 
league or cup match, Sub Only groups the players who did have some playing 
time but did not start any games during their time at the club.  
Games 
Category 
Aberdeen 
Dundee 
Utd 
Hearts Hibernian Kilmarnock Motherwell 
100 Plus 3 6% 2 6% 3 7% 4 10% 2 6% 3 7% 
75 Plus 1 2% 2 6% 1 2% 2 5% 2 6% 3 7% 
50 Plus 0 0% 0 0% 1 2% 2 5% 2 6% 1 2% 
25 Plus 4 8% 2 6% 4 9% 3 8% 3 9% 2 5% 
Over Ten 3 6% 1 3% 5 11% 3 8% 2 6% 2 5% 
Under 
Ten 
11 23% 10 30% 9 20% 11 28% 4 12% 8 20% 
Sub Only 9 19% 8 24% 7 16% 5 13% 6 18% 8 20% 
Unused 17 35% 8 24% 15 33% 10 25% 12 36% 14 34% 
 
Table 5.6b:  Usage of Players Leaving signed from Club Academy by Club.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
The different clubs within the peer group appear to have had different levels of 
success at developing young players (see Table 5.6b).  
Each of the clubs in the peer group developed several youth players who then 
went on to play over one hundred matches for the club. The peer group clubs 
produced a total of sixty-eight players over the eleven season review period that 
played more than ten matches, which is one player per club per year (Table 
5.6b). 
The interviewees focussed on the success stories, with the exception of the 
Manager, however these figures (see Figure 5.6a and Table 5.6b) do suggest 
that these players are the exception rather than the rule. The attrition rate of 
players who were released without taking part in a match is higher than the few 
success stories. Aberdeen (35%) and Hearts (31%) both released around one 
136 
 
third of the their trainees without playing which suggests that either players are 
being signed who do not have the physiological make-up to be successful, as 
the Manager suggested in his interview, or that the procedures are not in place 
to help those players develop. The best performing clubs in player 
development, Dundee United (17%) and Hibernian (21%) still released around 
one in five young players who did not progress to the required grade.  
If these players are being invested in as assets then there does appear to be a 
problem with the process across the peer group clubs. Whilst the interviewees 
discussed the successes the attrition rate amongst players signed from the club 
Academies does need to be examined further, since half of the trainees signed 
leave the club without ever starting a professional match that there is a 
disconnect between the Academy and the 1st Team definition of what is 
required to make the grade at the highest level.  
5.6.2.5 – Sending Young Players Out on Loan 
 
To establish if sending young players out on loan is beneficial to the parent club 
the detail in Table 5.6b was split into two: former trainees who had been out on 
loan at other clubs (see Table 5.6c) and those who had not (see Table 5.6d).  
Looking at the peer group as a whole, the 50% attrition rate of trainees who left 
without starting a match remains for players whether they are loaned out. For 
those not loaned out 30% of players (see Table 5.6d) play ten games or more 
before leaving with only 26% of players who are loaned out achieving the same 
number of matches.  
Games 
Category 
Aberdeen 
Dundee 
Utd 
Hearts Hibernian Kilmarnock Motherwell 
100 Plus 1 7% 1 6% 1 4% 1 5% 0 0% 0 0% 
75 Plus 1 7% 1 6% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
50 Plus 0 0% 0 0% 1 4% 1 5% 2 15% 0 0% 
25 Plus 1 7% 2 11% 1 4% 2 10% 2 15% 1 13% 
Over Ten 0 0% 1 6% 3 13% 2 10% 0 0% 0 0% 
Under 
Ten 
5 33% 5 28% 4 17% 7 33% 1 8% 2 25% 
Sub Only 1 7% 5 28% 6 26% 3 14% 5 38% 3 38% 
Unused 6 40% 3 17% 7 30% 5 24% 3 23% 2 25% 
 
Table 5.6c:  Usage of Players signed from Club Academy Sent on Loan by Club.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
137 
 
 
Games 
Category 
Aberdeen 
Dundee 
Utd 
Hearts Hibernian Kilmarnock Motherwell 
100 Plus 2 6% 1 7% 2 9% 3 16% 2 10% 3 9% 
75 Plus 0 0% 1 7% 1 5% 2 11% 2 10% 3 9% 
50 Plus 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 1 3% 
25 Plus 3 9% 0 0% 3 14% 1 5% 1 5% 1 3% 
Over Ten 3 9% 0 0% 2 9% 1 5% 2 10% 2 6% 
Under 
Ten 
6 18% 5 33% 5 23% 4 21% 3 15% 6 18% 
Sub Only 8 24% 3 20% 1 5% 2 11% 1 5% 5 15% 
Unused 11 33% 5 33% 8 36% 5 26% 9 45% 12 36% 
 
 
Table 5.6d:  Usage of Players signed from Club Academy Not Sent on Loan by Club.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
Further analysis suggests that some clubs use this means of player 
development more than others (see Table 5.6c). Motherwell sent only 20% of 
their former Academy players out on loan over the review period and only one 
of these played more than tenty-five games for the club. Dundee United, Hearts 
and Hibernian sent over half of their young players out on loan although it would 
appear that those who stay at the club (see Table 5.6d) are more likely to 
progress at those than those who do not (see Table 5.6c). At Hearts 56% of 
players loaned out left the club without starting as opposed to 21% of those who 
stay. At Dundee United (43% and 24%) and Hibernian (38% and 21%) were 
more successful at developing young players but there was still an advantage 
for those who stayed. This advantage can also be seen by a consideration of 
the significant player transfers who were signed from the club Academy or other 
youth teams (See appendices 1 & 2). Of the fifteen former players who 
generated a significant transfer fee for one of the peer group clubs (see Table 
5.6e) only three had been sent out on loan, two played for Aberdeen who were 
identified as one of the less successful clubs at developing young players (see 
Table 5.6a). The only other player sent out on loan was Craig Gordon, formerly 
of Hearts, who is the only goalkeeper on the list. As a specialist position it may 
have been essential for him to gain experience at another club.  
The data in Appendix 3 would seem to suggest that for clubs to turn trainee 
players into sellable assets the player needs to remain at the club for 
development and play a significant number of matches. Fifteen players of the 
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240 trainees signed is a success rate of 6% for the clubs in the peer group in 
terms of developing sellable assets from their youth academy.  
5.6.3 – Section Summary  
 
The analysis of the player data highlights that the manager faces a number of 
challenges in maintaining a successful culture at the club. With each club 
retaining between thirty and fifty-two players each season there is a degree of 
competition between the players for playing time. From the break-down of 
squad member usage it is clear that there are three main categories: regular 
starters, squad players and unused. The balance of these categories changes 
by club and by season although it was identified that a number of players leave 
the club each season without playing in a match.  
All of the interviewees discussed the importance of the club’s Youth Academy 
as a means of developing players with a view to selling the more successful 
players to other clubs. This is underlined by the number of players signed by the 
peer group clubs each season although the process is by no means certain with 
50% of the players signed from the Academy leaving the club without starting a 
match for the club although some clubs have been more successful than others 
at developing players from youth to regular starters. The practice of sending 
players out on loan appears to have little impact on the number of players 
leaving the club without playing although those players who become regular 
players tend not to have left the club on loan at any point.  
 
5.7 – Managers 
 
Much of the previous research focussed on the statistical link between the team 
manager and results without exploring the other factors that surround the 
managers’ role and relationships. Through the interviews the personal issues of 
the role were explored to develop a deeper understanding of the decisions 
made in the selection and replacement of managers. The interview with the 
Owner was deliberately focussed on the recruitment of managers as there had 
been seven managerial changes during his tenure at the club. The Chief 
Executive and Commercial Director both explained their role in hiring and 
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retaining managers at their clubs. The Manager was able to balance these 
views by explaining his view of the manager’s job.  
 
5.7.1 – Analysis of Primary Data: The Participants’ Views 
 
5.7.1.1 – The Relationship between the Manager and the Chairman 
 
The Chief Executive explained his views on the importance to the football club 
of the relationship between the manager and the chairman. He saw his role as a 
buffer who could reduce some of pressure between two powerful men.  
“The old cliché of the most important relationship in any club is between 
the chairman and the manager, and I think generally that’s correct.”  
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
The Owner agreed with the Chief Executive about the importance of the 
manager’s role within the club but admitted mistakes that he would not have 
made in his other businesses.  
“The most important position for me in a football without a doubt is the 
manager. Without a doubt. And we gave it a real lack of attention. If that 
was the key appointment you were making in a business area you’d be 
all over it.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
When the Chief Executive realised things were going wrong he began to think 
through his options. The important thing for him was to make the change at the 
right time so that it had the least impact on team performance. 
“There was a period of time where I saw the collision coming and 
buffered it for a while because needed to get to the end of a season or 
whatever and I could see the positives of the manager what he was 
developing but then that just exploded in a number of different directions 
and that’s when at that point in time, like any business, you have to 
make a decision for the business”. 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
5.7.1.2 – Candidate Selection 
 
In his attempt to minimise the impact on the team, the Chief Executive also had 
time to think about the type of manager who would fit best with their club and to 
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look around at who would be the best fit. He identified that the manager’s role 
needed to be split and several people appointed to work together.  
“When I brought in the next manager the important thing was, I had 
more time at that point in time, I knew it was coming and I had time to 
really look around and study what I needed, consider what I needed and 
what I actually needed was a team, probably three people to come in. 
And I had time to look around and just about get that ready. It wasn’t 
going out and checking with them I was knowing myself what was the 
perfect fit. I had people in my mind who I were going to do it. Who in the 
end didn’t do it, I got better. I walked into something better. Someone I 
knew the chairman would have a good relationship with.” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
Although the people who were identified did not join the club, the appointments 
made proved to be a good fit and the most important factor was the relationship 
between the manager and the chairman.  
Having identified that he had not given the selection of the manager the same 
attention he would in his other businesses, the Club Owner admitted that one 
former high profile player had not been the right choice as a manager.  
“Unmitigated disaster. I would never do that again.” “I went for very 
confident, very arrogant guy, high profile. I thought he had loads of 
passion. The mistake I made was he wasn’t really that clever at all and 
he was very, very insecure. Wouldn’t make a decision without [assistant 
manager] blessing it and it was [the assistant] that kept the club up.”   
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The Owner realised that the manager had made the right choice in the 
appointment of his assistant, who was highly experienced in the supporting role. 
The Owner suggested that one of the problems was the high number of former 
players who become managers without the relevant skillset. They had the 
coaching qualifications (badges) but lacked the relevant people skills to get the 
most out of the available resources.  
“We put people into management positons in football that have no 
people management skills. They might have all the badges, they might 
know all the routines to do to get the guys fit. If you shout at somebody, 
and that is the only way you have of expressing your anger with 
somebody, then you’ve got a problem.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The Club Owner saw that the problem lay with the manager’s lack of experience 
in developing people. The focus was on the candidate’s ability as a player 
rather than as a manager.  
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“Our current way of recruiting managers, in the main of which I’m totally 
guilty of, is you get a guy who was a good player or has been a player at 
a senior level, at a good level and you make him a manager. So you’ve 
got lots of footballing experience but we don’t know how much 
management….. A good manager is someone who gets 5% more out of 
the same resource than someone else. The resource so happens to be 
someone who kicks a ball.”  
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The Chief Executive had been more measured than the Owner in his approach 
to managers. He realised that there were problems within the club that meant 
that the manager had to be replaced as other relationships with the manager 
were suffering and that was causing significant damage within the club. His aim 
was to keep the relationship going until the end of the season to reduce the 
damage that would be caused by changing manager mid-season. 
“The decision for the business at that point in time was you’re a good 
manager and the other people you’re falling out with at the club such as 
the youth development manager, etc. who you are refusing to talk to, 
thinking that you’re being bugged by. We need to get rid of that. We 
need to clean that out and really need to be quite surgical about it.”  
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
This breakdown in relationships within football did not appear to be an isolated 
incident as the Manager explained that he preferred to bring in his own 
backroom team, since he didn’t trust those appointed by the club. At his 
previous club, the Manager had the opportunity to build the club from scratch 
over time but he was of the opinion that he would be unlikely to be in that 
position again. To get the job then the manager would be required to 
compromise on the staff he could bring in.  
“I don’t think I’ll ever get the chance that I had at [my previous club] 
because most of the infrastructure will be in place. I’ll go into a club and 
you’ll probably find it’s the Chairman’s mole, it’s probably just the sprint 
coach. And you’ll say ‘he’s rubbish’ but you’ll never get rid of him 
because he’s the Chairman’s mole. So when you go for a job interview 
and you say ‘I’m going to bring in my own staff, they’ll probably say ‘I 
can’t afford to do that because we’ve got a great masseur, we’ve got a 
great physio’ so what you’ve got to do is get in first then work it from 
there. And I think you have to take all of the staff that you do but you’ll 
never get that chance. You’ll probably never get the job.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager interviewed also felt that his comments were being relayed back 
to his chairman and that impacted on his ability to carry out his duties. 
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“When you go in, take as much of your own staff as you can. They know 
how you work, they know your standards. They watch your back. If I’m 
in a room with my staff and I’m having a rant and a rave, ‘is that him 
away off again? They bounce off of that. I went to [the club] and was too 
trusting. I brought people in and right back, right back, right back. It got 
to the stage at half-time or full-time team talk, you wouldn’t say anything. 
It’s like walking on egg-shells. They wouldn’t let me manage.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
In this case the Manager was concerned that anything he said that staff or 
players did not like went directly to the club chairman. Over time he said less 
and less to the players as he felt that this was preventing him from doing his 
job.  
The Manager found that the relationship with his chairman at one club was 
strained from the very start.  
“When I went in and negotiated my wages, I knew what [a predecessor] 
was on. As soon he went like that, I just went like that. And I asked why 
did you not give me the same wages as [a previous manager]? [The 
Chairman asked] What? I said ‘I know what [he] was on. Right from the 
off, Chairman, you’ve cut the legs from under me.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager’s comments about not knowing the budget were discussed in the 
section on fans but add weight to his argument that there was little trust 
between him and his chairman.  
“Behind the scenes, never knew the budget, giving the Chairman names 
– can we get that guy? We’ll see. I phoned up the agent a week later 
‘how are you getting on with the Chairman? He’d never phoned. The 
exact thing happened with [a predecessor]. All that stuff. Eventually 
you’re going ‘well get that one or that one in. It might cost a wee bit 
more.’ And you realise you will never get it. So you end up taking your 
number two or number three choice.  The fans don’t realise that.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
These comments seem to reiterate the point made by the Chief Executive that 
the relationship between the manager and the chairman is vital. This 
relationship did not start well and never seemed to improve. The Manager 
worked without knowing what his budget was. He explained how things had 
operated at a previous club.  
“They said your budget’s been cut £300(000) and I’m like ‘fine’. There’s 
my plans. Give him a new contract, let that one go – we’ve got a young 
boy, that’s it, get that tied up. This is the dates for the pre-season. We’ll 
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organise those dates. If you want a couple of glamour games, you’ll 
have to organise them at the stadium.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
Here the Manager was clear about his responsibilities and what budget he had 
to work with. At his second club this was not the case although the perception of 
the fans appears to have been that it was his fault that the team were not 
winning. The chairman negotiated the contracts without the Manager’s 
knowledge. The comparison shows that different clubs make decisions in very 
different ways.  
Although the Manager had left his club by the time of the interview he appeared 
quite philosophical about the situation.  
“It’s done and dusted. It’s one these things. I’ve had a bite at that apple. 
Something that you say to yourself, well I’ve managed [that club]…….It’s 
just a job to me. I’m trying to do the best I can for me. If that brings 
success for [the club], then great.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Commercial Director’s club had been relatively successful under their 
manager who was attracting interest from other larger club. The question “what 
can you do to keep him [the manager]?” was posed. 
“Do we want to keep him, I suppose is the answer. From his own career 
progression point of view I think if you ask him that question he would 
probably say it is time for him to move on to a bigger club. He’s been 
here five years. He just missed out on top six last year. He’s realistic 
enough to know he’s never going to win the league with [us], he might 
win a cup given a fair wind, but for his own career progression point of 
view he might want to move on to a Championship club, the same way 
that [another previous manager] moved to [an English Championship 
club], I’d expect to see [our manager] move to a Championship club in 
the next 12-18 months maybe.” 
(Do you have succession plans in place?) 
Well, we have succession plans but whether they would be into fruition, 
we have an excellent coach in [named coach] who runs the youth 
academy but obviously his name would be in the frame along with other 
if and when a vacancy ever arose. We do have succession planning and 
if it was the case that [named coach] became the next manager we have 
another ex-pro, who played with Aberdeen, who runs the under-17’s at 
the moment and he would probably step into [the named coach’s] shoes 
if he stepped into [the manager’s] shoes. So the potential’s there. It is a 
deliberate policy. “ 
“The Commercial Director” Interview with the author 8
th
 December 2008 
The Commercial Director’s club had a clear succession plan in mind that looked 
inside the club rather than to the wider market as the Chief Executive had. Both 
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of these approaches appear more controlled than that of the Owner who 
commented on the limited pool of available candidates for managerial positions.  
“What other business? I get rid of [a manager], I’ll get about 40 
applicants within about two days. What’s unique about those 40 people 
versus any other job they’ve all probably failed somewhere else.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The selection process for new managers was highlighted when a text message 
was received during the interview with Manager. The manager explained that it 
was from prospective employers and what was going on. 
“They’re doing their due diligence. Interview eight guys so if they get it 
wrong “he came up best at interview” I feel I’m just going down there for 
the sake of it but he did phone me up and say ‘we’ve been asked to cast 
our net far and wide. We like what the Scots boys are doing down in 
England. We’re checking up in Scotland and your name keeps coming 
up. Even if someone’s name has come up and we ask for another one, 
it’s your name that’s come up three or four times. We’ve checked your 
CV, it speaks for itself, we want you to come down and talk to us.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager was not overly optimistic about getting the job as he explained 
that the club were protecting themselves from a poor choice of manager by 
interviewing a range of potential candidates. He also discussed the importance 
of the fans’ reaction to a new manager.  
How do you sell me to your fans? Because you could put Ancelotti in 
here and they’re all shouting from the rooftops but put [me] in there - 
who’s that? If I’d done what I’ve done in Scotland down here I’d be close 
to managing in the English Premiership. Cup finals, all that stuff, no 
question. How do you sell that to your supporters?” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager saw that the initial reaction of supporter to a new manager could 
make the job even harder than it already was as his track record was not as 
widely known by fans in England. The pressure on football managers was 
highlighted by the Chief Executive who had been asked about becoming the 
team manager but had declined as he realised that he would not be successful, 
since the football manager’s role requires very long hours. His Chairman had 
suggested that the Chief Executive take over as manager.   
 
“He said to me “Could you be manager?”. I said no, I’d be rubbish. I’d be 
a rotten manager of a football team. Some people are made out for 
certain jobs, that’s not one of the ones that I’d like to do. I could do it but 
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I suspect I wouldn’t be very good. And the reason I’d not be very good is 
that in my life I’m not willing to give 24/7 to anything. I’ve got too many 
other things in my life. I want to be with my family. My kids are of an age 
I want to spent time with them.” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
He went on to express his own view that clubs should separate the roles of 
manager and coach although he did recognise that Scottish society, and 
particularly the media, did not like this set up.  
“The answer is a manager and a coach. The coach coaches and the 
manager does everything else. We don’t accept that. Our culture doesn’t 
accept that. As soon as you do that and you say the words Director of 
Football you have got the press against you, you have got the 
manager’s back up. These managers want to control everything even 
though, in many cases, it is beyond their capabilities. Particularly the 
financial side of it.” 
“The Chief Executive” Interview with the author 7
th
 June 2009 
The Chief Executive expressed concern in this statement regarding the 
manager’s ability to control budgets. This appears to reflect back to the issues 
raised by the Manager over the club budget and the pressure he felt under as 
he had no control over this.   
The Owner was of the opinion that he would have been better appointing an 
experienced people manager who would be able to add the football knowledge 
to their managerial experience more quickly than the other way round. He did 
realise that there would be resistance to such a move. 
“I fundamentally believe that I could get a manager, if society would 
allow me to do it, I fundamentally believe that I could find better 
managers that have never played football at any sort of high level.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
Reflecting on his time in football, the Owner suggested a different approach 
than the one he had adopted before although he did see that it would take a 
shift in the perceptions of fans to accept a non-football manager.  
“If you ask me what I would change, I would back the best people 
manager I could get, the best leader I could get to manage the football 
club. And go and get their coaching badges.” 
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
Despite the high number of managers appointed by him the Owner suggested 
that managerial success should be judged over the longer term.  
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“You can’t judge a manager in his first or second year. You have to take 
a longer view.”  
“The Owner” Interview with the author 5
th
 March 2009 
The Manager had a very different view of the time-frame that he expected to be 
judged in by the prospective employers.  
“You have to do it, you have to get them promoted in the first year or 
you get the sack.” 
“The Manager” Interview with the author 25
th
 May 2011 
The Manager accepted that the definition of success at each club is different 
and that the perception of failure would not be tolerated. The manager 
understood and accepted the tenuous nature of the job that was linked to 
perception of success.  
5.7.1.3 – Interview Summary 
The interviews gave an insight into the thought processes of those who make 
the decisions on when to hire and fire a manager balanced against the views of 
an active football club manager.  
Very different approaches were taken to the selection of a new manager. The 
Chief Executive acted as a buffer between the Chairman and his manager after 
the relationship between the two had broken down so that the change could be 
made at the best point in time for the club. This period was used to reflect on 
the needs of the club and targets were identified although a different manager 
took over. One of the main considerations for the Chief Executive was how well 
the new man would get on with the Chairman. The Commercial Director’s club 
looked internally at succession plans as they accepted that their existing 
manager would likely move on for his own career progression. The Owner 
accepted that he did not pay enough attention to the appointment of managers 
relying on the pool of available candidates at the time. As a result his 
appointments tended not to work out as the people appointed rarely had the 
people management skills that were required. On reflection, he acknowledged 
that the ability to lead people was more important that coaching certificates. The 
Manager spoke openly about the difficulties he had faced in his previous club 
with a strained relationship with his chairman from the outset. He was 
concerned that he was unable to manage the club effectively without 
147 
 
interference. In the final analysis he saw his job as a job and that his personal 
progression was important. 
 
5.7.2 – Analysis of Secondary Data 
 
This section of the report will focus on the managerial appointments made by 
the peer group clubs over the review period. Following on from the comments 
made by the interviewees the data was analysed to understand the number of 
managerial changes, the reason given for and the timing of the change.  
5.7.2.1 - Peer Group Club Summary Data 
 
Over the period 2000/01 to 2010/11 there were a total of sixty managerial 
appointments. Of these forty-five were permanent appointments with the 
remaining fifteen temporary, or ‘caretaker’, appointments made whilst a 
permanent manager was appointed. Table 5.7a illustrates the number of 
appointments by club over the review period.  
Manager Group - Club Summary - Tenure 
Club Type 
Number 
of 
Managers 
Median 
Tenure 
(Days) 
Shortest 
Tenure (Days) 
Longest 
Tenure 
(Days) 
Aberdeen Caretaker 1 6 6 6 
Aberdeen Permanent 5 910 530 1823 
Dundee Utd Caretaker 2 80 6 153 
Dundee Utd Permanent 8 702 115 1150 
Hearts Caretaker 5 18 3 23 
Hearts Permanent 11 215 91 1926 
Hibernian Caretaker 5 14 2 21 
Hibernian Permanent 8 499 69 1399 
Kilmarnock Permanent 5 1105 139 2874 
Motherwell Caretaker 2 24 20 27 
Motherwell Permanent 8 379 181 1484 
 
Table 5.7a: Peer Group Managerial Tenure Length in Days.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
 
The detail in Table 5.7a suggests some differences in the approach taken within 
the peer group clubs with some clubs replacing managers on a regular basis 
whilst others have sought stability through longer appointments. Hearts have 
had ten full-time and five caretaker managers during the review period although 
there have been a number of long-term tenures at the club within that period. At 
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the other end of the scale Kilmarnock have had only five full-time managers in 
the same period and have not appointed a caretaker boss. Franck Sauzee’s 
sixty-nine day tenure at Hibernian is the shortest ‘permanent’ stay at any of the 
peer group clubs. Jim Jeffries is the longest serving manager in the review 
period with almost eight8 years at Kilmarnock. 
The detail highlights that, in most cases, the caretaker role lasts for a few days. 
The exception to this is Peter Houston at Dundee United who was caretaker 
manager for 153 days. Houston became the permanent manager of Dundee 
United at the end of this period. The purpose of the caretaker manager is to 
provide some stability to the club whilst the club ownership searches for a new 
permanent manager. The brevity of most caretakers’ tenures underlines how 
quickly clubs move from manager to manager. 
The next section will look at the reasons why managers leave clubs. Although 
many managers are sacked there are also a number of managers who have 
moved from one club to another or to manage a national side.  
5.7.2.2 - Reason for Leaving 
 
There are a number of reasons why managers leave football clubs as the data 
in Table 5.7b shows.  More than half of the managers who left were sacked 
(31%) or left by ‘mutual consent’ (20%). In either case the manager left the club 
at short notice and an agreement was reached over compensation. 
Reason for Leaving Number Percent 
Contract Termination 14 33% 
Mutual Consent 9 21% 
End of Contract 2 5% 
Alternate Role with Club 2 5% 
Peer Group 3 7% 
Other Scottish Club 1 2% 
Other League 6 14% 
International Role 2 5% 
Resigned 2 5% 
Ill Health 1 2% 
 
Table 5.7b: Reason for Leaving. Created by the Author.  
 
In a few cases the manager and/or the club decided not to seek a contract 
extension or the manager was offered an alternative role within the club. Twelve 
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of the managers (28%) left one of the peer group clubs for another job. In these 
cases upheaval at one club had a knock-on effect at another. There are several 
managers who have managed several of the clubs in the peer group (see Table 
5.7c) although only three of those moves were directly from one peer group club 
to another. 
Manager Name 
Permanent 
Posts 
Peer Group Clubs Managed 
Jim Jefferies 3 Hearts (twice), Kilmarnock 
Bobby Williamson 2 Kilmarnock, Hibernian 
Craig Brown 2 Motherwell, Aberdeen 
Jimmy Calderwood 2 Kilmarnock, Aberdeen 
Mark McGhee 2 Motherwell, Aberdeen 
Mixu Paatelainen 2 Hibernian, Kilmarnock 
Craig Levein  2 Hearts (twice) 
Valdas Ivanauskas 2 Hearts (twice) 
 
Table 5.7c: Men who have managed multiple peer group clubs. Created by the Author. 
 
From these data seventeen of the forty-five managerial appointments (38%) 
have been filled by only six men although this challenges the point made by the 
Owner that the available pool of managers was small. Six of the seventeen 
repeat appointments were at the same club (Hearts) so that figure can be 
reduced to eleven (24%). 
Not all clubs within the peer group are the same as is shown by the reasons for 
leaving of permanent managers by club (see Figure 5.7c). The stacked bar 
shows how many permanent managers each club has had over the review 
period but distinguished between those who left by choice and those who were 
dismissed.  
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Figure 5.7a: Reason for Leaving - Grouped by Club. Created by the Author. 
 
The detail in Figure 5.7a shows that Hearts dismissed 70% of their managers 
within the review period. Both Aberdeen (75%) and Dundee United (71.4%) 
have a higher dismissal rate than Hearts although the actual numbers of 
managers are small. At the other end of the scale, Kilmarnock have only 
dismissed one of four managers over an eleven year period, although that is 
slightly skewed by the longevity of tenure of Jim Jeffries.  
The next section considers the timing of the managerial change to explore the 
idea expressed by the Chief Executive that this could be managed to reduce the 
impact on the club.  
5.7.2.3 - Timing of Managerial Changes 
 
The Chief Executive spoke of managing the deteriorating relationship between 
his manager and chairman so that a change could be made at a time that had 
the least impact on the club. Five of the six clubs have replaced managers in 
May or June which would suggest that, where possible, the changes are made 
in a controlled manner. 
Table 5.7d shows the length of time between permanent managerial 
appointments by club throughout the review period. The data have been split 
between those appointments made during the season and those not to 
determine which clubs appear to control the timing of replacement.  
Club In Season 
Number of 
Changes 
Median Gap 
(Days) 
Shortest Gap 
(Days) 
Longest Gap 
(Days) 
Aberdeen No 3 6 4 9 
Aberdeen Yes 1 18 18 18 
Dundee Utd No 1 153 153 153 
Dundee Utd Yes 6 0 0 6 
Hearts No 2 3 0 5 
Hearts Yes 8 9 0 52 
Hibernian No 1 21 21 21 
Hibernian Yes 6 9 0 34 
Kilmarnock No 2 2 1 2 
Kilmarnock Yes 2 2 1 3 
Motherwell No 4 9 0 21 
Motherwell Yes 3 1 1 28 
 
Table 5.7d: Length of Time between Permanent Managerial Appointments by Club.  
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
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From the data it can be seen that Aberdeen tend to replace their manager out of 
the season which allows a longer time to make the decision. Hearts, Hibernian 
and Dundee United are more likely to make a change during the season. 
Dundee United tend to make very quick decisions about replacement with one 
exception when Peter Houston was appointed on a temporary contract that 
lasted 153 days before becoming a permanent appointment.   
All clubs have appointed permanent managers within a few days of the 
incumbent leaving post which does leave questions over the effectiveness of 
the selection process. It is hard to imagine companies in other business sectors 
making senior appointments this quickly. In his interview the Manager explained 
that he was given no clear performance indicators and the lack of attention 
described by the Owner would suggest that he too had no clear definition of 
success for the manager.  
5.7.2.4 - Win Percentage and Attendance 
 
This section contains an analysis of the impact of permanent managers on 
match attendance. This is based on the premise that managers who are 
deemed to be under-performing are replaced to improve team performance. 
Team performance for each manager has been measured using two metrics: 
the percentage of matches won by the club under the direction of each manager 
and the percentage of potential league points won. These figures allow some 
comparison between managers despite the different length of tenure although 
this is not a metric widely used within the industry. The win percentage is simply 
the number of matches won over the manager’s tenure expressed as a 
percentage of the total matches played. The average home attendance is 
shown as a bar chart with the win and points percentages shown as line graphs 
(see Figure 5.7b). The inclusion of both percentage figures is to reflect drawn 
matches.   
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Dundee United 
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Hibernian 
 
Kilmarnock 
 
Motherwell 
Figure 5.7b: Average Attendance against Win% and Points % by Manager and Club.  
Created by the Author. 
 
These figures would suggest that there is no link between attendance and the 
percentage of matches won or points gained. It would be expected that if there 
was a clear link then as the teams won more matches and gained more points 
as a result then the attendance figure would rise accordingly. As with other 
analyses in this thesis there is no discernible pattern between the components. 
This analysis suggests that there is little link between the win-percentage of the 
manager and the average home crowd during his tenure particularly in the later 
stages of the review period as attendances have fallen despite the on-field 
picture. As 38% of the income at the Commercial Director’s club was based on 
ticket sales falling attendance had an impact on income. Replacing the 
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manager, however, even with one who wins more games, may not have the 
impact on attendance that might be expected.  
5.7.2.5 - Goals Scored at Home and Attendance 
 
Both the Owner and the Manager expressed the view that fans expect to be 
‘entertained’ so the match data was analysed to determine if the was any link 
between the number of goals scored by the home team and the average 
attendance by manager.  
Figure 5.7c contains six graphs that show the average number of goals scored 
at home by the peer group clubs by manager. The Aberdeen figures appear to 
suggest some correlation between the number of goals scored at home and 
attendance. The remaining five clubs show no clear pattern of a link between 
goals scored and attendance. The link between attendance and perceived 
entertainment of supporters may be suggested by the observation that the 
manager with the lowest average attendance at Hibernian is Bobby Williamson, 
who once quipped that if fans wanted entertainment they should go to the 
cinema.  
  
154 
 
 
 
Aberdeen 
 
Dundee United 
 
Hearts 
 
Hibernian 
 
Kilmarnock 
 
Motherwell 
Figure 5.7c: Average Attendance and Average Goals Scored at Home by Manager and Club. 
Created by the Author. 
 
As a measure of success for a manager the number of goals scored by game 
there appears to show no clear link however the perception of fans of being 
entertained may have an impact if the ‘Bobby Williamson’ effect is accepted: 
football is, in part, an entertainment business.  
From the data in Figures 5.7b and 5.7c, there appears to be no link between 
attendance and either the win percentage or goals scored when grouped by 
manager.  
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5.7.3 – Section Summary  
 
The impact of managerial change has been one of the major areas of academic 
research in the sports industry however this level of scrutiny does not appear to 
have been reflected by all of those in the industry.  
The Chief Executive discussed the importance of the relationship between the 
club chairman and the manager. The dangers of a poor relationship between 
the two were described in detail by the Manager who had experience of good, 
bad and deteriorating relationships within his clubs. The Market Director 
discussed the succession planning that his club had put in place whilst the 
Owner admitted that he had not given managerial appointments enough 
consideration through his tenure. Clear indicators of performance seemed to be 
missing within the industry.  
The analysis of the peer group detail showed little correlation between 
attendance and matches won or goals scored in most clubs. In some clubs, 
particularly the smaller ones, there appeared to be little that affected 
attendance. At the bigger clubs, Hearts, Aberdeen and Hibernian, there was 
variation however there appears to be no clear link between the measurable 
factors given the small sample size.  
No link is indicated between managerial change and on-field success as the two 
most successful clubs, Hearts and Hibernian, who had the highest number of 
changes. Managerial changes did appear to be carried out quickly with no 
suggestion that decisions taken in the less-pressured summer months were 
given more time than those taken during the season. A few managers did take 
charge of more than one club within the peer group however a wide range of 
managers were used within the review period, challenging the notion that failure 
elsewhere was rewarded.  
Whilst there is an element of playing-staff change at all clubs, managers take 
different approaches to their signings with some managers relying on loan 
players more than others. A consideration of those managers, who were in 
charge at more than one club, suggests that some managers may adapt their 
choice of signing to the situation rather than having a particular style that they 
adopt regardless of employer.  
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5.8 – Chapter Conclusion  
 
Using a combination of industry perspectives and an inductive exploration of 
match, player, manager and finance detail the original five frames have been 
explored to reflect the elements that make up a professional football club. 
These components demonstrate the multiple tensions between the long and 
short-term views of the club taken by the different stakeholders. All interviewees 
spoke of the attempts made to take a long-term view of club development and 
finance but discussed the contradictions and conflicts, at times within 
themselves, that made progress difficult if not impossible. Experienced 
business-men who came into football with the intention of using their 
professional knowledge of running successful companies admitted that the 
emotional environment and long-standing frames used within the sport to define 
behaviour meant that they did not pay sufficient attention to critical decisions. 
The analysis has demonstrated that, within this peer group of professional 
football clubs in Scotland, there are no clear patterns. Long-term success is 
hard to maintain and simply paying the highest wages is no guarantee of 
success. Short-term success is not always translated into higher attendance 
figures and the relationship with the fans needs care and attention as it does in 
other businesses. Whilst clubs seek to develop young players as assets this is a 
complex process with limited success although Scottish clubs do compare 
favourably with those in other leagues. The degree of managerial turnover 
appears not to have a short-term impact although the pressure to achieve 
success does hamper the ability of managers to make long-term development a 
possibility.  
These factors will be analysed in the next section to identify the components 
within the frames to create the conceptual framework. 
  
157 
 
Chapter 6: Findings – Identifying the Frame Components 
6.1 - Introduction  
The aim of this research project is “to develop a conceptual framework that 
combines a broad range of factors, both short and long-term to allow new 
frames to evolve within the strategic management of professional football clubs 
in Scotland. “  
The review of the sports literature identified five main frames that can be used 
to analyse professional football clubs. Those frames are: 
 On-field performance 
 Attendance 
 Finance 
 The players  
 The manager 
These were used to analyse the industry-participant interviews to identify the 
constituent components of these frames. The views expressed in the interviews 
were triangulated with secondary data from Scottish professional football to 
support, challenge or illuminate the perceptions of the participants with 
quantifiable data  
6.2 - On-field performance 
On-field performance has been considered first in this section since it can be 
used as a relative measure of competitive advantage within football as it 
provides a simple comparison of market position (Drucker, 2007) relative to 
other clubs. The definition of success and failure within football can be linked, 
very simply, to match results however clubs should resist a short-term 
interpretation of this and seek rather to balance these results with a 
consideration of the other factors in this framework. Several of the interviewees 
discussed the different levels of perceived success, over the course of a 
season, within Scottish football: top three, top six or simply avoiding relegation. 
For some there was a clearly articulated view of what the club hoped to achieve 
in the season. The Commercial Director sought a gradual improvement in the 
league season by season. The Owner had hoped to get his club back to the 
level they had been a few years earlier, finishing in the top three and winning a 
cup, but realised after taking over that the club had been over-achieving and 
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other factor made the slip harder to reverse than he thought.  Only the Chief 
Executive discussed the plan he created to ensure that the correct resources 
were in place at the start of the season to achieve a top three finish: the correct 
manager, the right group of players and the financial resources to support 
those. For others, achievement appeared more aspirational based on progress 
over the previous season.   
Throughout the interviews the definition of success tended to be based on final 
league position although the Commercial Director did believe that his club could 
compete with the Old Firm in the knock-out competitions (his focus being on the 
financial benefits gained from a successful cup run). Only the Manager reflected 
on the success of teams reaching cup finals and how that shaped others’ 
perceptions of him.  
On-field success should not simply be measured by the percentage of games 
won, which is not a statistic used within football as it is in other sports, or by 
league position but by relative success in the knock-out cup competitions in 
conjunction with the final league table. The two cup competitions offer clubs 
outside the Old Firm a route to success on the field leading to increased 
revenue through TV coverage, merchandise sales and more high profile games. 
The supporter interest generated around the club by the high profile games 
allows the clubs the opportunity to connect, or reconnect, with latent or lapsed 
supporters, as will be discussed in the next section. The gains of cup success, 
through regular semi-final and final appearances as well as winning, offer clubs 
more routes to expanding their fan and revenue base.  
One of the difficulties of the football industry is that success is not absolute it is 
relative. Success is measured against that of others who may have the same 
target and make better use of their resources. On-field success is under-pinned 
by balancing the other factors: finance, players and the manager. This balance 
may seem obvious from the outside but the on-field performance data for the 
peer clubs suggests that this ‘cumulative competitive advantage’ (Grundy, 
1999) proved elusive over the eleven-season review period. The interview data 
suggests that clubs were taking short-term decisions that had long-term 
implications for on-field success. The original definition took account only of the 
number of matches won and lost. Using these three components to measure 
success, based on the competitions entered, this matches the levels of 
perceived success within the sport in Scotland. Whilst the league position 
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remains the highest priority measure for clubs the inclusion of cup competitions 
in the frame underpinning decisions a more detailed analysis of success and 
failure is possible.  
Frame Component 
Performance League position 
Performance Scottish Cup 
Performance League Cup 
 
The tension of the short and long term implications (Dodd & Favarro, 2007) of 
business decisions is one reason a single outcome measure of success can be 
damaging (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985) as the other factors can be forgotten or 
ignored. By using the performance data from the three competitions a more 
balanced measure is created. Grusky (1963) argued that there was a strong 
correlation between on-field success and attendance so the next frame to be 
discussed in this chapter is attendance.  
6.3 - Attendance 
Previous research has suggested a link between on-field performance and 
attendance: the more successful a club is, the more supporters they will attract. 
The interview with the Chief Executive highlighted that there are those within 
the industry who share that view. To some extent Forrest & Simmons (2006) 
agreed with Grusky (1963) on the link between success and attendance 
although they did notice that there are other factors, such as varying kick-off 
times and days as well as a number of matches close together, which could 
reduce attendance levels. The data gathered for the peer group clubs over the 
review period challenges this notion. There appears to be no clear short-term 
link between success and attendance when measured over the length of a 
season. Both the Chief Executive and the Commercial Director discussed the 
idea that fan development is a long-term process that requires the identification 
of the different fan groups who attend matches and the ways in which the 
consumption of football is changing through TV and social media content 
although it would appear that the movement in Scotland from the local to global 
model of finance (Andreff & Staudohar, 2000) is happening more slowly than in 
other countries. The Commercial Director demonstrated that ticket sales 
accounted for 38% of the revenue for his club which underlines the importance 
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of attending supporters in Scotland. Although the Administrator did discuss the 
growing importance of overseas TV deals and the marketing opportunities 
available to clubs by signing high-profile international players this tended to be 
restricted to those clubs that were big enough to have the commercial 
resources available to support this. Although smaller in number, the different 
media create a number of supporter types and the engagement with each group 
needs to reflect the relationship.  
In order to answer the basic questions posed by Markides (2000) - who are our 
customers and what products do we offer? - clubs need to adapt effective 
customer management strategies, as used within other commercial sectors 
(Adamson, Jones & Tapp, 2006), which reflect the different types of relationship 
between the club and the fan. For fans who physically attend matches four 
distinct types of fan have been identified within the research: 
 
Fan type Nature of the Relationship 
Season ticket 
holder 
Purchases an agreed attendance package 
providing the club with a guaranteed income over 
the season. 
Regular attendee Supporter pays on entrance to the ground for 
matches they attend. Less predictable source of 
revenue for the club.  
Potential attendee Has some affiliation to the club and may attend a 
few high-profile matches especially cup semi-final 
or final.  
‘Away’ supporter Supporter of another team who attends only a few 
matches featuring their team.  
 
This breakdown of customer type reflects the basic questions asked by 
Markides (2000) about who a firm’s customers are, what products are on offer 
and how a firm can most efficiently provide the service. By removing the 
assumption that football supporters are uniform in how they attend matches, 
and that their attendance is based solely on success, the clubs can gather 
information about the individual customer and tailor the offering accordingly. To 
develop the relationship effectively the clubs need to understand how the 
different supporters view the product as is the case in other businesses 
(Jacobs, Stayaert & Überbacher, 2013). Scottish football remains highly 
dependent on match-ticket income without the large TV deals that English clubs 
enjoy, as explained by the Commercial Director. There are those within football, 
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particularly supporters, who do not want to be viewed as customers as other 
businesses would but for long-term supporter development to occur clubs may 
need to categorise supporters and engage with them appropriately without 
simply viewing them as cash-machines (Adamson, Jones & Tapp, 2006). The 
relationship will need to be effectively managed, as successful firms in any 
industry would, but for clubs to grow attendance they do need to encourage 
season ticket holders to renew year after year and to move some of the regular 
attendees to season ticket holders to formalise the relationship more and make 
income more predictable. The potential attendee has enough affiliation to the 
club to attend high-profile matches so clubs could try to slowly expand this 
relationship to include more matches. This study has focussed purely on the 
clubs relationship with the supporter rather than the other way round, in order to 
retain the focus on the club view.  
The relationship with the away supporter is secondary as the fan’s loyalty lies 
with another club however that does not mean that there should be no contact. 
The opportunity to increase the ‘away’ support at matches helps the host club’s 
finances. The Owner and the Commercial Director spoke of football fans who 
travel to watch the team they have traditionally supported but could be 
encouraged to come to their local club when there is no fixture clash. This is 
unlikely to be a huge income generator but does strengthen the local 
community ties.  
Changing technology means that fans’ match consumption has changed and 
social media opens up new avenues for club’s to develop. Ex-pat fans can be 
linked through web technology to watch matches on-line to maintain a link 
across the globe. This is not restricted to ‘home’ fans but also ways in which 
coverage could be sold to ex-pat ‘away’ fans as well. As the definition of football 
fans expands through different means of watching games, clubs need to 
recognise, develop and measure the changing relationship between themselves 
and their fans so that they do not lose out, financially, to other clubs or leagues.  
Although the link between performance and attendance was previously 
suggested, in different countries and, in the case of Grusky (1963) different 
sports and times, this project challenges that direct link. However the findings of 
customer development are consistent with those arguing for Fan Relationship 
Management (Adamson, Jones & Tapp, 2006) systems to be developed by 
football clubs and although the movement to the global model (Andreff & 
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Staudohar, 2000) does appear to be happening in Scotland it is on a smaller 
scale and at a slower pace than some other countries.  
Without a clear link between on-field performance and attendance clubs in 
Scotland need to manage their relationship with individual fans whilst 
recognising the nature of the relationship. Although there appears to be no 
immediate link between better performance and higher attendance, it is likely to 
increase the opportunities for clubs to develop the relationships with the 
different types of supporter.  This should allow clubs to increase revenue from 
fans by expanding the number of relationships rather than simply relying on the 
already committed to give more which can lead to resentment as identified by 
Adamson, Jones & Tapp (2006). The importance of match attendance on club 
finances has been referred to several times in this section and the next section 
will focus on this in more detail.   
From the data the attendance frame can be split into two main sections: CRM of 
those who attend matches, recognising that there are different types of 
supporter, and the relationship with remote supporters through social media and 
TV. The link to community engagement is shown separately to highlight the role 
that clubs can play in their local community although from a club perspective 
this is likely to be linked to fan development. The factors to be included in the 
conceptual framework are as follows: 
 
Attendance Customer Relationship Management Season Ticket 
Attendance Customer Relationship Management Regular Attendee 
Attendance Customer Relationship Management Potential Attendee 
Attendance Customer Relationship Management Away Supporter 
Attendance Remote Supporters Social Media 
Attendance Remote Supporters Television 
Attendance Community Engagement  
 
6.4 - Finance 
Both of the previous frames, on-field performance and attendance, have a direct 
impact on the level of income generated by professional football clubs within 
Scotland. On-field performance (through sponsor’s prize money) and 
attendance (via ticket sales) both have a direct impact on a club’s income. By 
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increasing the number of paying customers, irrespective of which team they 
support, clubs should be able to increase their revenue by attracting more 
people to attend league matches but also by increasing the number of matches 
played by success in the cup competitions. Better performance leads to higher 
income, through the distribution of prize money based on performance, 
although costs are also likely to increase through bonus payments to players 
and coaching staff. Conversely, falling income can put pressure on the players 
as budget cuts are made although this can be used to create a ‘siege mentality’ 
with the manager and the players, as discussed by the Manager in his 
interview. Increased spending on wages can also impact on dressing room 
harmony if one or two players are favoured over others, as the Chief Executive 
highlighted when his Chairman decided to sign a player and move the costs 
outside the normal budget. The Chief Executive was of the view that this 
decision was taken as a result on the emotional impact of football rather than a 
rational business decision. This type of decision can impact negatively on 
performance which in turn may reduce income so there is a difficult balance to 
be maintained.  
Other financial difficulties can arise where the stated financial position of the 
club is worse than expected, as discussed by the Owner, which makes it difficult 
for new owners to implement their strategy without a significant increase in 
revenue or debt. The Commercial Director and the Chief Executive discussed 
the need for benefactors to underwrite losses or invest in the stadium as is 
common in the Arts where personal sponsorship of opera and ballet are 
commonplace. However this support cannot be guaranteed as a future source 
of revenue if the benefactor has a change of heart. In the case of the Chief 
Executive, the owner was required to underwrite a loss-making operation whilst 
the Commercial Director discussed ground improvements paid for by a local 
businessman. 
Using Whittington’s (1999) strategic framework to understand the firms within 
the football industry, clubs seek plural outcomes as profit-maximisation is not 
the target; on-field success is sought over profit and the need for benefactors in 
various guises suggests a precarious business model. Grundy (1999) and Lago, 
Baroncelli & Szymanski (2004) have proposed frameworks that offer possible 
means of clubs growing income but these are limited because they are purely 
conceptual rather than under-pinned by data gathered from those who work in 
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the industry. The impact of emotional decisions or the need for benefactors are 
not discussed in these papers nor is there any consideration of the destructive 
cycle that can be caused by falling revenues.  The Manager was able to use the 
financial difficulties to build a ‘siege mentality’ within the players to avoid 
relegation but the Owner was unable to implement his plan as the he realised 
that the club position, in terms of finance and supporters, had been over-stated 
in the purchase process. As revenue falls a club’s debt will rise unless there is a 
corresponding reduction in expenditure. The dangers of long-term debt, 
securitised on future ticket sales or other club assets, has been identified by 
Grundy (2004) and Morrow (2006) leaving the club exposed to outside 
influences. The problems caused by a ‘fire sale’ of players, leading to falling 
performance and attendance levels in a destructive spiral that can be difficult to 
arrest (Buraimo, Simmons  & Szymanski, 2006) was echoed in the comments of 
the Owner as he dealt with falling attendances and the realisation that the club 
had previously over-achieved. The Manager highlighted the difficulties caused 
by selling key players without sufficient time given to sign adequate 
replacements. Financially, in the short-term, the decision made sense as the 
club had an asset that could be sold to generate revenue. The long-term impact 
was seen on the field as the club struggled to perform to the expected level.  
The analysis of the limited financial reporting that was available in a standard 
format highlighted that the amount of interest paid on club debt may be more 
significant rather than the actual level of debt as a measurable component 
within the finance frame. Debt tends to become a problem when a club cannot 
service the debt which passes control to the creditors who have called in the 
loan however the amount of interest paid to service debts, both long and short-
term, emerged as a significant proportion of the clubs annual turnover. As well 
as focussing on the wage level at the club, as a proportion of income, it is 
important to ensure that interest repayments do not exacerbate the long-term 
debt situation. If the recommended wages to interest turnover ratio should not 
exceed 65% then clubs need to manage their interest repayments as a 
percentage of the turnover to ensure that all other financial commitments can be 
met as well as future investment funded. The consistent debt reduction by most 
of the clubs within the peer group suggests that this is recognised within the 
industry. Hearts’ financial problems, leading to administration and relegation, 
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were entirely predictable as the outlay on wages and interest, in comparison to 
income, was not sustainable in the long-term.  
The development of players as sellable assets will be looked at in the next 
section but the analysis of the peer group clubs suggests that as a revenue 
stream this process is unreliable. The Commercial Director did admit that they 
were a ‘selling club’ but did not budget for player sales at the start of the 
season. Clubs may be ready to sell a player if the right offer is made by another 
club but that is reliant on other clubs needing to purchase that type of player at 
that time. The four interviewees based in clubs discussed the importance of 
developing players through the Youth Academy and the revenue that could be 
generated as a result but as more clubs move to this model of player 
development there is likely to be a reduction in the number of clubs looking to 
buy players. This will reduce the value of individual players and the numbers 
that can be sold which will lead to less revenue from this stream.  
Each of the clubs represented in the interviews appeared to use a different 
financial model. The analysis of attendance levels, the income generated and 
the wages paid to players are different in size without the largest clubs 
establishing a ‘cumulative competitive advantage’ (Grundy, 1999). As a result, 
there are challenges in identifying the key factors within the financial frame. 
Three financial measures were identified as crucial in this research: turnover, 
wages and interest repayments. The first two have feature in previous research 
and the relationship between them has been used for some time within the 
industry as a relative measure of financial health. By expanding on the existing 
literature to include interest repayments the two largest expenditures are linked 
to turnover.  
From the data three significant financial factors emerge that will be incorporated 
into the conceptual framework: 
Finance Turnover 
Finance Wages 
Finance Interest Payments 
 
6.5 - The Players  
Within this research project players are viewed as human resources, as 
employees of the company on fixed-term contracts who impact on and are 
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impacted by organisational culture, but also as financial resources that can be 
sold to other clubs as a revenue stream and as production assets who 
contribute to on-field performance.  As the focus of the research project is the 
club as an organisation no current players were interviewed as part of the data 
collection, although two of the participants had played professional football at 
the highest level, and players will be viewed collectively rather than individually.  
The Chief Executive and the Manager both made reference to the culture within 
their clubs. The Chief Executive had to deal with wage pressure within his 
dressing room when the owner of his club signed a new player who earned 
considerably more than the others. The decision by the owner to keep this 
player’s wages outside the established budget resolved a potential finance 
issue, of breaking the agreed levels within which the club would operate, the 
Chief Executive had to deal with the unhappiness of other players as he had 
responsibility for player contracts. He did not discuss the impact that this had on 
the 1st Team manager.  
The Manager did discuss the difficulties that he had in changing the player 
culture at one of his clubs. From the outset of his tenure he was concerned that 
the attitude of the players would be an inhibitor to achieving the expected level 
of success. Player fitness was poor, the attitude of injured players concerned 
him and there were processes that hindered progress. Changing these aspects 
of the club proved more challenging than he expected partly due to the attitude 
of players who may resist change knowing that the manager is more likely to be 
replaced than they are. The role of the non-playing staff, such as the physio, 
highlighted that the culture of the club is wider than the players and should be 
understood, developed and managed at an organisational level whilst 
recognising the different parts of the club. It has been argued that firms need a 
creative culture to allow reframing to occur (Dewett, 2004) that would allow 
those within the firms to see, and accept, new ways of working. The Manager 
expressed the view that the chances to create, in his view, the ‘right’ culture 
would be limited as most clubs already had structures in place that made 
wholesale change difficult. This opinion appears to reflect one of the 
weaknesses of the cultural school of strategy development in that organisational 
culture can hold change back by preserving the established order (Mintzberg, 
Ahlstrand & Lampel, 2009). Whilst culture may not be a driver to a new strategy 
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it would appear that it can be an inhibitor to the creation of new frames that 
allow the development of a new strategy.  
It was agreed by all of the interviewees that the management of the 1st Team 
and the Academy should be split as the focus of the 1st Team is short-term in 
outlook whilst the Academy should take a longer term view of young player 
development. These two departments within the clubs will be considered in turn, 
with the Academy considered first.  
During the interviews the importance to the future of Scottish football of young 
player recruitment into the club academies was stressed. The Administrator 
discussed the measures put in place by the governing bodies to ensure that this 
was given priority. Both the Owner and the Commercial Director thought that 
the smaller SPL clubs had an advantage over the Old Firm because they had 
been more successful at transitioning young players from the Academy to the 
1st Team and, in some cases, on to higher profile clubs and international 
football. Whilst all of the interviewees discussed, by name, a number of players 
who had made such a transition the data analysis carried out within this project 
suggests that these players are the exception.  
Within the interviews the focus was on those players who had progressed from 
the Academy to International football. There was no mention of what happens to 
those players who do not make it onto the field of play and leave the club at the 
end of their first contract without achieving their dream of a career in 
professional football.  
Analysis of the available secondary data non players suggests that the peer 
group clubs develop, on average, one former player per season who plays more 
than ten matches, which compares favourably with their English counterparts 
who produce one player every two seasons from their Academies (Anderson & 
Miller, 2011). The success of young player development within the peer group 
would be appear to be limited however with 27% of the former trainees who 
have been given professional contracts leaving their clubs without taking part in 
any matches. An additional 16% of these players leave after making only 
substitute appearances. 43% of players developed by the club’s Academy and 
deemed not good enough to be awarded a professional contract leave the club 
without starting any competitive matches. The Manager discussed some 
possible reasons for this at one of his clubs where he was not responsible for 
deciding which of the players were awarded contracts. He had expressed 
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concern to his CEO that some of the trainees did not, in his professional 
opinion, demonstrate the correct attitude he considered essential to make the 
grade. The club decided that these players would be sent out on loan to lower 
league clubs to develop.  
Within the analysis of secondary data it was discovered that the practice of 
sending players out on loan was of limited benefit in player development. 
Players who had left on a short-term loan basis were less likely to return and 
make an impact at their parent club than those who remained. Of the former 
trainees who were sold onto bigger clubs, only one had spent time out on loan. 
The other players had developed at their parent club. This would suggest that if 
the club does not feel that the player has the potential to progress then they 
should allow the player to leave permanently.  
The development of players from the Academy as sellable assets was 
discussed by all of the interviewees and the financial implications of this are 
explored in the section on finance. From an organisational perspective, the 
interviewees all expressed the opinion that control of the Academy system 
needs to remain separate from the management of the 1st Team and it would 
appear that the transition from one to the other could be managed more 
effectively.  Without clear control on the final decision on who makes the 
transition and whether that player is to develop it appears unlikely that the 
current attrition rate can be improved.  
It is not just the former Academy players who could be found on the fringes of 
the first team as the analysis of player detail suggests that there are three types 
of player within the 1st Team squad: regular starter, squad player and potential 
asset. The first two of these categories consider the impact of the player as a 
production asset in relation to on-field performance and takes account of the 
high cost of player wages. The third looks to a possible financial return from a 
high-performing production asset that can be sold to another club.  
The analysis of the playing squads within the peer group showed a variance in 
the number of signed players from thirty (Kilmarnock in 2009/10) up to fifty-two 
at Hearts (2007/08). There appears to be no on-field impact of squad size or on 
the resultant wage bill. On average, Hearts have had the largest squad, the 
highest wage bill and the highest per player wages over the review period and 
although that have been the most successful team in the peer group the level of 
success has been inconsistent. In Season 2007/08 Hearts had the largest 
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squad (fifty-two) but finished eighth with an average annual salary of £217,673. 
In the same season Motherwell finished third with a squad of thirty-eight players 
paying an average salary of £89,789. This challenges the findings of Kuper & 
Szymanski (2009) that clubs who pay the highest wages tend to finish highest 
although they used a large number of clubs (forty), a longer time period (1978-
1997) and a different analytical frame to analyse the data for statistical 
significance. 
The analysis of the Academy transition highlighted a degree of resource 
wastage and a similar picture can be found when the whole 1st Team squad is 
considered. The distinction between regular starter and squad player highlights 
a different level of contribution to the on-field performance by individual players. 
Within those classed as squad players there can also be a wide variance from 
those who make some on-field contribution and those who make none. It is not 
only the former Academy players who do not play but some players recruited 
from other clubs never start for the club. The Manager discussed the 
recruitment policy at one of the clubs where players he had made contact with 
were never signed and others were brought in by the club Board. A reduction in 
the squad size would either reduce the wage bill or allow more head-room for 
more expensive players to be recruited without the damage to dressing-room 
harmony described by the Chief Executive.  
The impact of the sale of a key player without adequate time to find a 
replacement, discussed in the finance section, links the playing squad to the 
financial position of the club. By focussing on the financial value of an asset the 
Board reduces the team’s capacity to perform on the field. The recruitment of 
players, externally and from the Academy, who fit the club’s culture is vital, 
although as the Owner conceded there is not always enough attention paid to 
this aspect when signing players. The Manager expressed his frustration at key 
decisions being made by non-football members of the club that impacted on the 
resources at his disposal. By reducing the number of players at the club, and by 
extension the wage bill, clubs would likely reduce the financial pressure which 
makes the sale of players less likely or at a time that suited the club.  
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From the data used to explore the player frame, three first-level components are 
identified with 1st Team players categorised on a secondary level based on 
contribution.  
Players Youth Academy  
Players Loan Players  
Players First Team Squad Player 
Players First Team Regular Starter 
Players First Team Potential Asset 
 
6.6 - The Manager 
Grusky’s original paper (1963) considered the impact of the managerial change 
on the on-field performance of the whole club which underlines the importance 
of the role within sport. Subsequent research into the link between managerial 
replacement and improved on-field performance has been inconclusive but 
tended to focus on single changes rather than the cumulative effect of multiple 
changes, which Grusky suggested had a long-term negative impact on the club 
but Gamson & Scotch (1964), in direct reply to Grusky, suggested that 
managers could be used as a scapegoat to mask wider organisational issues. 
This research project has found that the role of the manager suffers from a lack 
of clear definition and little job security.  
Both the Chief Executive and the Owner discussed the manager’s role and 
explained the importance of finding the right person for the job but the Owner 
admitted that he had not enough spent the time required to achieve that goal. 
The speed with which replacement managers are employed suggests that 
club’s do not seek to learn from their experiences to understand what, if 
anything, went wrong and who would be best placed to remedy that. The Chief 
Executive, in his interview, discussed the importance of managing damaged 
relationships between the manager and the owner so that changes could be 
made at a time where the impact would be limited and used the time to identify 
the best potential candidates. The Owner reflected that too many managers are 
thrust into team management with little training, beyond technical coaching, and 
lack the people management skills.  
The role of the manager appears not to be clearly defined and with no clear 
performance indicators agreed between the manager and the club. Little 
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support is provided to ensure that managerial learning can occur. The different 
approaches discussed in the interviews suggest that the hiring process needs to 
be better understood so that the right style of manager is appointed to reflect 
the situation of the club. As Leavy & Wilson (1994) identified the person 
appointed to the pivotal role needs to have the correct skillset to develop the 
club and be given the authority to make the necessary changes. To make the 
right choice those making the decision need to fully understand the current 
situation. Does the club need to be revitalised or is a more radical turnaround 
required? This question can be linked back to the other frames discussed in this 
research project. Are the current players good enough? Is the dressing-room 
culture an asset or a liability? Is the transition from the Academy to the 1st Team 
effective? Does the financial position support redevelopment of the club assets 
or are cuts enforced through falling revenue? How has the relationship with the 
supporters been managed? Without taking time to have answers to these 
questions the club does run the risk of scape-goating the manager (Gamson & 
Scotch, 1964) to mask other structural issues within the club. The review of the 
peer group clubs suggests that there are no clear links between on-field 
performance and the rate of managerial change which in turn would suggest 
that the wider issues within the club have a greater impact than simply the skill 
of the manager to improve results.  
Grusky (1963) queried the link between managerial responsibility and authority. 
The findings in this research project suggest that the manager does not always 
have full authority over the 1st Team, taking the final decisions on who comes 
in, who goes and when, as he is required to take full responsibility for on-field 
failure. Clear communication and trust between the manager and the chairman 
is important so that means that player sales are discussed and planned for, 
wherever possible. If the Manager has control over players coming into the 1st 
Team that should include youth players signed from the Academy but he then 
should assume responsibility for their development into squad players and on to 
potential assets. There is no reason why bonus schemes for Managers to 
produce sellable assets should not be more widespread within football. If 
bonuses are linked to league position or cup success then, if it is part of the 
club’s vision, player development should be rewarded to ensure it happens.   
The Manager does need to manage their relationship with the fans as this does 
appear to have an impact on attendance. Without a clear and positive 
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relationship between the two then the Manager may find themselves under 
pressure from unhappy fans. This relationship does not appear to be based 
solely on results but also on how the fans perceive the style of football.  
If the relationship between the Manager and the Chairman is the most important 
within the club, as was suggested within the interviews, then it needs to be 
treated as such. There can be no room for suspicion if the club is to progress. 
The role of the Chairman, or club owner, has not been widely discussed within 
the existing academic literature but it has been included here as it featured in all 
of the interviews. Those interviewed or discussed brought a broad range of 
business experience from other industries and sought to utilise that knowledge 
within football. The findings of this research project would suggest that the 
development of a new mental frame to understand the football industry takes 
time as the established frames are deeply imbedded within the game and new 
ideas are not always readily adopted. The other difficulty faced by those coming 
into the industry is how to handle the fame associated with being a football club 
chairman, as discussed by the Chief Executive. The Owner and the Chief 
Executive noted that the attention focussed on these roles is disproportionate to 
the size of the company, when compared with much larger firms in other 
industries which have a greater economic significance. This attention, for good 
or bad, can impact on the most rational of businessmen where big decisions are 
taken without the same level of scrutiny that would be afforded in other 
industries. The long-term implications of the decisions appear not to be always 
fully thought through. This is not exclusive to the football industry but the level of 
press interest and public attention is likely to intensify the pressure. Without 
time, space and deliberate action to fully understand the existing frames in use 
within the football industry it is likely that emotional responses will continue and 
this will stunt growth.  
The research framework can be developed to take account of the roles of the 
manager and his relationship with the Chairman and/or CEO.  
 
Manager Agreed KPIs 
Manager Chairman/CEO 
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6.7 - Chapter Conclusion 
 
The five frames were used to analyse the industry-participant interviews to 
identify the constituent components of these frames. The views expressed in 
the interviews were triangulated with secondary data from Scottish professional 
football to support, challenge or illuminate the perceptions of the participants 
with quantifiable data. This process can be seen as the ‘detective work’ 
(Mintzberg in Smith & Hitt, 2005) where evidence has been gathered and 
analysed to produce a list of components within those five frames (see Table 
6.1).  
Frame Component Sub-Component 
Performance League position 
 
Performance Scottish Cup 
 
Performance League Cup 
 
Attendance Customer Relationship Management Season Ticket 
Attendance Customer Relationship Management Regular Attendee 
Attendance Customer Relationship Management Potential Attendee 
Attendance Customer Relationship Management Away Supporter 
Attendance Remote Supporters Social Media 
Attendance Remote Supporters Television 
Attendance Community Engagement  
Finance Turnover 
 
Finance Wages 
 
Finance Interest Payments 
 
Players Youth Academy 
 
Players Loan Players 
 
Players First Team Squad Player 
Players First Team Regular Starter 
Players First Team Potential Asset 
Manager Agreed KPIs 
 
Manager Chairman/CEO 
 
 
Table 6.1 Frames and Components. Created by the Author. 
The conclusions chapter will draw these components together to develop the 
conceptual framework.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions – Reframing Scottish Football 
7.1 - Introduction  
The aim of this research project is “to develop a conceptual framework that 
combines a broad range of factors, both short and long-term to allow new 
frames to evolve within the strategic management of professional football clubs 
in Scotland. “  
This chapter expands on and combines these factors to create a visual 
representation of how a professional football club can be analysed. The 
framework is designed as an exploratory representation that captures the 
tensions within a senior football club rather than a predictive tool that focusses 
on a few key variables thus losing sight of the complexity within which the 
business operates (Porter, 1991). The components within the framework are not 
typologically the same building on Simon’s (1997) view that firms are not only 
defined in organisational charts but in patterns of communication and decision-
making by people.  Performance is an objective measure of progress yet 
remains relative to competitors. Attendance can also be used as an objective 
measure of success, by counting paying customers, but there is recognition that 
not all customers are the same and therefore should be managed differently. 
How those customers consume the product, physically or virtually, poses new 
questions for clubs. The complexities of finance are reduced to three main 
components: turnover, wages and interest repayments to explore the 
relationship with income generation and expenditure levels as a means of 
highlighting potential problems early. The components within the player frame 
are partly structural, in the relationship between the 1st Team and the Academy, 
and partly asset management.  Players are viewed as resources to be 
developed, utilised and traded for financial gain. This reflects the unique 
position of professional sports where players are traded as commodities rather 
than treated as employees. This study focus more on the role of the manager 
rather than the impact of the individual as has often been the case in past 
research. Where previous research has often linked performance with the 
manager directly this research explores how the two link and how clearly 
defined the role of the manager is within professional football.  
The framework is designed to encourage participants in the industry to ask a 
wide range of questions about the firm as part of their strategic decision making 
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process rather than to provide quick answers to complex situations. The aim of 
the project is not to structurally design a football club, but rather to identify the 
factors that can affect clubs and the relationships between them. In the creation 
of the model the tension between avoiding the risk single outcome decisions 
(Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985) without creating paralysis through constant review 
that Mintzberg (1987) warned of.  
7.2 - On-field performance 
From the performance frame identified in the literature three components have 
been articulated: league position, Scottish cup success and League cup 
success. The definition of good performance for a club can be constructed by 
combing the three of these on a season by season basis.  
Performance
League 
Position
Scottish 
Cup
League Cup
 
Figure 7.2: Research Framework Expanded To Include Performance Categories. Created by 
the Author 
Figure 7.2 illustrates how these three components can be used to feed into the 
wider frame of performance in order to create a balanced definition of on-field 
performance over the course of a season.  
7.3 - Attendance 
 
By breaking down the components within the attendance frame the shifting 
relationship with fans can be included in the overall framework (see Figure 7.2). 
Performance Attendance
Customer Relationship 
Management
Remote 
Supporters
Social 
Media
Television
Regular 
Attendee
Potential 
Attendee 
‘Away’ 
Supporter
Season 
Ticket
League 
Position
Scottish 
Cup
League Cup Community 
Engagement
 
Figure 7.3: Research Framework Expanded To Include Attendance Categories. Created by the 
Author 
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Understanding the specific relationships should allow clubs to increase revenue 
from fans by expanding the number of relationships rather than simply relying 
on the already committed to give more which can lead to resentment as 
identified by Adamson, Jones & Tapp (2006). This research expands the 
classification of fans to include away supporters as clubs can now develop 
relationships with them through direct ticket sales helping to build the customer 
database. Several of the interviewees discussed the importance of remote fans 
who do not physically attend matches can social media and television does 
offer new opportunities for clubs to extend their fan-base in new areas. Within 
this research, the aim of community engagement appears to be to develop fans 
as long-term customers hence the link to CRM. The views expressed in this 
project may reflect the views of those involved directly in the running of the club 
rather than those engaged in community work at arms-length from the club as 
suggested by previous research Anagnostopoulos and Shilbury, 2013; 
Kolyperas, Morrow & Sparks, 2015). 
 
7.4 - Finance 
  
The overall financial position is shown by the dotted line surrounding the three 
key factors (see Figure 7.4). 
Finance
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Figure 7.4: Research Framework Expanded To Include Finance Categories. Created by the 
Author 
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This has been included to demonstrate that these three factors are suggested 
as key but are likely not to be the only finance issues that should be addressed. 
It is likely that the financial situation at any club is considerably more complex 
than these three values control over these, in relation to the other components 
of the framework, does give greater clarity of the finance with in the club and 
how sustainable, in the long-term, the business model is.  
7.5 - The players  
The original frame of players has been expanded (see Figure 7.5), through the 
interviews and the data analysis, to separate the Youth Academy and the 1st 
Team with loan players identified as a distinct group, since those sent out on 
loan are now external to the club and those brought in have no asset value to 
the club although they could make a significant on-field contribution.  
 
Finance
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Figure 7.5: Research Framework Expanded To Include Player Categories. Created by the 
Author  
 
By expanding the frame to cover the different components a better 
understanding of the complexity of the club is demonstrated in the framework. 
The link to from the Youth Academy to the 1st Team is shown as a dotted line as 
this link is not automatic and the data available from this project allow only 
limited conclusions to be drawn. The link is made from the players to on-field 
performance to indicate that players are largely responsible for performance 
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and that the perception of on-field success will impact, positively or negatively, 
on the potential asset value of the player. To successfully manage the wage bill 
the different categories of player need to be appropriately managed to develop 
players to contribute more or to allow them to leave the club. Strategically, the 
players, including those in the academy, should be viewed as resources that 
can be developed rather than just as employees although the role of culture in 
this should not be ignored. This player development should not simply focus on 
them as players but should involve longer-term educational development for a 
life beyond football.  
 
7.6 - The manager 
The addition of the manager, chairman and other executive members of the 
club to the conceptual framework (see Figure 7.6) completes the reframing 
exercise within this research project. The clear line between the manager and 
the players is established with the Academy at arms-length. The link between 
attendance and the manager is included as there does appear to be a 
perception link between the two. The manager does need to be accepted by the 
fans or attendance levels may fall. The key relationship between the chairman 
and the manager is established with the need for clear key performance 
indicators (KPIs) established. These would set out what is important to the 
chairman and how the manager is expected to contribute creating greater role 
clarity.  
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Figure 7.6: Research Framework Expanded To Include Manager Categories. Created by the 
Author 
  
The dotted line between the wage bill and the manager is shown as an option 
for clubs with most of the financial responsibility given to the chairman. Within 
the KPIs the club may give the manager budgetary responsibility but where this 
is not the case it would appear that clarity of the budgets would improve the 
trust between manager and chairman.  
7.7 - Section Conclusion 
The framework created as part of the research goes some way to identifying the 
current business issues and dangers within the football industry. It can be used 
as a starting point for those wishing to develop a better understanding of a 
complex industry that is over-reported and under-researched within the media. 
Using Porter’s (1991) distinction between a conceptual framework and a 
predictive model, the findings of this project offer a complex framework that 
reflects industry practice rather than reducing firms to a few control variables. 
The framework has been designed not to stop arguments about football, but to 
allow those making the decisions to be better informed through a balance of 
factors that can be taken into consideration.  
Ohmae (1982) suggested that good strategy was based on the balance 
between customer, competence and competition for each firm. This framework 
contextualises these questions for the football industry. These are the business 
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issues that football Chairman and Chief Executives could think about to avoid 
following into the short-term mind-set that currently pervades the industry. The 
multi-faceted view encouraged by this framework encourages a range of views 
from different parts of the club reducing the need for senior management to 
make all of the decisions (Quinn, 1980).  
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Chapter 8: Contribution 
8.1 - Key findings  
 
The development of the conceptual framework through this project has sought 
to balance the complexity of firms within an industrial context whilst identifying 
the crucial factors that are likely to have an impact on long-term strategy. The 
final framework (see Figure 8.1 overleaf) draws together the crucial aspects and 
illustrates the relationships between the factors.  
 
The key findings from the project are: 
 Performance - This should be measured over the course of a 
season with latter-stage participation in the cup 
competitions prioritised as it increases the number 
of matches played and offers clubs a chance to 
engage with a wider range of supporters. 
 Attendance - The process of increasing attendance levels should 
be recognised as a long-term activity with CRM 
systems that are customised to the level of 
engagement for different types of supporter. 
 Finance - The key measure of financial health, the wages to 
turnover ratio, should be expanded to include 
interest-repayments so that the servicing of debt is 
expressed in terms of income.  
 Players  - The research highlighted the importance of the 
prevailing culture of the club and how it is affected 
by other decisions, including player recruitment. 
The transition of young players from the Academy 
to the 1st Team should be enhanced to reduce the 
number of players signed to professional contracts 
who never play in competitive matches.  
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 Manager - The does appear to be some evidence of 
managerial ‘scape-goating’ although the speed of 
replacement and the lack of a clear job description 
may be contributing factors. The manager’s 
relationship with the chairman is crucial but the 
view of players, and the cultural fit of the manager, 
and fans can also play a part in the decision to 
replace a manager. Clear KPIs, agreed at the 
outset, could lengthen the time given to managers 
to develop clubs.  
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Figure 8.1: Conceptual Framework to Reframe Scottish Football. Created by the Author  
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8.2 - Contribution to Knowledge 
8.2.1 - Strategy Literature 
The research is under-pinned by Porter’s (1991) question: why do some 
businesses do better than others? The definition of ‘better’ needs to be created 
in relation to a specific industrial context: in this case professional football in 
Scotland. As an industry in flux, there appears to be a need for an emergent 
strategy than allows the decision makers to take account of external changes in 
the environment. The definition of an emergent strategy should include sense-
making of the changes, through ongoing data collection, that leads to creative 
problem-solving as suggested by Rumelt (2011). This two-stage process of data 
collection leading to creative solutions is a step back from the reactive mode of 
decision making in the football industry that is reflected in this research.  
The data collected by firms should reflect the outcomes sought by the firm. 
Where Whittington (1991) makes the distinction between the singular aim of 
maximising profit and unspecified plural strategic aims, industry-specific 
research should seek to identify what the different goals are. Without clarity of 
those aims how do firms know whether or not they are performing better than 
their competitors? Without comparative data how does the firm know if they are 
closer to achieving their aims this year than they were last year? As the 
research focuses on a specific industry then specific aims can be suggested 
whereas more generic research on a non-specific industry will lead to vague 
goals, likely to limit the benefit of the research to practitioners. 
The tension that is likely to exist between the different strategic goals is 
increased by the balance required of long and short-term goals (Dodd & 
Favarro, 2007). The amount of tension experienced within firms is likely to 
reflect the outlook of the industry. This research has shown that the unstable 
environment within which Scottish professional football operates tends to result 
in a short-term view that leads to greater internal instability within the individual 
firms.  
Mintzberg queried the reliance of companies on a single strategic decision 
maker as it would be unlikely that one person could fully understand the 
complexities of the organisation (Mintzberg, 1990) whilst Leavy & Wilson (1994) 
suggested that the skillset of the organisational leader needed to match the 
situation the firm found themselves in. This research suggests that the overall 
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responsibility for the success of the club lies with the 1st Team Manager who is 
removed from his post if the performance is deemed unsatisfactory by the Club 
Chairman or Board. The responsibilities of the role appear to be poorly defined 
and the recruitment process is limited. Those in the Manager’s role suggested 
that they had limited decision making power, particularly in the realm of player 
recruitment, and there was often deep mistrust within the clubs. The clarity of 
agreed goals and roles was poor and subject to reactive decision making rather 
than the two stage process of sense-making and problem-solving.  This would 
appear to challenge the existing theory that suggests that strategy is designed 
by those at the top of the organisational structure. Rather than a single frame 
being used to make sense of the situation and the creation of a strategy 
(Duhaime, Stimpert & Chesley, 2012), it would appear that there are multiple 
frames in use but that these are poorly defined, if they are defined at all. 
The output of this research project is a framework rather than a model (Porter, 
1991) that seeks to retain the complexity of an unpredictable industry (Rumelt, 
2011) to facilitate discussion amongst academics and practitioners. The 
framework is not applicable to other industries as the measures used reflect the 
components of professional football: on-field performance, attendance at 
matches by the different types of supporter, the key elements of finance, player 
development and the relationship between the chairman and the manager. 
Research into other industries would need to identify the key aspects of the 
businesses involved to create a bespoke framework that made sense to the 
participants. 
8.2.2 - Sports Business Literature 
This research responds to Grusky’s (1963) call for field-based research in the 
sports industry rather than relying purely on secondary quantitative data. The 
conceptual framework is the result of a study that starts with practice, through a 
series of interviews, and is rounded out by secondary data. The method 
adopted can be used to reduce the impact of researcher bias in a largely closed 
industry by encouraging engagement with practitioners. The framework 
provides a basis for future research into the different components of football 
clubs that retains the complexity of the firm rather than focussing on single 
issues. The views of players, managers and supporters could be explored to 
develop the concept and the field of sports business literature. Two of Grusky’s 
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(1963) original factors are addressed by this study: the objective assessment of 
effectiveness, and the difference between authority and responsibility. The 
framework proposes a structure for objectively measuring effectiveness across 
the five frames whilst retaining the complexity of the firm. This research 
highlights that the lines between who has the authority to make the day to day 
decisions within clubs remain blurred but that the 1st Team manager is expected 
to take responsibility.  
8.3 - Contribution to Practice 
Throughout the interviews the participants demonstrated a desire for the football 
industry to change but believed that the media attention, entrenched mind-sets 
and   underlying politics appeared to prevent the implementation of change. The 
business impact of emotional decisions was also a factor in the inability of the 
participants to implement long-term, sustainable decisions. The conceptual 
framework generated by this research project blends the existing tacit frames of 
participants with a longitudinal numeric analysis to create a conscious frame 
that identifies the ‘crucial aspects’ of firms within the industry. The quote from 
the book Moneyball at the beginning of this thesis states that the systems 
developed by the Oakland Athletics were not perfect but provided a more 
secure basis for decisions than ‘gut feel’. The framework proposed here carries 
the same caveat. It is a framework to help participants develop a wider view of 
professional football clubs in Scotland that reflects both the short and long-term 
nature of decision making by developing an objective measure of success.  
By placing on-field performance in the top left corner there is a recognition that 
what happens on the pitch is likely to remain the first measure of success 
according to most observers but that a more long-term and rounded view could 
be taken rather than relying on the last few results. The link between on-field 
success and attendance appears to be long-term and requires specific attention 
by working with changing supporter demographics. Finance is placed in the 
centre as it provides short-term security and long-term sustainability. The desire 
for on-field success from supporters does need to balance against a longer-
term financial view. The tension between these three factors as one of the 
areas of objective assessment, defined in long- and short-term objectives, is 
likely to be key.  
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As the highest expenditure within the club, the size and use of the playing 
squad has financial as well as performance implications. The recruitment and 
development of players currently seems to be haphazard without clear authority 
given for this key resource. Decisions are made about buying and selling 
players without the impact on performance or finance being taken into 
consideration. This is an area where short-term choice can have long-term 
implications. Better communication between those involved in the process could 
reduce the role strain on managers however this would require a high degree of 
trust between the participants.  
Few players from the club’s youth academy seem to develop into regular 
contributors to on-field performance. The current system does not appear to 
work well in the majority of cases which would suggest that changes are 
required but the overall responsibility for the transition is not clear. Whilst the 
industry participants were proud of the exceptions who became successful 
players there appears to be little understanding of how to improve the current 
system. Clearly established lines of responsibility linked to clear performance 
indicators could help develop this process within the clubs. The choice may be 
to sign fewer players from the youth academy and focus on those with the 
‘attitude’ required to be successful or to help develop the necessary mental 
attributes required as well as the technical ones.  
Clubs should also look at what happens to the young players that do not fulfil 
their dream of professional football. Although the thesis does not look explicitly 
at the academy process the underlying questions remain: What happens to the 
players released from their contracts? Does the club do enough to promote 
education to the players, particularly those who have moved from the club 
academy, to help them prepare for a life beyond football? The figures in this 
thesis only look at those who make the transition from the Academy to the 1st 
team. What about the players who do not make that step?  
This research suggests that several aspects of the manager’s role need to be 
developed for clubs to be more successful. The selection process appears to be 
rushed and the available candidates tend to be those recently dismissed by 
other clubs. By spending more time on the recruitment process clubs would be 
able to identify and hire the right type of manager for their situation. The 
manager’s role needs to be more clearly defined with the areas of responsibility 
agreed and performance indicators set. Time and support are required to help 
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managers develop the necessary skillset. Many other businesses invest in 
leadership development programmes for their senior staff, should football follow 
suit? Would a longer-term relationship between clubs and their managers, 
based on mutual development, see improved performance in the other factors 
identified here? With performance indicators agreed then the required support 
could be provided as it is in many industries. With managers benefiting from 
personal development, this would likely encourage players to seek education as 
the overall culture of the industry changes away from a short-term anti-
intellectual view to a longer-term developmental one. 
By adopting the more holistic view to the club represented in this conceptual 
framework, rather than focussing only on short-term match results, managers 
and chairman may be able to develop their club collaboratively for long-term 
success rather than continue on an ever-shortening cycle of uncertainty. The 
framework has been designed not to stop arguments about football but to make 
those making the arguments to be better informed. 
 
The conceptual framework could be used in practice to pose a series of 
questions to football industry participants: 
 
 How is good performance defined within the club? What is the time-
frame used to measure this? How does this compare to clubs of a similar 
size? 
 How does the club differentiate between the supporter types? Is 
attendance increasing within the different categories? Are the community 
engagement programmes beneficial to all stakeholders? 
 How is player development defined? Is the Club Academy producing the 
necessary calibre of players? If not, what can be changed? Does the 
club provide a range of development opportunities on and off the field? 
 Is the manager’s job role clearly defined? Is the manager meeting the 
required performance measures? Is the manager being given the 
necessary support to achieve the goals? 
 What is the financial impact of progress? Is the club able to sustain the 
current level of expenditure?  
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This list of questions is by no means exhaustive but is designed to challenge 
the existing frames within the industry. The aim of the thesis is to allow new 
frames to develop within Scottish professional football. To encourage new ways 
of thinking, the existing frames need to be made tacit so that they can be 
challenged. This framework is designed to make frames explicit and to 
encourage reflection within the industry; different combinations of questions 
could be used to determine the current health of the club and promote longer-
term decision making within the industry. Rather than simply focus on wins and 
losses, although a vital measure of sporting success, more holistic view could 
be taken by the clubs. The combination of sense-making and problem-solving 
could help industry decision-makers balance the inherent tension between long 
and short-term success across all of the constituent parts of the firm. This 
balance of data and creativity requires a learning environment to be created that 
allows for the development of individuals. This does not alter the fact that the 
industry is fuelled by passion and that can only increase the tensions between 
the various expectations involved. For Scottish football to develop then a new 
set of frames are required. To paraphrase Michael Lewis, this framework is not 
perfect but it may be “better than the hoary alternative, rendering decisions by 
gut feeling” (Lewis 2011 p.136). 
 
 8.4 - Limitations of the Study  
 
As was noted in the research methods chapter the project is limited by a 
number of factors. The use of a convenience sample for the interviews, 
although from a range of senior roles and clubs, is a limitation. The participants 
were included in the research because they were accessible rather than being 
deliberately approached because of a key role within the industry.  Also, a wider 
range of interview participants would have offered a deeper insight into the 
current frames in use. The research did not interview any current players as 
part of the research and their views on the development process may have 
added more detail.  
As the project focusses on a small group of clubs within one country there may 
be limitations on the generalisability of the findings across other sports or 
markets. The study focuses on those clubs who have been within the SPL for 
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the full eleven-season review period. The findings may be different if all of the 
clubs who participated in the competition were included.  
As an inductive study there is a limitation on the reliability of the findings as they 
do reflect the values of the researcher in terms of what can be studied, how the 
data can be collected and analysed and the findings presented. This is an 
exploratory study that does not seek statistical significance but, reflecting the 
purpose of the DBA to contribute to practice, is rooted in the language of the 
industry. 
8.5 - Opportunities for Further Study  
 
The conceptual framework does provide a basis for future studies into the 
football industry.  
 The framework could be applied to clubs in another country to discover 
what factors are specific to a given league or to provide a means of 
comparing clubs across borders.  
 The views of players and managers in the industry could be sought to 
deepen the understanding of the development process and how it could 
be improved.  
 The framework could be expanded to include views of fans on clubs as 
businesses to develop an understanding of the customer relationship 
process with different types of supporters including those who watch on 
TV or online.  
 The framework could be used as a basis for training managers in the 
business aspects of the industry to broaden their understanding of how 
clubs operate.  
 
As Grusky (1963) noted in his original study, more fieldwork is required to 
understand the sports industry from a participant’s perspective rather than as an 
outside observer. This study has included some fieldwork to improve the 
industry relevance of the research. The framework provides a basis for others to 
follow to increase the knowledge of the sports business. 
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Appendix 1: Database Design  
Table App 1a: Club Data 
 
Category Title  Description Comment 
On-field Performance League Position Team’s position in the final league table for the 
season. 
Data held reverses the positions for numerical 
analysis. 1
st
 place awarded 12 points down to 1 point 
for 12
th
 place. 
On-field Performance Scottish Cup Round Cup round that the team exited the Scottish 
Cup.  
See Table 4.8 for coding system. 
On-field Performance League Cup Round Cup round that the team exited the Scottish 
Cup. 
See Table 4.8 for coding system. 
On-field Performance Season Success Total Total of League Position,  
Scottish Cup Round and  
League Cup Round to determine overall season 
performance 
 
Finance Turnover (£000) Annual club turnover   
Finance Wages (£000) Total wage bill for the season  
Finance Long-term Debt (£000) Level of long-term debt from company balance 
sheet 
 
Finance Interest Repayments (£000) Annual payments on loan interest taken from 
company accounts 
 
Finance Wages /Turnover Calculated value  
Finance Interest + Wages/Turnover Calculated value  
Finance Average Salary Total wage bill / number of players in squad  
 
Created by the Author 
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Table App 1b: Individual Match Detail 
 
Field Description Comments 
Unique Unique identifier for each match  
Season Season the match took place  
Club Club to link to Club Detail table  
Match Date Date the match took place  
Home Team Designated home team.   
Home Team Score Number of goals scored by the home team  
Away Team Designated away team.   
Away Team Score Number of goals scored by the away team  
Crowd Official match attendance  
Competition Competition category to indicate the type match played. League, Scottish Cup, League Cup or European 
competition tie. 
Result Category Results were categorised for analysis purposes:  Categories used:  
Away Defeat – Club lost match away from home 
Away Draw– Club drew match away from home 
Away Win– Club won match away from home 
Home Defeat – Club lost  home match 
Home Draw – Club drew home match 
Home Win – Club won home match 
Manager Code to link to Manager table  Create to allow specific manager detail to be calculated: 
home wins, average attendance or goals scored.  
 
Created by the Author 
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Table App 1c: Individual Manager Detail by Appointment 
 
Field Description Comments 
Manager Id Unique identifier for each manager  
Club Club to link to Club Detail table  
Manager Name Manager name  
Date Joined Date signed for the club  
Date Left Date left the club  
Type Type of appointment Caretaker or permanent 
Length of Tenure Number of days at the club  
Season Joined Became manager in this season  
Season Left Left club in this season  
Reason Left Reason given for the manager leaving the club  
Push or Pull To distinguish between managers who chose to leave 
and those who were sacked 
 
In Season Did the manager leaving during the season or during 
the summer break? 
 
Gap Number of days between the previous manager 
leaving and this manager signing.  
 
 
Created by the Author 
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Table App 1d: Individual Player Movement Detail 
 
Field Description Comments 
Unique Unique identifier for each player contract  
Player Id Unique identifier for each player   
Signed From Club signed from Used to note which players had been signed from Youth 
Academy 
Signing Fee Fee paid to previous club Where recorded  
Signing Date Date contract was signed  
Moved To Name of club the player joined after leaving  
Sale Fee Fee paid by club joined after leaving Where recorded 
Date Left Date player left club  
Comments Used to note where players had moved to a loan club  
Club Club name to link to Club Detail  
Loan Signing Temporary signing from another club Yes or No 
Loaned Out Player was loaned out to another club Yes or No 
Age at Signing Player’s age at signing Calculated but unused in final analysis 
Age When Leaving Player’s age at signing Calculated but unused in final analysis 
Contract Length Number of days player was signed to the club Calculated but unused in final analysis 
Season Joined The player signed for the club in this season Calculated but unused in final analysis 
Season Left The player left the club in this season Calculated but unused in final analysis 
Manager In Name of manager who signed the player  
Manager Out Name of manager who allowed the player to leave  
 
Created by the Author 
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Table App 1e: Individual Player Appearance Detail by Season 
 
Data Definition Comment 
Club Club name to link to Club Detail  
Season Season identifier  
Player Id Unique identifier for each player  
Position On-field position played As specified by Soccerbase 
Number of League 
Appearances 
Number of matches started in the league  
Number of League Substitute 
Appearances 
Number of times listed as a substitute in the league   
Number of Goals in League  Number of goals scored Collected but unused 
Number of Scottish Cup 
Appearances 
Number of matches started in the Scottish Cup  
Number of Scottish Cup 
Substitute Appearances 
Number of times listed as a substitute in the league   
Cup Goals Number of goals scored in the Scottish Cup Collected but unused 
League Cup Appearances Number of matches started in the League Cup  
Number of League Cup 
Substitute Appearances 
Number of times listed as a substitute in the League 
Cup 
 
LC Goals Number of goals scored in the League Cup Collected but unused 
Age at Season Start Player’s age at the season start Calculated but unused in final analysis 
Loan In Temporary signing from another club Yes or No 
Loan Out Player was loaned out to another club Yes or No 
 
Created by the Author 
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Table App 1f: References for Managers Leaving 
Club Manager Name Date Joined Date Left Source 
Aberdeen Ebbe Skovdahl 01-Jun-99 05-Dec-02 (BBC, 2002a) 
Aberdeen Steve Paterson 11-Dec-02 24-May-04 (BBC, 2004) 
Aberdeen Jimmy Calderwood 28-May-04 25-May-09 (The Guardian, 2009) 
Aberdeen Mark McGhee 12-Jun-09 01-Dec-10 (BBC, 2010a) 
Dundee Utd Paul Sturrock 05-Sep-98 07-Aug-00 (BBC, 2000a) 
Dundee Utd Alex Smith 08-Aug-00 07-Oct-02 (The Scotsman, 2002) 
Dundee Utd Paul Hegarty 07-Oct-02 30-Jan-03 (The Telegraph, 2003) 
Dundee Utd Ian McCall 30-Jan-03 14-Mar-05 (UEFA, 2005) 
Dundee Utd Gordon Chisholm 14-Mar-05 10-Jan-06 (DUFC, 2006) 
Dundee Utd Craig Brewster 16-Jan-06 30-Oct-06 (Fraser, 2010) 
Dundee Utd Craig Levein 30-Oct-06 23-Dec-09 (BBC, 2009) 
Hearts Jim Jefferies 01-Aug-95 08-Nov-00 (BBC, 2000b) 
Hearts Craig Levein 01-Dec-00 29-Oct-04 (The Guardian, 2004) 
Hearts John Robertson 03-Nov-04 09-May-05 (BBC, 2005a) 
Hearts George Burley 30-Jun-05 21-Oct-05 (BBC, 2005b) 
Hearts Graham Rix 08-Nov-05 22-Mar-06 (BBC, 2006) 
Hearts Valdas Ivanauskas 22-Mar-06 23-Oct-06 (The Guardian, 2006a) 
Hearts Valdas Ivanauskas 01-Dec-06 02-Mar-07 (The Guardian, 2007) 
Hearts Anotoly Korobochka 02-Mar-07 01-Jan-08 (BBC, 2009a) 
Hearts Stephen Frail 01-Jan-08 11-Jul-08 (BBC, 2008) 
Hearts Csaba Laszlo 11-Jul-08 29-Jan-10 (BBC, 2010b) 
Hearts Jim Jefferies 29-Jan-10 01-Aug-11 (Murray, 2011) 
Hibernian Alex McLeish 11-Feb-98 11-Dec-01 (BBC, 2001) 
Hibernian Franck Sauzee 14-Dec-01 21-Feb-02 (BBC, 2002b) 
Hibernian Bobby Williamson 25-Feb-02 20-Apr-04 (Robertson, 2004) 
Hibernian Tony Mowbray 24-May-04 13-Oct-06 (The Guardian, 2006b) 
Hibernian John Collins 31-Oct-06 20-Dec-07 (BBC, 2007a) 
Hibernian Mixu Paatelainen 10-Jan-08 08-Jun-09 (BBC, 2009b) 
Hibernian John Hughes 08-Jun-09 04-Oct-10 (BBC, 2010c) 
Hibernian Colin Calderwood 18-Oct-10 06-Nov-11 (McLauchlin, 2011) 
Kilmarnock Bobby Williamson 07-Dec-96 25-Feb-02 (UEFA, 2002) 
Kilmarnock Jim Jefferies 28-Feb-02 11-Jan-10 (The Guardian, 2010) 
Kilmarnock Jimmy Calderwood 12-Jan-10 31-May-10 (BBC, 2010d) 
Kilmarnock Mixu Paatelainen 01-Jun-10 31-Mar-11 (Barnes, 2011) 
Motherwell Billy Davies 14-Oct-98 18-Sep-01 (The Guardian, 2001) 
Motherwell Eric Black 16-Oct-01 24-Apr-02 (Forsyth,  2002) 
Motherwell Terry Butcher 24-Apr-02 17-May-06 (Nisbet,  2006) 
Motherwell Maurice Malpas 18-May-06 01-Jun-07 (BBC, 2007b) 
Motherwell Mark McGhee 18-Jun-07 29-Jun-09 (BBC, 2009c) 
Motherwell Jim Gannon 30-Jun-09 28-Dec-09 (BBC, 2009d) 
Motherwell Craig Brown 29-Dec-09 09-Dec-10 (BBC, 2010e) 
Created by the Author 
197 
 
Appendix 2: Significant Transfer Fees by Club  
Club 
Season 
Left 
Player Name Signed From Moved To Sale Fee 
Age at 
Signing 
Age When 
Leaving 
Aberdeen 2006/07 Russell Anderson Trainee Sunderland £1,000,000 18 29 
Aberdeen 2010/11 Chris Maguire Youth Derby County £400,000 16 22 
Aberdeen 2011/12 Richard Foster Trainee Bristol City £250,000 18 27 
Dundee Utd 2000/01 Jason De Vos Darlington Wigan £500,000 24 27 
Dundee Utd 2005/06 Mark Wilson Youth Celtic £500,000 16 22 
Dundee Utd 2007/08 Barry Robson Inverness CT Celtic £1,250,000 25 30 
Dundee Utd 2011/12 Scott Allan Youth West Brom £300,000 19 21 
Hearts 2000/01 Gary Naysmith Whitehill Welfare Everton £1,750,000 18 22 
Hearts 2001/02 Colin Cameron Raith Rovers Millwall £1,750,000 24 29 
Hearts 2002/03 Antti Niemi Rangers Southampton £2,000,000 27 30 
Hearts 2005/06 Rudi Skacel Marseille Southampton £1,600,000 26 27 
Hearts 2006/07 Paul Hartley St Johnstone Celtic £1,100,000 27 31 
Hearts 2006/07 Craig Gordon Trainee Sunderland £9,000,000 18 25 
Hearts 2007/08 Andrius Velicka FBK Kaunas Viking £1,000,000 27 29 
Hearts 2007/08 Roman Bednar Mlada Boleslav West Brom £2,300,000 22 25 
Hearts 2008/09 Christophe Berra Youth Wolves £2,300,000 18 24 
Hearts 2010/11 Lee Wallace Trainee Rangers £1,500,000 17 24 
Hearts 2011/12 Eggert Jonsson Fjarðabyggð Wolves £250,000 18 24 
Hibernian 2001/02 Ulises De la Cruz Depotivo U Aston Villa £1,500,000 27 28 
Hibernian 2001/02 Ulrik Laursen OB Odense Celtic £1,500,000 24 26 
Hibernian 2005/06 Garry O'Connor Youth Lokomotiv Moscow £1,600,000 16 23 
Hibernian 2006/07 Kevin Thomson Youth Rangers £2,000,000 19 23 
Hibernian 2006/07 Scott Brown Youth Celtic £4,400,000 17 22 
Hibernian 2006/07 Ivan Sproule Non league Bristol City £500,000 24 26 
Hibernian 2006/07 Steven Whittaker Youth Rangers £2,000,000 18 23 
Hibernian 2007/08 David Murphy Middlesbrough Birmingham £1,500,000 20 24 
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Club 
Season 
Left 
Player Name Signed From Moved To Sale Fee 
Age at 
Signing 
Age When 
Leaving 
Hibernian 2008/09 Steven Fletcher Youth Burnley £3,000,000 17 22 
Kilmarnock 2010/11 Conor Sammon Derry City Wigan £600,000 21 24 
Kilmarnock 2010/11 Craig Bryson Clyde Derby £350,000 21 25 
Motherwell 2000/01 Steve McMillan Troon Juniors Wigan £550,000 17 25 
Motherwell 2000/01 Lee McCulloch Cumbernauld Utd Wigan £700,000 17 23 
Motherwell 2003/04 James McFadden Youth Everton £1,250,000 16 20 
Motherwell 2003/04 Stephen Pearson Youth Celtic £350,000 18 22 
Motherwell 2006/07 Scott McDonald Free Agent Celtic £700,000 21 24 
Motherwell 2008/09 Paul Quinn Youth Cardiff £300,000 17 24 
 
Created by the author using Soccerbase data 
Appendix 3: Significant Transfer Fees for former Youth or Academy Players 
 
Club Date Left Player Name Moved To Transfer Fee 
Age at 
Signing 
Age When 
Leaving 
Loaned 
Out 
Total Games 
Started 
Substitute 
Appearances 
Aberdeen 27/06/2007 Russell Anderson Sunderland £1,000,000 18 29 No 201 8 
Aberdeen 30/06/2011 Chris Maguire Derby County £400,000 16 22 Yes 85 67 
Aberdeen 13/01/2012 Richard Foster Bristol City £250,000 18 27 Yes 182 59 
Dundee Utd 16/01/2006 Mark Wilson Celtic £500,00 16 22 No 129 7 
Hearts 08/08/2007 Craig Gordon Sunderland £9,000,000 18 25 Yes 161 1 
Hearts 02/02/2009 Christophe Berra Wolves £2,300,000 18 24 No 126 14 
Hearts 21/07/2011 Lee Wallace Rangers £1,500,000 17 24 No 134 22 
Hibernian 07/03/2006 Garry O'Connor Lokomotiv Moscow £1,600,00 16 23 No 133 30 
Hibernian 30/01/2007 Kevin Thomson Rangers £2,000,000 19 23 No 84 9 
Hibernian 29/05/2007 Scott Brown Celtic £4,400,000 17 22 No 120 10 
Hibernian 01/08/2007 Steven Whittaker Rangers £2,000,000 18 23 No 147 19 
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Club Date Left Player Name Moved To Transfer Fee 
Age at 
Signing 
Age When 
Leaving 
Loaned 
Out 
Total Games 
Started 
Substitute 
Appearances 
Hibernian 30/06/2009 Steven Fletcher Burnley £3,000,00 17 22 No 131 52 
Motherwell 01/09/2003 James McFadden Everton £1,250,00 16 20 No 58 12 
Motherwell 09/01/2004 Stephen Pearson Celtic £350,000 18 22 No 75 13 
Motherwell 04/07/2009 Paul Quinn Cardiff £300,000 17 24 No 168 13 
 
Created by the Author from Soccerbase Data 
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